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Summary
The thrift: crisis is a crisis because of the 
volume of taxpayer liability arising from Federal 
Government guarantees of thrift losses.
The crisis arose because the government 
extended a 1007. guarantee on most thrift deposits 
without taking commensurate measures to prevent 
unsound banking practices likely to lead to 
1o s s e s .
Further losses can best be prevented by 
cutting back on insurance coverage which would 
give savers incentive not to provide funding for 
poorly run thrifts.
Additionally, the government can help deter 
unsound banking practices by requiring higher 
levels of owner capital.
( i i )
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What Exactly is the Current 
Savinas— a nd—Loan Problem?
When -financial commentators refer to the savings— 
and— loan crisis they are referring to the growing contingent 
liabilities of the Federal Government arising from savings— 
and— loan losses. These contingent liabilities arise because 
the Federal Government insures nearly all deposits in 
savings— and— loan banks* often referred to as S&L or thrifts. 
In the 1980s S&Ls gathered unprecedented amounts of savings— 
account funds from the public. Most of the S&Ls have had 
enough earnings to be able to repay depositors without 
outside h e l p . However some savings banks have invested 
savings funds so unsuccessfully that they do not have that 
ability. Federally guaranteed deposit insurance makes the 
government liable for almost any shortfall.
Why is the S&L Problem a Crisis?
The word crisis is defined by most dictionaries as a 
critical time when the course of future events is 
determined. The word crisis is therefore largely synonymous 
with the word impasse. A crisis occurs when one reaches a 
point at which it becomes an impossibility for events to 
continue on an unaltered course. The S&L problem may be 
accurately described as a crisis because the contingent 
government debt arising from S&L losses is now so big, and 
the rate of its growth so great, that the government no 
longer has any choice but to try to deal with the matter.
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Any f u r ther dilatory measures by the new Bush administration 
would have so eroded the confidence of the financial 
community as to give the new administration untenable 
credibility problems with the business community» probably 
the single most important constituency of the Republican 
P a r t y .
Although the S&L problem has many aspects » there are 
essentially two broad areas requiring policy decision.
First» the government must decide where to find the 
necessary funds to cover its present debt to depositors. 
S e c o n d , the government must implement sufficient regulation 
and supervision to prevent a recurrence of such large-scale 
S&L losses. The federal legislation passed in August 1989 
dealt with both of these areas of concern. However even the 
most partisan supporters of the bill anticipate that in a 
bill of such great size and complexity there are likely to 
be some errors and o v e r s i g h t s . For this reason the S&L 
crisis cannot be assumed to have ended with the passage of 
this bill. Ongoing monitoring of the industry will be 
necessary if there is to be prompt detection of problems and 
timely amendment of the bill.
How Serious is the Current 
Savings-and-Loan Problem?
The savings— and— loan problem is a grave development 
from many points of view. W i despread reports about 
irresponsible and dishonest behavior among politicians and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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S&L executives» combined with similar reports of dishonesty 
in connection with the insidei— trading scandals* give ample 
cause for worry that business ethics in this country may be 
deter i orat i ng to the point that monitoring and security 
measures may unfortunately become necessary on a widespread 
basis at a great cost to the national economy. These 
considerations alone make the thrift crisis a serious and 
troubling development. Aside from that * however* the 
savings—and— loan crisis must be considered an extremely 
significant development simply because the volume of loss is 
so huge. How to pay for these costs— and how to prevent 
their recurrence— will be a daunting challenge.
The Hall Street Journal (often abbreviated WSJ) quotes 
an unnamed budget official as saying "This i s n ’t just a huge 
problem* w e ’ve got huge problems all a r o u n d . This one is 
thjB problem. " ( WSJ* Nov 23 '88, A14 ) Paulette T h omas, a
Wall Street Journal reporter specializing in the thrift 
crisis, calls the crisis "the biggest financial disaster in 
U.S. history." ( WSJ, Nov HI ’09, A20> Frederick Wolf of the 
General Accounting Office describes the S&L crisis as a 
problem "that goes far beyond anything that the government 
has ever had to deal with." (W S J , Oct 25 '88, A24)
According to L. William Seidman, chief regulator of 
commerical banks in the United States, "you’re talking about 
a problem that is many* many times greater than anything 
that has been faced before." (New York T i m e s  often
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abbreviated N Y T — March 13 *09» p 2 5 ) Thomas Moore» writing 
in the Jan. 23 *89 U.S. News and World Report calls the 
crisis George Bush * s biggest problem and says that 
"politicians» government officials» and banking officials 
will not talk about it o p e n l y ....but in private they worry 
mightily about a wildfire bank run." Maggie M a h a r » chief 
thrift commentator at Barron * s » conjectures that the S&L 
crisis might even prove to be George Bush's downfalls
"As Washington wisdom has it» Bush told the 
architects of the S&L bill 'bury this problem for 
eight y e a r s .* For whatever reason» they failed to 
carry out that c o m m a n d . And now the president 
will almost certainly have to go back to Congress 
and ask for more money. The timing could be 
d r e a d f u l . According to one seasoned spectator of 
the financial and political sc e n e : 'It will
probably happen in 1991 just when Bush is coming
up for re-election*. The S&L * s could be George 
B u s h ’s hostages . " ( Bar r on * s. Sept 11 *09. p32>
Nathaniel C . Nash » chief thrift writer for the New York
Times. estimated» in an April s t o r y , that the ultimate cost
of the crisis would be some $157 billion, which he points
out is "far larger than the bailouts of Chrysler » Lockheed,
Continental Illinois and New York City combined". (N Y T »
April 20 *89» p 2 5 ) But even this figure is now considered
by some to be insufficient for on June 20» 1989 an editorial
in the Wall Street Journal (page A 16) branded the problem as
"mind-boggling" and estimated that the ultimate costs could
eventually be "well over $300 billion" and on June 24 the
New York Times concurred (page 14) stating that "the
official estimate is $150 billion and that could double."
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In April 1990 Comptroller General Bowsher warned that the 
long-term cost could eventually rise as high as $500 
bill ion.
To put these figures into perspective it is helpful to 
consider the opportunity cost of the crisis as expressed by 
various authorities. Economist Benjamin J- Stein points out 
that his S&L loss estimate of $100 billion "is more than the 
total wage of all the public school teachers in 
A m e r ica..Iand isi about the total income of all the 
active-duty soldiers» sailors and airmen in the U.S. armed 
forces." (B a r r o n 's , Feb 20 '89» p20) Oavid E. Rosenbaum» 
writing when the cost estimate had been updated to $200 
billion» informs us that this amount "is much more than the 
Government will spend on such critical social problems as 
preschool education, drug control and aid to the homeless.
It is more than will be spent on highways» air traffic 
control, and pollution a b a t e m e n t . It amounts to more than 
$1,300 for every American t a x p a y e r , and it will not enhance 
national security, promote economic growth or improve public 
welfare one bit." (NYT » March IB '90, Sec 4 pi)
These figures do however have two basic flaws- First 
of all, they do not take into consideration the time value 
of money. Robert M . Garsson writing in American Banker 
(Aug 14 '89, p 9 ) points out that the largest estimates
include interest rate costs over the thirty years. Garsson 
points out that "the federal government operates at a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
deficit. At the margin it borrows for everything it 
b u y s . ..interest must also be financed as must interest on 
that interest... you can make the total almost anything you 
want it to be." If the problem were completely taken care 
of with a one-time surtax then according to some expert 
opinion the amount needed might not much exceed $ 180 
bill ion.
The second basic flaw of the cost estimates is that 
they are based on subjective estimates of the market value 
of the nonperforming loans and seized a s s e t s . As Maggie 
Mahar points out, "..until the FDIC actually checks the 
assets at individual institutions, Washington's estimates of
the cost and the length of time it will consume— are
no th i ng more than shots in the dark." ( Bar r o n 's, Sep t 2 1 
'89, p20)
As uncertain as the actual numbers may be there is no 
doubt in the minds of the experts that this is truly a 
disaster. Even if the more moderate figure of $180 billion 
is accepted as the best estimate, we still must raise $750 
for every m a n , woman and child in the country. It would be 
u n r e a 1i st ic to hope that the United States can be burdened 
with a per c ap i ta cost of such dimensions and not suffer 
some disadvantage when competing with other nations.
One authority who advocates calculating costs using the 
more conservative present value approach is Bert Ely of 
Washington, D.C., who, according to Maggie Mahar, "..may
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 7 -
well be the world's leading expert on federal deposit 
insurance." (B a r r o n 's. Sept 11 '89» p 9 ) Ely is often quoted 
in both the New York Times » and the Nall Street Journal and 
has also been interviewed on the National Public Radio 
n e t w o r k . Although Ely accepts the lower cost estimate, he 
still feels that the problem is gravely serious and in an 
article in the Nall Street Journal on Nov. S3 '80 (page A 14 > 
Ely is quoted as saying, "Ne now realize we are in the 
financial equivalent of a nuclear meltdown."
As emphatic as many of the experts' statements may 
sound, it is possible to argue that the severity of the 
crisis has been exaggerated. The chief factor said to 
mitigate the crisis is the fact that much of the $180 
billion will be raised by domestic debt. Some economists 
are of the opinion that domestic debt is not actually a 
burden at all in that it is only "money that we owe 
ourselves." Funding will come mainly from two sources : 
increased deposi t-insurance premiums and bond sales. Nearly 
ail of the former will be domestically raised and also a 
large part of the latter.
In a special report appearing on the front page of the 
New York Times Louis Uch i t e lie maintains that there is a 
consensus among economists that "..the public will not f e e 1 
the one-time 1o s s ... because money the government borrows 
from the public to repay lost deposits goes right back to 
the public in the form of restored deposits." < NYT, Aug 13
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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’89» pi) Of course» the argument can be raised that 
although S&L—bailout funds are domestically raised» there is 
nevertheless going to be an increase in foreign debt as a 
result of such borrowing since domestic money used for S&L 
bonds (and increased insurance premiums) is then unavailable 
for other government borrowing» which» of course, means that 
there must then be more reliance on foreign capital markets- 
If this is true, then the marginal composition of federal 
borrowing should be considered the significant indicator, 
and at the margin government borrowing is dominated by 
foreign lending, acknowledged by all to be a real burden.
Even the domestic portion of the marginal borrowing may 
not be entirely innocuous. Many economists would argue that 
"debt is d e b t " and regard 1ess of who the creditors may be it 
still must be repaid by future taxpayers. With this in mind 
Representatives Joseph P. Kennedy 2nd (D—M A ) and John J . 
Lafalce (D—NY), apparently with some sympathy from their 
colleagues, advocated immediate taxation, however heavy » to 
immed i at 1 y and completely pay for the S&L problem. (NYT »
May 3 ’89, C 2 ) In March Rep. Sam Gibbons <D—F L ) said "we 
created the mess. We s h o u l d n ’t pass it along to my children 
or my grandchildren." (W S J , March 16 ’89, B 5 )
It may seem difficult to «econc i le K e n n e d y ’s and 
L a f a I c e ’s concerns with the apparent logic of U c h i t e l l e ’s 
position. Macroeconomically speaking it can indeed be 
argued that the crisis will have few economic effects
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
because the money needed to take care of the problems after 
being taken from the public will be given right back to the 
public, Uch i t e 1 le is certainly w r o n g , h o w e v e r , in his 
assertion that the public will not f e e 1 the effects of the 
crisis» for the S&L impasse has without consensus or 
discussion brought into being a redistribution of wealth in 
the form of windfall profits achieved by sellers of 
overpriced real estate and other overpriced a ssets. These 
uneconomically high prices could only be demanded because 
overly optimistic purchasers had access to large amounts of 
S&L deposit money which never would have been available in a 
market in which the government played no part» but which was 
available because underpriced federal deposit insurance 
served as an effective magnet for attracting funds from 
s a v e r s . However unfair these windfall profits may seem » 
there is usually no w a y , in the absence of proven fraud, 
that a completed sale can be reversed. Very often» when 
these assets are overpriced» the purchaser finds that the 
income (or capital gain) is insufficient to permit repayment 
of the loan. Then the bank will usually seize the assets 
and sell them for whatever they will bring» which often has 
not been enough to cover the amount outstanding on the 
mortgage. When this happens » if the bank is not financially 
strong enough to absorb the loss it becomes the 
responsibility of federal deposit insurance, i.e. the 
taxpayer, to cover the shortfall- Thus the redistribution
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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alluded to is from taxpayers to the fortunate sellers of 
overpriced a s s e t s , The same redistributional dynamics apply 
in favor of contractors who overcharge or else who erect 
buildings which cannot pay for themselves» such as unrented 
office and apartment buildings* and the same overall result 
will occur regardless of whether the S&L supplies funds to 
borrowers for such uses or builds or buys such uneconomic 
properties for its own direct ownership.
Although the main cost to citizens will be increased 
taxes to cover S&L losses » for a long time there will be 
additional burdens on citizens in that the tremendous volume 
of bailout bonds will use up available investment funds 
making credit harder to obtain* and because of this shortage 
of available credit interest rates will be somewhat higher, 
the difference likely being about 10 or 15 basis points.
( NYT. June 6 '90* A 1 )
A less publicized redistributional influence caused by 
the crisis is the artificial transfer of wealth to the 
South-West * especially T e x a s . Because of overly optimisic 
borrowing and construction in that region there has been a 
vast increase in vacant houses, apartments and office space, 
particularly in Dallas and Houston- This surplus has made 
residential and commercial rents in those two cities so 
c h e a p , and house prices so reasonable* that there is now an 
artificially induced incentive for large companies to move 
to those two cities. In the last year both Exxon and J.C.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Penney have moved "their headquarters from New York to Texas. 
Thus not only do the citizens of New York have to pay higher 
taxes for the bailout* and endure higher interest rates, but 
they also must tolerate an outflow of jobs from their 
community to Texas. Hilary Stout writes, "The government's 
thrift-industry bailout amounts to an enormous transfer of 
wealth to a few states that have the bulk of the U.S.'s sick 
savings—and— loans, a fact that is beginning to provoke 
resentment in states left to foot the bill....'I think 
there’s starting to be a lot of anger,' said Keith L a u g h 1i n , 
staff director of the Northeast—Midwest Coalition, a 
bipartisan group of House members." ( WSJ, June 25 '90, A 2 ) 
Edward Hi 11, an economist from Cleveland State University, 
has made a special study of the inter—r e g iona1 effects of 
the crisis and concluded that for each citizen of Texas 
there will be an influx of $4,OOO of unearned wealth paid by 
citizens of the rest of the country, (ibid )
Thus an approach such as Uchitelle's which only takes 
into consideration the overall effects of the crisis errs 
badly since it does not take into account important concerns 
of fairness. Uchitelle's assertions, h o w e v e r , at least have 
the merit of being macroeconomica11y s o u n d . A far emptier 
argument that the crisis is benign is presented by Willi am 
Baldwin in the February 20 '89 edition of Forbes (pp. 3 8 —9).
Baldwin contends that "'Solving' the crisis will not save 
much money now. It will merely help account for the loss
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that has already o c c u r r e d .....even the dumbest S&L operators 
aren't putting out new money to "finance new condo projects 
in Houston." At the time those words were written» however » 
many loans of this nature were still being m a d e , often by 
desperate S&L managements trying to gamble their way back to 
solvency. It is astonishing that Baldwin should be so 
unaware of these occurrences despite the fact that they were 
widely reported at the time he wrote his article. Baldwin 
correctly asserts that a thrift solution would have to 
provide an accurate accounting of past losses and a 
satisfactory plan for paying off these losses but he erred 
badly in implying that an S&L solution would not have to 
concern itself with terminating ongoing abuses. The fact of 
the matter is» putting a stop to unsound practices is the 
element most necessary of all to the successful solution of 
the thrift crisis» and what is more, it will likely prove to 
be the most elusive feature of thrift reform since the new 
regulations and enforcement policies must at the same time 
be strict enough to prevent further large-scale losses, and 
yet not so strict that they stifle initiative and useful 
service to the community. Despite the efforts of writers 
such as Uchi tel le and Baldwin to downplay the crisis» layman 
and expert alike, generally speaking, remain unconvinced, 
and like Kennedy and Gibbons consider the problem to be 
u r g e n t .
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Why Was the Public So Slow to Realize 
The Gravity of the Crisis?
The main reason for the slowness of the public to react 
to the crisis probably was the long—entrenched public image 
of conservativeness and soundness which thrifts until very 
recently enjoyed in the public mind. For many years this 
widely held opinion was to a considerable extent warranted, 
for prior to the 1980s S&Ls seldom had financial problems 
largely because they were not permitted to engage in any 
speculative or unusual activities. S&L investments were 
very conservative and usually well collateralized, mortgages 
backed by owner—occupied housing being the main investment 
vehicle. There used to be a standard joke among bankers 
that anyone at all could successfully manage an S&L by 
simply following the 3 —6— 3 rule : borrow at three per c e n t , 
lend at six, and be on the golf course by three ! The 
general perception of S&Ls as being dull and staid was so 
deeply ingrained that the public persisted in holding these 
views even in the face of repeated S&L bankruptcies and 
scandals. It was not until 1988 and 1909 that people became 
concerned enough to demand political action, and it is 
questionable whether there was much awareness of the problem 
in 1988, in view of the fact that S&L reform was not a 
campaign issue in the 1988 presidential election.
The great delay in public response would at first 
glance seem to suggest either a lack of open government or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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e 1 se a "failure on the part of the news media to carry out 
their responsibility to alert the public to important 
developments in public affairs.
Politicians certainly must bear some of the b 1a m e , for 
there was scarcely any mention of proposed S&L reform in the 
Congressional or Presidential campaigns of 1984» 1986 or
1988. The shortcomings of t o d a y 's shallow politics are 
decried by David E. Rosenbaum who observes that "the savings 
crisis was too complicated for a catchy slogan or a 
television sound bite." (N Y T » June 6 '90» A 1 >
Although the lack of discussion by politicians was very 
regrettable» an even greater cause for concern was the 
failure of the national news industry to convey to the 
public the seriousness of the S&L situation. Professor 
Edward Kane » of Ohio State University» suggests that the 
media were overly cautious about reporting S&L problems 
because "sticking o n e 's neck out can hurt career prospects 
if an accuser fails to uncover a 'smoking gun'-" ("How 
Incentive-incompatib1e Deposit Insurance Funds Fail", p 16) 
This explanation is not entirely satisfying, h o w e v e r , for 
there have several occasions when failure to locate a 
"smoking gun" has done little to inhibit bold e x p o s e s . In 
fact, the most notorious political scandal of the last fifty 
years, Watergate, only came to light because of the tenacity 
of two Washington Post reporters who held no "smoking gun" 
but knew they were onto something and would not quit
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hounding the Nixon Administration until finally the truth 
came out. Why then, in a country with this kind of a 
journalistic tradition, was more coverage not given to the 
S&L calamity? The failure of the media to make the public 
aware of the thrift crisis gives one cause to examine the 
nature of modern news reporting. According to Ellen H u m e , 
renowned critic of the p r e s s , the failure of the press to 
arouse timely public interest in the thrift crisis was "a 
scandal in i ts e l f ..[warrant ing] . .embarrassment and soul- 
searching at the highest levels of journalism." < See Mar t z , 
Newsweek, June 25 '90, p 4 2 . )
Larry Martz blames a similar neglect on the part of 
news broadcasters on the fact that "the story wasn't right 
for television, since it had no vivid i mages. It was 
boring, since it turned on obscure regulations and difficult 
financial concepts rather than clashing personalities."
( ibid)
Although failure to communicate the gravity of the S&L 
crisis can indeed be taken as prima facie evidence that the 
news media are not fulfilling their obligations to the 
public, such a charge can be refuted to some extent, 
however, for the truth of the matter is that although the 
problem no doubt was u n d e r represented, nevertheless, for 
those who took the trouble to look, there were at least a 
few thorough and accurate reports on the S&L problem right
from the start.
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In -fairness to the news media* it must be conceded that
until the recent scandal the average American really did not
care much about banks and banking problems and could not 
easily have been motivated to take an interest in any b a n k s , 
and especially S&Ls. As Larry Martz points out in the 
Newsweek article cited above* "The press can lead the horse 
to water. The horse has to decide whether to drink." 
Responsibility for the inappropriate slowness of the 
public's response to the crisis* therefore * must be 
apportioned among politicians* the media* and the public 
i tseIf.
Causes of the Savings—and—Loan Crisis 
The comment "there's plenty of blame to go around" has
been repeated so often by President Bush and others that it
has become the main S&L cliche. Although this remark is 
usually made in reference to individuals* it could be 
applied equally well to causes of the crisis.
The S&L crisis had about nine or ten major causes* any 
one of which would have been sufficient to cause major 
problems* and there were also many less important but still 
troublesome contributing factors.
The major causes are the present system of deposit 
insurance* overly lenient legislation allowing thrifts to 
engage in unfamiliar activities* overly lenient regulation 
and supervision (including the granting of regulatory 
goodwill, certificates of regulatory net worth* forbearances
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and delay privileges)» inadequate agency funding (needed for 
adequate supervision and timely closures)» the failure of 
generally accepted accounting principles (usually 
abbreviated GAAP) and more especially regulatory accounting 
principles (RAP) to portray the true financial condition of 
S&Ls » excessive interest—rate fluctuations» weak capital 
requirements, unreliable property appraisals and excessive 
growth in many thrifts» which often created problems for 
managers many of whom had insufficient experience to 
competently manage such large amounts of m o n e y .
Many of these problem areas are interrelated to a 
greater or lesser d e g r e e , and at least five of them are 
particularly closely related in that they are direct results 
of thrift deregulation. Deregulation was the trend in the 
1980s of granting greater freedom not just to financial 
institutions but to business in g e n e r a l . The five major 
causes of the thrift crisis which may be grouped together 
under the heading "deregulation” include permission to 
engage in unfamiliar activities, overly lenient regulation 
and supervision, inadequate agency funding, weak capital 
requirements, and overly lenient accounting. Excessive 
industry growth, while not strictly speaking an essential 
component of deregulation, was nevertheless an immediate 
consequence in that it was the result of weakened capital 
standards and newly expanded investment activities- 
A1though the list of factors which contributed to the crisis
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could be shortened by subsuming these five or six under the 
designation "deregulation” » it is probably more useful to 
look at each of them separately since it would be entirely 
possible to adopt any one of them without adopting any of 
the others.
The Problem W i th Federal Deposit Insurance 
Although one occasionally hears deregulation named as 
the main cause of the crisis» expert opinion tends not to 
consider any facet of deregulation» nor even deregulation in 
the aggregate » to be the main c a u s e , but instead the chief 
blame is usually placed on federal deposit insurance in its 
present form. The deciding factor that causes federal 
deposit insurance to bear the brunt of the blame is the fact 
that without it the unprofitable S&Ls would not have been 
able to raise the money which they eventually lost. This 
desirable termination of funding, which would have saved the 
country billions and which would have occurred under normal 
market conditions, did not occur because the public has 
strong faith that in the event of a bank failure the Federal 
Government will immediately make good any insured lasses. 
Because the depositor is convinced, probably rightfully so, 
that he cannot lose any money under any circumstances, he is 
usually more or less unconcerned about the soundness or 
unsoundness of a bank's lending and investment practices. 
Unless the service or location is especially bad, many 
depositors, particularly those with large accounts, will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 9 -
base their choice of bank strictly on where their savings 
will draw the highest interest. To be sure» there are some 
SStL customers who » for personal reasons based on location» 
habit or personnel » tend to remain loyal to one particular 
b a n k , but even these core depositors can often be induced to 
switch banks if the interest they are earning falls too far 
below what they can get somewhere else.
Because a very large segment of the saving public has 
little or no interest in a bank * s financial condition» but 
is mainly interested in finding the one that pays the 
highest interest, it is easy for unprofitable banks to 
attract new deposits simply by raising the interest rate 
paid on savings deposits. In the absence of appropriate 
intervention» this easy availability of funds sets into 
motion a vicious circle which works as follows : when losses 
occur and a bank starts to run out of cash » it will raise 
rates paid on savings» and new deposits will soon come in. 
The bank will now be faced with higher interest c o s t s , 
however » and to meet these higher costs it must accordingly 
demand higher interest rates from its b o r r o w e r s . In fact 
when there is an increase in rates paid on savings accounts 
there must be a considerably greater increase in loan rates 
demanded since the increased loan interest rates can only be 
charged on new loans, whereas the increases in rates paid to 
depositors must be granted right away to most depositors» 
and in a short time to the rest as their time deposits come
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up for renewal. Thus if a bank needs cash very badly it can 
readily obtain it merely by raising interest rates on 
savings accounts, but if it does so it must raise loan rates 
even more. Unfortunately for the b a n k , the most reliable 
borrowers cannot be charged these above—market r a t e s , since 
their good credit rating enables them to obtain credit 
elsewhere. This means that if the bank wants to raise its 
interest income it has no choice but to accept a greater 
number of lower—quality loans » despite their greater risk.
As the general loan quality deteriorates there are greater 
and greater loan losses. Before long the bank will once 
again find itself short of c a s h , so once again it will have 
to raise rates offered on savings accounts» and in this way 
the cycle is started all over again.
In a booklet describing thrift problems Jonathan Gray» 
an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.» cited a remarkable 
example of such a loss cycle with its ever-increasing bad 
loans and ever-increasing deposits :
"American Diversified Savings» a California 
S&L »...had been a mere $11 million in size at June 
30» 1983» and had grown to $800 million in the
next IB m o n t h s . At liquidation its $1,3 billion 
in assets were worth less than 40 cents on the
dollar or $509 million» with a total cost to FSLIC
of $800 million.
"This anecdote is tantamount to a news report 
that a drunken motorist has wiped out the entire 
city of Pittsburgh.
"A company with $11 million in assets lost 
$800. With perhaps $500 » OOO in equity, it 
destroyed $800 million of insured deposits» a kill
ratio of 1 » 600 to 1. In terms of sheer
destructive power, only the black hole in 
astrophysics would appear to be in the same
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league. " (Jonathan Gray» cited by David O- Beim in 
"Beyond the Savi ngs—and—Loan Crisis"» The Pub lie 
Interest. Spring '09» pp 9 6 —7)
How Deregulation Worked in Concert Ulith 
Federal Deposit Insurance to Cause the Crisis
Although deposit insurance provided ready -funding, the
thr i f t crisis still could have been averted i f legislators 
and regulators had maintained suf f icie n t 1y strict controls. 
Indeed» although insurance has existed in virtually its 
present form for over fifty years » serious loss cycles 
seldom if ever had a chance to get started prior to 
deregulation» for prior to the 19SOs S&L activities were so 
stringently controlled by law that in many respects S&Ls 
almost seemed to be straitjacketed - For example» it was
once required that a loan for a single-family home (usually
about the safest loan) could not be made if the house was 
more than fifty miles away from the S & L . Under such rigid 
rules profits were generally very m o d e s t , but major losses 
hardly ever occurred.
When the monetary policy of the 1979-02 period resulted 
in unprecedentedly high interest rates» S&Ls found it 
difficult to pay the 12% or so interest which was then 
expected by depositors since the bulk of their earnings came 
from long-term noncancelab1e mortgages only earning about 
7%.
The proponents of thrift deregulation correctly 
realized that the thrifts were in an impossible position»
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and their solution was to grant far greater freedom to the 
thrifts by greatly loosening traditional use—o f —funds 
restrictions so that hopefully S&Ls could find more 
profitable lending and investment opportunities.
Deregulation also weakened inspection and supervision 
activities by making provision for various exemptions and 
d e 1a y s , and more indirectly by reducing the funding for 
inspection and supervision activities. Ownei— capital 
requirements were also weakened and thrift accounting 
standards were weakened to make it easier for money— losing 
thrifts to conceal their l osses. Although the proponents of 
deregulation knew that these various protective devices were 
now substantially weaker than before» they nevertheless felt 
that these safeguards still had enough strength to prevent 
the types of unsound lending and investing likely to cause 
the type of loss cycles described earlier. Unfortunately 
this did not prove to be the case » for these overly 
liberalized mechanisms responded neither quickly enough nor 
firmly enough when problems began to emerge and by the early 
’80s the loss cycles described earlier were endemic in the 
industry- By the late ’80s industry losses had reached 
unprecedented levels and it would have been in the public 
interest to close down hundreds of the most unprofitable 
S & L s . Since deposit insurance was not structured to prevent 
S&L losses » industry soundness depended on the various 
regulatory safeguards’ continuing to prevent (or at least
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contain) losses as they had successfully done in the p a s t . 
Although badly structured deposit insurance is considered 
the chief cause of the crisis» the malfunctioning 
safeguards» which had been undermined by deregulation» were 
almost equally to blame* and should it prove politically 
impossible to change deposit insurance» then the main hope 
for improving industry safety will lie in amending these 
a r e a s .
Of the five problem areas of deregulation alluded to 
earlier» one» the newly legislated permission to engage in 
unfamiliar activities» was a problem in that it permitted 
money— losing activities to occur in the first place.
Another, weak capital standards, was a problem in that it 
removed a powerful deterrent to such activities, in that 
owners were no longer required to have large amounts of 
their own money at s t a k e . These two mechanisms, therefore, 
are similar in that when working properly they both deal 
with prevention of money-losing activities, the one directly 
through express rules, and the other indirectly through fear 
of owner loss. The other three problem areas » however, did 
not involve lack of prevention of money— losing activities, 
but instead were problems of overly slow response to the 
ensuing S&L insolvencies, i.e. overly delayed shutdown of 
insolvent S & L s . These three problem areas that caused these 
delays were underfunding of enforcement activities, lenient 
accounting, and permissive regulation and supervision, which
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included excessive availability to S&Ls of various delay 
mechanisms as well as excessive regulatory discretion to 
bend rules for favored S & L s . Even if one or two of these 
mechanisms had been functioning properly there would have 
been far less overall loss.
Lenient accounting posed a particular problem in that 
it made it legally impossible for the federal enforcement 
agency to shut down a thrift when it first became 
economically insolvent. Although the accounting profession 
likes to think that its activities are insulated from 
passing ideological movements such as deregulation, 
nevertheless S&L accounting was indisputably affected by the 
mood of the times as shown by the adoption of RAP, now 
discontinued, an extremely permissive accounting system 
which allowed S&Ls to unduly postpone loss recognition while 
at the same time oftentimes fully recognizing profits which 
had not yet been confirmed by bona fide arm's-length 
receipts. According to law, a thrift was not in a negative— 
net—worth situation, and therefore subject to closure, until 
it was deemed to be so by RAP standards. H o w e v e r , by the 
time this occurred, true economic losses had invariably 
reached unmanageable levels. Because RAP gave full 
recognition to such empty assets as regulatory goodwill and 
regulatory-net-worth certificates, many thrifts which in 
real terms were worthless could argue that according to 
federal law they really had substantial financial strength.
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O-f course by the time they had zero net worth even by the 
lenient RAP standards they were no longer even close to 
having enough assets to pay off insured depositors» and to 
make matters worse, even at that point thrift managements 
still had at their disposal several ways to postpone 
c 1o s u r e .
To begin with there was the ninety-day grace period 
which an errant thrift was normally allowed for the 
preparation of a reasonable business plan. After this 
delay, a further eighteen—months delay was possible in that 
this was the length of time required for regulators to 
withdraw deposit insurance from an unsoundly run b a n k . 
Needless to s a y , these long delays gave poorly run and 
desperate thrifts ample time to lose vast additional amounts 
of money. A few aggressively managed thrifts obtained even 
further delays by means of lawsuits or threats thereof. 
Although not known as s u c h , these lawsuits were de facto 
appeals against regulatory closure orders, for generally 
speaking their chief object was not so much the winning of 
large monetary damages as the reestablishment of the right 
to remain in business.
The most notorious example of this strategy was the 
case of the gravely insolvent Lincoln S&L of Irvine, 
California whose m a n a g e r , the charismatic and very 
domineering Charles Keating Jr., threatened to take the 
federal agency to court. S&L authorities in Washington felt
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that such a 1awsui t had some chance of success so closure 
actions were held off until the enforcement agency felt it 
had a stronger case. When Lincoln finally was closed it had 
amassed losses of $2 billion.
The third aspect of deregulation that prevented timely 
closure of insolvent S&Ls was the excessive amount of agency 
discretion to deal leniently with favored S&Ls. Reference 
has already been made to such accounting fictions as 
regulatory goodwill and certificates of net worth. The 
blame for perpetrating these deceptions must be shared by 
RAP accounting which allowed the recognition of these 
a s sets, and the regulators themselves who arbitrarily 
granted permission to favored thrifts to include them among 
their a s s e t s . Regulators also had the authority to exempt 
favored S&Ls from specific regulations. Although these 
exemptions, known as forbearances, were technically 
discretionary, in reality the enforcement agency had little 
choice but to grant them because of the third aspect of 
deregulation which contributed to the closure problem : 
under f und i n g .
It is extremely expensive to close a thrift. All 
insured depositors must be immediately paid in cash, and it 
can take a long time to sell off the assets and partially 
recover the funds expended. The federal agency did not have 
enough money to close all the insolvent thrifts and the 
Federal Government did not provide it- Even as late in the
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crisis as 1986 Congress only authorized a small fraction of 
the necessary closure funds. This left the enforcement 
agency with two choices : either reneging on the insurance 
guarantees, or else granting the various privileges 
described above, allowing the errant thrifts to stay open, 
while hoping for a turnaround in profitability. Neither 
option was very appealing, but it would have been the height 
of irresponsibility to choose the former since this would be 
sure to start a terrible financial panic, and would 
permanently undermine the public's confidence not only in 
banks, but also in the g o v e r n m e n t . Really, then, the agency 
had no choice but to try to buy time by granting whatever 
discretionary favors it had at its disposal.
Although most experts agree that many of these 
forbearances were probably necessary under the 
circumstances, nevertheless they consider it very 
unfortunate that somehow it was not possible to find some 
other strategy, for forbearances, on general principle, are 
held in very low repute by most banking authorities since 
they generally only make a b a n k ’s situation worse by giving 
unsuccessful managements extra time to draw in more insured 
deposits which are usually lost as quic k 1y as were the 
earlier deposits.
Although the main problem arising from underfunding was 
that it prevented timely thrift closures, inadequate funding 
also prevented the hiring of enough examiners to curb
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unsound banking practices. Because of cutbacks in 
examination s t a f f , bank inspections were not always as 
thorough as they had been in earlier days and in many cases 
by the time a particular problem was discovered serious 
losses had already occurred.
It has been aptly pointed out that with the greater 
freedom allowed thrifts by deregulation it would have been 
more logical to increase the staff of examiners rather than 
reduce it, as was done, but the policy of staff reduction 
was deemed to be more consistent with the general aims of 
deregulation. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, editor-in-chief of 
U.S. News and WorId Reoor t. reveals in a June 18, 1990
editorial <p92> that from 1981 to 1985 the number of 
regulators in Texas, the state with by far the greatest 
number of S&L problems, was slashed from 54 to 14.
Of course the advocates of deregulation never would 
have recommended liberalizing the various regulatory 
mechanisms to such an extent had they realized that by doing 
so they were making it impossible to shut down unprofitable 
thrifts in the early stages of insolvency, for even the most 
avid proponents of deregulation would agree that it is 
nearly always in the public interest to close down an 
insolvent thrift as expeditiously as possible so that losses 
may be minimized- It is true that from time to time there 
is a successful turnaround situation, and under very special 
circumstances it might make good business sense to allow a
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thr i f t extra t i me to get back on its feet, but in the great 
majority of cases any delay in taking action only results in 
more loss.
News stories about improprieties at such S&Ls as 
Lincoln, Silverado, Centrust and Vernon reveal that in some 
cases failure to close insolvent thrifts was due to improper 
influence and/or careless e x a m i n e r s . It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that most of the delays in closure were 
due to such lapses as t h e s e . Most of the delays were caused 
neither by dishonesty nor by negligence but by the S & L s ' 
lawful availing themselves of the various privileges newly 
created by deregulation.
Why Deposit Insurance Even More Than 
Deregulation Was the Cause of S&L Troubles 
Deposit insurance may confidently be named as the main 
cause for the crisis, for no matter how ineffective all the 
other regulations were, even the simplest changes in deposit 
insurance would have kept the public from entrusting its 
savings to unsound S&Ls. The most drastic solution would be 
a complete repeal of deposit insurance. This would not be 
politically feasible. There should be little or no problem, 
however, in slightly reducing the current lOOV. coverage.
Even if coverage were kept as high as 95% the risk of losing 
fifty dollars out of every thousand would make depositors 
far more interested in the soundness of a b a n k ’s practices. 
Small investors might not be sophisticated enough to know
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how to avoid an unsound bank, but many of the larger 
investors are, particularly the handlers of brokered 
deposits, and these larger investors would certainly provide 
adequate monitoring of the soundness of individual thrifts.
A slight reduction in deposit insurance, perhaps to 95% 
would have been extremely easy to introduce- There are no 
complicating factors that would have prevented it, and 
measures similar to those just outlined would have been 
sufficient to prevent the crisis. In no other way could the 
crisis have been so easily prevented. That is why federal 
ceoosit insurance must rightly be considered the mein cause 
of the crisis. It must be acknowledged, however, that this 
policy would also have allowed a large number of 5&Ls to go 
bankrupt since without full insurance coverage miany 
depositors would have hesitated to leave their savings in 
institutions having large holdings of low—earning mortgage 
assets. Such savers would have realized that thrifts o n 1v 
earning six to nine per cent on their assers really were in 
no position to compete for savings dollars at a time when 
12% savings rates were the norm. Recognizing the inherent 
ur.soundness of rne situation such severs w o u l d  h a v e  
wi indrawn their money , relieved ever, to get ninetv—five 
cents on the do-lar, and of course w i t h  tne pcssicility of a 
5 %  1 OSS new oepositors would not be  as easily f o u n d  as the>
are n o w . Selling off their mortgage assets at l o w e r e d  
m, a r K e t prices m a n  v thrifts, perhaps as mar. as h a l f ,  w o u i o
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not have had enough money to pay off depositors and would 
have shut down, with the government ultimately making sure 
all depositors received their 95%. Although such widespread 
shutdowns would involve considerable outlays, it would have 
been far less costly to the government, for the same half of 
the industry which would have been shut down by such a 
measure ended up being shut down anyway but at far greater 
public cost. Furthermore, S&Ls as an industry would have 
been taught a valuable lesson : that they must insure
themselves against intere s t —rate risk, mainly by making 
better use of ad justable—rate mortgages (ARMs>. For years 
authorities had warned that thrifts were sitting on an 
interest—r a te time bomb in that they were borrowing short 
and lending long. Removing the deposit— insurance prop would 
have forced the industry to make long—overdue and salubrious 
changes to cope with interest-rate swings.
It has been suggested that instead of cutting back on 
insurance coverage S&L problems could have been solved by 
having the premiums banks pay for deposit insurance adjusted 
according to the level of risk associated with an S & L 's 
activities. H o w e v e r , if this change were made without 
cutbacks in coverage, umlimited funding from an unconcerned 
public would still be available, so unfortunately a 
desperate thrift would still get caught up in loss cycles, 
the only difference being that with higher insurance 
premiums to pay as riskier loans were made the S&L would
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have to raise savings rates even faster than otherwise in 
order to raise the additional cash n e e d e d , and this would 
only accelerate the move to still riskier loans, since loan- 
interest income would have to rise sufficiently not only to 
pay the higher savings—account rates but also to pay the 
higher deposit-insurance premiums. In other words, if risk- 
related premiums had been introduced without any 
accompanying measures, not only would they not have 
prevented the loss cycles which occurred, they would* in 
fact, have made them worse. In the context of overall 
change, risk—related insurance is generally considered a 
good ide a . Had it been brought in by itself it would have 
proven to be a d i s a s t e r .
The second cause for the crisis was the newly 
legislated permission to engage in unfamiliar thrift 
activities such as direct investments in raw land, and 
buiIding-and—development loans to contractors. F IAREA 
wisely curtailed those activities, but it would be a mistake 
to blame the crisis on this one problem area. The 
speculative ventures such as investments in raw land and 
unneeded office towers resulted in very fast losses. But 
had the other unfortunate problem areas been left alone* and 
this one area c h a n g e d , large amounts of money still would 
have been lost* although, to be sure * it would have been 
lost more slowly since traditional house mortgages are less 
likely to undergo drastic deterioration in value. In spite
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of this* it must not be imagined that all residential 
mortgage loans are sound. It is possible to debase these 
instruments to a low speculative grade by lending to persons 
with doubtful credit histories and also to lend too much 
money in proportion to the true market value of the 
residential property. As long as weak capital standards 
existed and lenient accounting methods were allowed it still 
would be possible for a negat ive—net—wor th S&L to stay in 
business with deposit insurance providing funding for 
ongoing loss cycles. As in all loss cycles there would have 
been the same need to make loans earning a higher and higher 
rate of interest» which means tolerating more and more risk. 
It is not hard to imagine a very desperate thrift lending 
$100 » OOO for the purchase of a property only worth $80 » OOO 
if the borrower seemed sincere» despite his unfortunate 
p a s t , and promised to pay five per cent above the going 
r a t e . Of course a bank can lose money faster on speculative 
investments such as raw land and badly located shopping 
malls than can be lost on even the most imprudently granted 
house mortgages. Because reform of this particular problem 
area » even without any other r e f o r m , would at the very 1east 
have resulted in far less loss » it may be considered an 
especially significant cause of the crisis» possessing » as 
it does » considerable autonomy from the rest of the causal 
f ac tor s .
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This autonomy is completely lacking» however* in the 
third causal factor* overly lenient regulation and 
supervision. Underfunding made it impossible to conduct 
optimal inspections* and weak capital requirements combined 
with unrealistic accounting methods made it illegal for 
regulators to shut down thrifts in the early stages of 
insolvency- By the time S&Ls could be legally shut down the 
immediate cash costs of doing so were so great that again* 
because of underfunding* there was a de facto paralysis of 
enforcement which was disguised only very thinly by the 
various exemptions and forbearances which prevented the 
situation from coming to a h e a d . On the surface it might 
seem that the various appeal privileges could have been 
limited s o m e w h a t , but if the means to take control of an S&L 
was lacking due to underfunding then any lessening of appeal 
privileges would have been largely meaningless since without 
closure funding shutdowns were seldom a serious worry to 
risk—prone S&Ls. All in all, the lenient regulation and 
supervision which occurred was closely tied to weaknesses in 
many other areas* and being lacking in autonomy* the lenient 
regulation and supervision situation was not amenable to 
easy correction. It would be a mistake to consider the 
crisis to be prima facie evidence of lack of dedication or 
vigilance on the part of regulators. Preventing a 
recurrence of the crisis will not be so simple a matter as 
merely hiring examiners who are more alert. Although there
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have been a few reports of examiner negligence» on the whole 
the problem of lax regulators and examiners was more a 
symptom of the crisis than a cause.
The fourth cause of the crisis» inadequate agency 
funding» is likewise beset with autonomy problems» in this 
case of a political n a t u r e . Given the lack of appreciation 
of the seriousness of the crisis the American public never 
would have tolerated the huge expenditures needed to 
expeditiously close down all the distressed thrifts. Both 
politicians and the media are at least partly to blame for 
the p u b l i c ’s indifference» but it is hard to imagine how any 
informational campaign could have made the public realize 
the depth of the problem in time to demand action while an 
industry cleanup could still be done cheaply. Given the 
former rigid public attitude toward thrifts» and refusal to 
believe that there really was a crisis» there certainly 
would have been great taxpayer protest to the expenditure of 
the few billion dollars which at that time would have been 
sufficient. Although the funding shortfall was a cause for 
the crisis, it was one which would have been difficult to 
avoid, and perhaps it could not have been avoided at all.
It is not clear that even now the public is really ready to 
lend its approval to the funding needed to solve this 
crisis. It may well be that this lack of public enthusiasm 
has influenced the decision to finance most of the bailout 
off budget- It is only to be expected that most 1ower-
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income taxpayers, having little or no savings of their o w n , 
would be resentful of having their tax dollars go toward the 
protection of the assets of the wealthy» especially since 
many of these well-off savers will r e f u s e , in the voting 
booth» to return the favor by supporting programs designed 
to benefit the poor taxpayer » such as child care» higher 
minimum w a g e , e t c . Although the public now realizes that 
the cleanup will require tremendous outlays» most taxpayers 
probably will once again be resentful of lavish agency 
funding once industry normalcy is restored » so it is 
probably not wise to rely to any great extent on perpetually 
generous federal funding as the main means of preventing 
future thrift problems.
Although the most serious result of the low funding has 
been the problem of not having enough cash to close 
insolvent thrifts» underfunding also creates a situation of 
under staf f i n g . The hiring of a greater number of examiners 
would almost certainly have been cost effective, even if 
only a few irregularities had been c a u g h t , and would require 
far less money than the amount needed for bank closures, 
since even the closure of a mildly insolvent bank is 
administrati vely extremely expensive and requires a great 
amount of immediate working capital pending the sale of 
a s s e t s . Uithout accompanying reforms to provide a 
disincentive to risk-taking as fast as one thrift was shut 
down by the hypothetically better funding another thrift
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vMould also amass staggering losses requiring expensive 
shutdown, and in terms of public cost the industry would be 
a bottomless pit. Although improved funding could not by 
itself prevent a recurrence of thrift problems» it is a good 
idea since larger examination and inspection staffs could 
undoubtedly pay for themselves by catching more errors and 
preventing a greater number of unsound loans and 
investments.
The fifth cause of the crisis» inadequate financial 
reporting, provides a promising area of a t t a c k . If GAAP 
and/or RAP really had given an accurate picture of S&L 
earnings and net worth on a fai»— market—value basis then the 
hands of agency enforcement officials would not have been 
tied by bankrupt t h r i f t s ’ spurious but legal claims of 
having acceptable levels of positive net worth. If GAAP 
and/or RAP had immediately identified the thrifts which were 
either at or approach i ng market insolvency then shutdowns 
could have been enforced while there were still enough 
assets left to pay off depositors» or at least come close to 
doing so» and the cost to the government of such expeditious 
shutdowns would generally have been comparatively modest.
There is considerable autonomy in this area of r e f o r m , 
and indeed FIRREA has largely moved in that direction.
There are » however, some complications which make this 
reform less straightforward than would be a reduction in 
deposi t — insurance coverage. For one thing» it might be
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resented by the accountants and the FASB as an interference 
in their profession. Lively and cogent arguments could be 
raised that if each industry in the land were free to adopt 
its own variation of GAAP there would be no meaningful way 
to compare inter— industry financial s t a t ements. Although 
there were no reports of militant accountant opposition to 
or sabotage of RAP» striking an independent accounting 
course must be considered at least slightly antagonistic to 
FASB and the accounting profession. An additional problem 
is that any departure from GAAP could entail extra work for 
GAAP— trained bookkeepers and accountants » and this would 
mean higher preparation and auditing fees. Furthermore, the 
use of a specialized accounting system would add to the time 
needed for the preparation and auditing of financial 
statements. The problem with this is that it is likely to 
result in further delay in closing down or otherwise reining 
in a risk—prone S&L » and this additional delay would only 
give such an institution more time in which to run up 
additional losses. Accounting reform in the direction of 
market—value accounting will also encounter opposition from 
within the thrift industry. According to Robert L i tan of 
the left— leaning Brookings Institute, "bankers aren't 
worried about market—value accounting; they're freaked out 
about it." ( WSJ, Aug 30 '89, A 1 6 ) Reliable appraisals and 
estimates both of real assets and loan assets are nearly 
impossible to obtain, and very expensive. Michael Allen
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reports that an official f rom a large Houston thrift 
recently complained to a group of real—estate executives 
that one of t h r i f t ’s properties had been valued by one 
appraiser at $6.4 million* and by another at $2.2 million. 
"'So what am I supposed to do* split the difference?’ he 
asked * frustrated." (WSJ » Jan 24 ’90* A 1 ) Equally 
disturbing* a hotel was valued at exactly $1.7 million in 
four separate appraisals after which it was sold for $3.6 
million, (ibid) According to Michael Allen* one-fifth of 
the appraisals in Texas have a valuation spread of at least 
30%. Thus it can be seen that establishing a reliable 
value* even at a given point in time is difficult, and the 
task of recording up-to-date values is complicated by the 
need to estimate the impact of intervening economic events 
and trends on these appraised values. Thus recording month- 
to—month or even quarter— to—quarter fluctuations in asset 
values would undeniably be a considerable diversion of 
m anagements’ and audi t o r s ’ time and energy * and managers 
would have more inducement than at present to manage their 
assets from the short-term perspective of traders rather 
than the long-term perspective of investors, American 
business is widely criticized for focusing too much on 
short-term profits rather than long-term planning. By 
permanently holding assets at acquisition cost the manager 
is freed from the distraction of value fluctuations. As 
long as the difference between book value and market value
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was fairly smal1, whether or not to switch to market—value 
accounting was not a major issue. In the past ten y e a r s , 
however, with the advent of higher interest rates, the 
difference between book value and market value has become 
too great to be tolerated, and it is plain that some 
movement toward more realistic asset values will have to 
occur. The main stumbling block to such a reform is the 
fact that many asset values, especially those of real 
e s t a t e , are so subjective a n d , as shown a b o v e , so varying 
from one appraiser to another as to have little value. 
Because of all of these complications, it is impractical to 
rely entirely on accounting reform to prevent future S&L 
mi stakes.
The sixth cause of the S&L crisis was the extreme 
interest—rate rise which occurred in the late '70s and early 
'80s and for which the S&L industry was unprepared. The 20% 
rates which occurred were deliberately created by Paul 
Volcker of the Federal Reserve Bank as a means of combating 
the high inflation of the late 'VOs. It is hard to imagine 
how any thrift reform could impose itself upon the Federal 
Reserve System, and even were such influence possible there 
is every year a greater and greater international influence 
on interest rates, not subject to our control, so it 
probably most realistic to consider future interest-rate 
fluctuations as an unavoidable parameter.
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This being s o , there are two possible accommodations. 
First» the Federal Government could provide some sort of 
insurance to tide S&Ls over during periods of higher— than— 
expected interest rates. Politically this would be very 
complicated. S&Ls are not the only businesses adversely 
affected by high interest r a t e s . When the cost of money is 
20% all businesses suffer » and if the government gives high — 
interest subsidies to S&Ls it would have to do the same for 
all the other businesses hurt by high r a t e s . This would be 
impossible» of course» so if the government granted this 
favor to S&Ls it would have to explain why that industry was 
more deserving than the rest— a complicated task. The other 
possible reform to protect against high interest rates would 
be to require S&Ls to hold a larger number of interest- 
resistant a s s e t s , most notably A R M s . Although such a 
policy» adopted many years ago » would have been helpful, it 
would not have prevented the crisis» for losses caused by 
rises in interest r a t e s , although very severe » pale in 
comparison with losses that were caused by bad credit 
decisions. A brief example will show why this is so.
Suppose that an S&L owns a reliable *100,000 mortgage and 
interest rates soar. The value might fall to *60,OOO or 
*70 » OOO but it will not disappear entirely. If an S&L makes 
a bad loan, however, and ends up seizing the property, and 
finds out that it is unsaleable it may end up only salvaging 
*10,000 or *20,000, with property taxes to be paid all the
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while until a buyer is f o u n d . This extreme difference in 
potential magnitude of loss between credit problems and 
interest—rate problems makes it far more important to have 
in place reforms which will prevent S&Ls from assuming too 
much credit risk.
The seventh cause of the crisis» weak capital 
requirements* is the mainstay of FIRREA- The requirement 
that all thrifts have 3% tangible real owner investment is 
expected to give managers strong incentive to lend money 
more carefully* since the first losses come out of the 
owners' p o c kets. There is no question that this will be a 
beneficial effects on the problem of excessive S&L risk 
taking- The problem in using capital standards as a tool 
for controlling risk is that it is very tricky to strike the 
right balance* for although the required level of owner 
capital must be set high enough to provide a risk 
disincentive* the required owner capital must not be set so 
high that it becomes impossible for investors to earn an 
acceptable rate of r e t u r n -
Home mortgage lending is not extremely profitable. The 
government is presently finding that there is not a great 
deal of interest on the part of investors in purchasing even 
the most attractive S&Ls which it has for sale. The only 
way to make an S&L a desirable investment is to allow 
considerable leverage. And yet if the government lowers the 
required owner capital to the point that a satisfactory
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return is possible» any slight market or interest—rate 
fluctuation could reduce owner capital to razor—thin levels 
and then there would no longer be any effective disincentive 
to risk taking. The stricter owner-capital requirement of 
FIRREA is a good idea in that this measure will definitely 
inhibit risk taking» but it is important to realize that 
there are severe practical limitations to this remedy in 
that investors cannot be forced to invest in thrifts at 
leverage levels they deem unsatisfactory. As high a level 
of owner capital as possible should be striven for» but 
since it is highly uncertain what levels can be
realistically be demanded it is preferable that this remedy » 
potent as it is» be brought in together with deposit— 
insurance r e f o r m .
The eighth cause of the crisis» unreliable property 
appraisals» has already been alluded to in the paragraphs 
describing the need for accounting reform. Had all 
appraisals been accurate much of the industry loss would 
have been prevented » for even a recklessly run thrift would 
not knowingly lend double the real value of a property. 
American Banker reports (July 19 '89, pi) that "until now 
appraisers have been virtually u nregu1ated ....agenc i es such 
as Fannie Mae » however » set high standards of their own."
The article just cited mentions that FIRREA requires that 
all appraisers working for S&Ls will have to meet certain 
standards and be licensed by 1991. While the goals of these
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strengthened requirements are entirely commendable» no act 
of legislation can instantly cause appraisals to become 
accurate. In particular* there will always be valuation 
problems with buiIding—and—development schemes such as 
unfinished shopping centers in y e t —to-be—opened urban 
subdivisions. The shopping center may remain uncompleted 
forever, or, given favorable developments, it may be 
finished off in a few weeks and prove to be a gold mine. 
There is no way of securing an immediate correction of the 
problem of uncertain appraisals, although, to be s u r e , 
requiring that appraisers be better qualified is likely to 
result in far greater accuracy, and is a long—overdue 
m e a s u r e .
This leaves only one cause for discussion : excessive 
growth- It takes not only great skill to manage a large 
portfolio of assets, but also great restraint. Because of 
explosive growth in the thrift industry many managers found 
themselves in control of more money than ever before, and it 
is not to be wondered at that many of them were taken in by 
various schemes and promotions. There is no talk now of 
future excessive g r o w t h . In fact, the thrift industry is 
expected to become much smaller in the '90s, so one may 
consider this particular problem to be already corrected.
If appropriate checks and balances can be kept in place, 
there would not need to be any great worry even if another 
expansionary period did occur, since with proper safeguards
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
— H  5
overly risky lending would be strong1y discouraged» making 
it probable that excess -funds would end up in T —bills and 
other ultra—sa-fe investments rather than in speculative 
s c h e m e s .
At this point it is well to take an inventory of the 
nine causes discussed, and decide which are most likely to 
yield beneficial results if corrected.
One of the causes, excess g r o w t h . has already been 
cured. Two of the c a u s e s , interest—rate fluctuations and 
unreliable property appraisals are not amenable to 
correction by any SS.L reform bill» and must be tolerated as 
par ameters-
This leaves insurance reform and the five causes 
related to deregulation, which are permission to engage in 
unfamiliar activities, lenient regulation and supervision, 
inadequate funding, inadequate reporting, and tougher 
capital requirements. One possible approach would be to 
consider whether any combination from these five would be 
more cost—effective than a reform of deposit insurance.
Any effective prohibition of S&L involvement in 
unfamiliar activities must depend upon effective enforcement 
which in turn must depend upon adequate supervisory funding. 
Assuming that such funding were no problem, and assuming 
that there were no major loopholes in the list of prohibited 
activities, these three reforms in concert, even without 
strengthened capital requirements and/or better financial
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reporting» Mould bring the industry under control as 
effectively as could ever be hoped f o r . The only 
disadvantage that this approach has » when compared to 
deposit— insurance reform is its very great cost- Reduction 
of deposit-insurance coverage» on the other h a n d , would cost 
the government nothing, and very likely the discipline of 
the marketplace would provide equal protection. Thus 
reliance on deregulatory reform is automat ical1 y defeated if 
such reform includes expensive supervisory upgrading- Since 
the first three deregulatory aspects just named are 
impossible to enforce without such heavy supervisory 
spending» the only remaining possibility of d e r e g u 1 ation- 
related reform being more cost effective than insurance 
reform lies in the other t w o -
It is unreasonable to expect that better accounting» 
all by itself, could have prevented the crisis- Although it 
would more realistically describe the losses, it would not 
prevent the losses, as long as managers were allowed to make 
risky investments and pull in any amount of insured deposits, 
and escape shutdown because regulators lacked the funds to pay 
off depositors- However if better accounting were combined 
with the remaining deregulatory factor, tougher capital 
standards, there would be a combination that would offer 
strong potential benefits, in that tougher capital standards 
would enable regulators to shut down money— losing thrifts 
while they still had positive n et—market value, which would
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solve the problem of thrifts having to be allowed to stay in 
business simply because regulators did not have enough money 
to pay off depositors. Thus these two aspects of 
deregulation offer an equally effective and less costly 
alternative to the first three. As already pointed o u t , it 
is very difficult to strike a happy medium in the matter of 
capital requirements. If set too high additional investment 
ceases. If set too low» then, when the first increase in 
general interest rates lowers the value of thrift assets, 
the thrift will be reduced to a zero or negative net—worth 
position so quickly that it may not be possible for 
regulators to shut it down soon enough to salvage any rea l — 
market value. Then, assuming that adequate closure funding 
is a problem, there would have to be the same capital and 
accounting forbearances as before, and the loss cycles would 
be a problem once again. Other S&Ls could demand the same 
forbearances, claiming to be innocent victims of "temporary" 
economic downturns, and of course, that would put an end to 
all semblance of regulatory discipline.
The main object of requiring higher real capital 
standards is to control S&L behavior by making sure that 
owners have a real financial stake in the decisions that 
they make. But the same result can be obtained without the 
complicated accounting and i nterest—rate complications 
simply by requiring depositors to have a greater financial 
interest in the actions of the S & L . Small savers cannot be
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expected to have sufficient sophie t icatiort to judge the 
soundness of a bank» but the purveyors of brokered deposits 
are capable of being effective monitors. No doubt» in 
response to the new insurance conditions regularly published 
reports would soon appear giving the safety ratings of 
individual S & L s .
Reform of deposit insurance is the area that promises 
the greatest improvement with the least cost and disruption» 
and it should receive the main emphasis in future r e f o r m . 
Although capital requirements should not be increased to the 
point at which they stifle further investment » nevertheless 
they should be increased to whatever level the market will 
b e a r . A complete overhaul of S&L accounting would prove 
extremely expensive and troublesome, and would not likely be 
cost effective» but where it is fairly simple to make 
changes in the direction of fair—market—value reporting, 
this should be done, and in fact is already being done by 
FIRREA which » for example, now requires low-grade ("junk") 
bonds to be recorded at lower of cost or market instead of 
at cost. Any other asset for which there is an established 
secondary market could with equal ease be reported under 
this more stringent method- Appraisal problems make it very 
unlikely that in the foreseeable future there will be a 
total switchover to market—value reporting, but this should 
not discourage the government from requiring whatever 
partial move in that direction might be practicable, since
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even a partial switchover to fai r —value accounting will 
increase the reliability of financial statements. Of course 
risk reduction implies requiring that thrifts avoid 
unfamiliar activities and in the future there will have to 
be sufficient examination staff to enforce the r u 1e s , but if 
depositors and owners have more to lose as a result of 
insurance and capital—standard reforms» then there ought to 
be much less propensity to take risks» making industry 
safety less reliant on express prohibition of risky 
activities- Similarly» if the above suggested reforms are 
adopted there should be far less need for heavy closure 
funding in the future » once the currently insolvent thrifts 
are disposed of- Since much of the leniency of the past was 
due to a lack of closure funding» the problem of excessive 
leniency will probably be self—correcting once the mismatch 
between closure funds needed and closure funds available is 
reso1v e d .
In summary then » a consideration of the workings and 
interworkings of all the mechanisms which were relied upon 
in the past to prevent thrift losses leads to the surprising 
conclusion that deposit insurance— a venerable American 
institution which seemed to work well for years and years—  
is the well-intentioned cause of the crisis» and the 
industry adjunct most in need of reform- Though each expert 
has his own approach to analyzing the crisis» nearly all
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experts come to the same conclusion and Ii kewi se place the 
main blame on a faulty system of deposit insurance.
Although deposit— insurance reform alone could probably 
restore the industry to its former useful role, there is no 
reason why other modifications should not also be made, if 
they are not unduly disruptive- There are two in particular 
which are likely to prove worthwhile : a movement toward 
fair—market-value accounting and a requirement that there be 
as high a level of real owner capital as is compatible with 
the needs of the industry to attract new investment. 
Enforcement of real—value capital standards is impossible 
without fair—market asset valuations, so cap i t a 1-standards 
reform must imply accounting r e f o r m . Both the capital- 
standards reform and the insurance reform are predicated on 
the axiom that fear of actual financial loss (by depositors 
or by owners) serves as the most effective deterrent to
risky S&L behavior. If either one of these deterrents is in
place, or preferably both, then the public can expect to see
great improvement in how thrifts are m a n a g e d . Other
proposed reforms have their individual merits and should be 
adopted when cost effective, but reduced deposit insurance 
is far and away the most promising area of reform, with 
strengthened real—value capital standards also a highly 
worthwhile reform.
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How Certain Is It That Deposit Insurance 
Really Is to Blame for the Crisis?
There is a surprising level of agreement among the 
experts that the present system of deposit insurance must be 
c h a n g e d . Very few commentators overlook this problem. Some 
commentators want to abolish deposit insurance altogether.
The rest want to modify it usually drastically. Nearly
all of them consider deposit insurance to be the main 
culprit in the thrift crisis.
Failure to blame the crisis on deposit insurance is 
uncommon but must not be taken as proof of incompetence. 
Philip B, Chenok blames thrift problems on interest—rate 
fluctuations, weak oil and farm prices, and deregulation and 
does not mention deposit insurance at all. ( NYT. Jan 16 '90,
A 1 6 ) Mr. Chenok could not have risen to the presidency of 
the AICPA without great intelligence and exceptional 
business sense, so his omission of this problem area shows 
that the majority position is not absolutely de r loueur . 
Nevertheless such an omission is highly unorthodox.
R. Dan Bru m b a u g h , Jr. and Andrew S. Carron flatly 
state, "The cause of the current thrift problems is the 
moral hazard inherent in the deposit insurance s y s t e m ." 
(Brookings Papers on Economic A c t i v i t y , 2:1987, p359> In an
editorial entitled "Who is to Blame for the Thrift Crisis?" 
For tune guarded 1y states only that "much [no t m o s t ] of the 
problem is rooted in the present system of deposit
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insurance* *' (March 13 '09> and yet two—thirds of the 
editorial discusses deposit insurance and no other causes 
are n a m e d , so the writer must consider this to be far and 
away the main c a u s e . The main thrust of this editorial is 
that the current system "generates an avalanche of perverse 
incent ives-"
Moral hazard and perverse incentives refer to the same 
problem : by providing 100% coverage the insurance removes
any fear of loss which would otherwise cause the depositor 
to more closely monitor the operations of savings 
institutions. Commentators also use the terms in connection 
with owners * and those who act under their direction* i.e. 
managers. In this case the perverse incentive* or moral 
hazard* refers to the fact that when real owner capital is 
low* as has often been the case * it is in the o w n e r s ’ best 
interests to take spectacular gambles since in that 
situation owners have little or nothing left to lose and 
everything to gain by adopting such a strategy. The 
perversity of the situation arises from the unintended and 
unnatural separation of risk and r e t u r n . The owners bear 
little or no risk, since it is the insurer that is 
responsible for any loss* and yet they are allowed to reap 
the full benefits of any gambles which prove to be lucky. 
Deposit insurance is justly condemned as the underlying 
cause for this bad situation since it provides the funding 
for these ventures.
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According to W. Lee Hoskins* president of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland* "The major f 1 aw in the system is 
not the lack of regulatory powers or the regulatory 
structure* but is rather the system of deposit-insurance 
pricing and coverage * which creates an incentive for bank 
management to take— and private suppliers of bank funds to 
be unconcerned about— excessive risks." (Amer ican Banker » 
July 18 '89* p4)
Lowell Bryan* of MeKinsey & Co.* writing in the Harvard 
Business Review. Jan—Feb '87* notes that "..federal deposit 
insurance enables weak participants to take on credit risk 
disproportionate to their management skills and their 
capital. The result is an unhealthy concentration of credit 
risk in our weakest institutions that creates instability 
and puts stress on the entire s y s t e m ."
Willi am Niskanen* past president of the conservative- 
leaning Cato Institute* and Catherine England write in the 
May 19 '89 edition of National Review (p 3 9 )* "A number of
commentators have concluded* quite incorrectly* that the 
current crisis among savings banks is due to
deregulation....As long as insolvent banks are allowed to 
remain open and offer federally insured accounts* deposits 
will flow from low—risk to high-risk banks..”
In 1933 President Roosevelt foresaw the dangers of 
deposit insurance : "the minute the government starts to do
that..-the government runs into a probable loss...We do not
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wish to make the United States government liable for the 
mistakes and errors of individual banks» and put a premium 
on unsound banking in the f u t u r e . ” < WSJ$ May 8 '99, A 1 )
According to the article just cited, it was only the 
simultaneous adoption of ultra— strict regulations (which 
prevailed until the Garn—St - Germain Act of 1983) that 
allayed FDR's fears.
Because the issue of deposit insurance is politically 
sensitive, and would be subject to long public and 
Congressional debate, and because immediate industry 
improvement was needed, FIRREA relied on tougher capital 
standards and somewhat more market—v a 1ue—or i e n ted accounting 
requirements to accomplish an immediate improvement of 
thrift discipline, but Section lOOl of FIRREA does establish 
a committee to study deposit insurance and report to 
Congress in April, 1991. In a sense the present FIRREA may 
be considered a laudable stop—gap measure which has indeed 
resulted in quick improvement, but which cannot even pretend 
to be the final answer in that it leaves deposit insurance 
basically unaltered.
What Should Deposit Insurance Try to Accomplish?
There is a general perception that deposit insurance 
exists for the purpose of helping unfortunate persons who 
might otherwise lose their savings. Perhaps this ought to 
be the purpose for such insurance, but the existence of such 
altruism is not consistent with the lack of altruism shown
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by society in other even more essential aspects of life. 
Health is far more important than money» and yet there are 
millions who have no health insurance» and society does not 
guarantee these people free health insurance, nor even 
emergency treatment. If such an uncovered person breaks his 
a r m , he is at the mercy of private charity to obtain 
treatment. Similarly, it is well known that there are 
millions of homeless Americans. There is no constitutional 
guarantee of shelter, and those without a roof over their 
head must also often resort to private charity, when it is 
too cold to sleep out of doors. If there is so little 
societal and public concern for the individual in these 
areas of living, which are far more necessary to the 
individual than having a bank account, then it is probably 
unrealistic to believe that altruism and love of the 
individual are the moving forces behind deposit insurance.
Timothy W . Koch, states in Bank Management, a widely 
used finance textbook, that all future reforms must take 
into account "the true insurance purpose— to strengthen 
public confidence in the safety of financial institution 
deposits," (19B8 edition, pl77> The need to maintain this 
macroeconomic function is indisputable. If savers quit 
using banks, then, of course, borrowers would have no access 
to funds needed for important uses such as capital 
expansions. To a large extent, this is what triggered the 
painful contraction of the early thirties, and therefore it
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is imperative, when considering any proposed reform, to take 
into account the extent to which the changes considered 
could trigger excessive disintermediation and subsequent 
dearth of credit. A further problem is that without the use 
of b a n k s , check writing would no longer be an available 
mechanism for making p a y m e n t s , and this obstruction in the 
actual and anticipated flow of payments would also seriously 
inhibit economic activity-
The Most Drastic Solution---
Get Rid of Deposit Insurance Altogether 
In spite of the grave danger that abolition of deposit 
insurance might drive away depositors, two extremely 
prominent authorities, R. Dan Brumbaugh,J r . and Lowell 
Bryan, have recommended this extreme measure. When one 
considers that on April 6, 1990 Comptroller General Bowsher
estimated that the final forty-year cost could easily be 
$500 billion, it is easy to be driven to an abolition 
viewpoint out of sheer exasperation. If there were no 
deposit insurance, there would be no government liability, 
and therefore no crisis. At least, not the same crisis.
It is interesting to imagine what would have happened 
in the ’SOs had there been no deposit insurance- The 
collapse of land, oil and farm product prices, and the 
concomitant i nterest —rate problems were widely known and 
without the protection of deposit insurance these problems 
certainly would have led to numerous bank runs and
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widespread bank -failures. These occurrences* of c o u r s e , 
have always been anathema to the smooth flow of business * 
and have always triggered intense business contraction.
When this occurs* there is a fall in personal and business 
income levels as money becomes more and more tightly held 
and the depression mentality takes hold. The $500 billion 
expenditure we may now face is* of course* a painful and 
unprecedented expense and enough to make us wish that the 
country had never adopted deposit insurance. But if the 
choice had to be made between having a decade of economic 
stability at a cost of $500 billion or having a decade of 
instability* we may well be money ahead in terms of overall 
salaries and profits to have had the admittedly expensive 
deposit insurance in place. S&L losses over the last ten 
years have been staggering, but we must acknowledge that 
taken as a whole the decade has been one of prosperity. 
Personal and business income levels and tax collections have 
all been very strong, and for that reason it is only prudent 
to be very cautious about tampering with any aspect of the 
economic i nf r astrue ture as essential as deposit insurance. 
The record shows that until bank insurance was adopted in 
the ’30s panic d i si ntermed i at i on and resultant depression 
were a constant threat to national prosperity. David 
Glassner, author of Free Banking and Monetary R e f o r m * is 
opposed to deposit insurance* but concedes that it has been 
supported by highly reputable authorities :
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"The addiction to deposit insurance stems 
from the trauma of the bank runs that marked the 
Great D e p r e s s i o n , when 40% of U.S. banks failed.
The idea that without deposit insurance the 
economy might be vulnerable to another collapse 
was reinforced by the work of Mil ton Friedman and 
Anna Schwartz* who argued that it was bank 
failures that transformed a serious but not 
abnormal downturn into A m e r i c a ’s worst economic 
c alamity.
"Thus* the rationale for federal deposit 
insurance is not that it protects individual 
depositors but that it ensures macroeconomic 
stability. Mr. Friedman himself supported this 
notion by stressing that deposit insurance has 
made the modern economy 'depression p r o o f ’" (WSJ *
May 5 ’89, A14)
If Mil ton Friedman is correct that deposit insurance 
has made the United States depression proof * then no 
commentator could reasonably ask the nation to give it up 
without first persuading society that its continued economic 
safety can be just as well preserved without it. In other 
words* if banking authorities wish to abolish deposit 
insurance* the burden of proof is on them to convincingly 
demonstrate that such action would definitely not result in 
renewed bank runs and depression and in that way do more 
harm than good.
Lowell Bryan in Breaking Up the Bank (1989)* and 
Brumbaugh in Thrifts Under Siege (1988), suggest that any 
deposits collected for the purpose of making housing and/or 
commercial loans should be completely uninsured. Bryan 
suggests also offering an alternate type of account for 
those who have no tolerance for risk. Such fully guaranteed 
lowei— earning deposits would not be loaned out but would
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only be placed in ultra— sa"fe government securities* which 
would serve as direct collateral* obviating the need for 
government insurance. Brumbaugh* in Thrifts Under Siege 
(p 178)* also makes this suggestion* although much less 
emphat i c a l 1y .
Having thrifts offer two types of deposit accounts so 
vastly different is an experiment society cannot afford to 
take. The Lincoln fiasco clearly demonstated that 
depositors do not always know the difference between the two 
types of placement. Even if emphatic warnings* similar to 
those found on cigarette packages * were required every time 
an uninsured (i.e. unco 1 laterali zed > deposit were received* 
a bank eager to obtain uninsured cash available for lending 
could well be tempted to soft-pedal the risks by telling 
depositors words to the effect that "this deposit* 
technically speaking* isn't insured, but it pays a fantastic
return * and don't worry there isn't a chance in the world
that you'll lose a cent." There is too much risk that if 
two types of accounts— insured (i.e. collateralized) and 
uninsured— are offered on the same premises— perhaps at the
very same wicket there will be confusion and
disillusionment as there was in the case of the Lincoln 
customers who bought uninsured subordinated debentures 
apparently in the belief that it was only another form of an 
insured CD. Since this already has actually occurred the 
government cannot without guilt sanction any similar double
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offering. Thus Mr. Bryan's desire to mitigate the 
radicali ty of his suggestion by providing an ultra—safe 
option is not feasible» and the no— insurance proposal must 
be considered entirely on a stand-alone basis.
Mr, L o w e l 1 contends that insurance can be dispensed 
with if thrifts will reduce their credit risk and interest- 
rate risk by selling their mortgage assets instead of 
holding t h e m . Being divided into marketable shares such 
bundles of mortgages would go off the balance sheets of 
thrifts and this disengagement from risk—prone long-term 
assets » combined with the greater market discipline which 
abandonment of insurance would impose» would give sufficient 
protection to the ordinary s a v e r .
R. Dan Brumbaugh is less committed to the abandonment 
of traditional insti tution—held mortgages. He does however 
favor greater investment freedom for thrifts and banks. He 
believes that the public is capable of establishing reliable 
information agencies which would provide accurate risk 
assessments and ratings of individual S&Ls » and hopefully 
this free-market approach would put a quick end to unsound 
management practices. This increased soundness of 
management would hopefully make bank runs unlikely.
Brumbaugh also advocates market-value accounting with 
provision for quick seizure of ailing thrifts- Any unsound 
thrift would be shut down, hopefully before it actually sank 
to a negative fail— value net worth. In that way whatever
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■funds were avai 1 ab 1 e could be equitably distributed on a pro 
rata bas i s to the various claimholders» including 
depositors, whose claims, of course, would have priority 
over those of other creditors. If a soundly m a n a g e d , 
positive—net—worth thrift experienced withdrawal problems 
the Federal Reserve Bank would lend it any amount of money 
needed pending an orderly sale of assets to cover the 
withdrawal outlays.
Since confidence in the system is the real goal of 
deposit insurance, and since, whatever its failings, deposit 
insurance does inspire this confidence, it would be 
foolhardy for the public to tolerate the abandonment of 
deposit insurance unless strong prior assurances could be 
credibly given that despite this change public confidence in 
banks would not be undermined by the occasional uninsured 
bank failure which inevitably would o c c u r , especially in the 
event of fraud, even with the strictest controls. The main 
result, and also a major cause, of such lack of confidence 
is the occurrence of widespread bank runs.
Edward Kane astutely points out that there is no th ing 
reprehensible about a rati o n a 1 bank r u n . ("How Incentive- 
Incompatible Deposit— Insurance Funds Fail", pp9— iO) If a 
bank really is b r o k e , and depositors line up to recover what 
they can, then it cannot be said that the behavior of these 
customers is not in and of itself destructive. The bank 
failure has already o c c u r r e d . The depositors are only
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reacting to it. Allowing rational bank runs to occur does 
not in any way undermine the aggregate value and smooth 
workings of the banking industry-
If a bank failure could be no more emotional or 
problematical than a furniture store closure» then it would 
probably be acceptable policy to allow rational bank runs» 
rather than preventing them from occurring by means of 
deposit insurance. Other businesses go bankrupt all the 
time» and as painful as bankruptcies a r e , sometimes they are 
blessings in disguise since they force people to redirect 
careers and resources to more productive uses. Rational 
bank runs are not in and of themselves any more of a 
societal problem than similar collection efforts by 
creditors in other bankruptcies. Unfor tunate 1 y » h o w ever, 
bank insolvencies are beset with unique complications. If 
Jones Furniture Store goes b r o k e , creditors and suppliers of 
Smith Furniture Store might become a bit more nervous than 
they were before» but it would not be usual for Smith to 
have all further credit cut off ftterely because Jones had 
gone u n d e r . In banking» however » there has always been a 
unique tendency for trouble at one bank to cause unmerited 
problems at other banks. It might be all right to follow 
Lowell B r y a n ’s suggestions and allow bank runs to occur if 
these bank runs could be confined to rational bank r u n s . 
However » as Professor Kane has pointed out » the danger in 
allowing rational bank runs is that they usually cause
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rumors and hysteria to take over and cause irrational runs 
on soundt solvent banks* which are quickly forced into 
insolvency by the emergency sale of assets at distress 
prices precipitated by the wildfire withdrawals. Without 
the inhibiting safeguard of deposit insurance to prevent 
bank r u n s , any negative rumor about a bank that sounds at 
all plausible will be a self-fulfilling prophecy in that it 
will trigger stampede withdrawals which will cause the 
insolvency assertions to become true, and thus what started 
out as an irrational run could end up being a rational run.
A brilliant thumb-nail sketch of these interdynamics is
provided by R. Dan Brumbaugh :
"It is important to emphasize why the U.S.
government has been so concerned about bank and
thr ift — institution runs and why the regulatory 
s y s t e m ’s vulnerabilities are disquieting. The 
Federal Reserve* the FDIC, and the FSLIC were not 
created to prevent runs per s e . Were they 
intended to prevent each and every bank run * they 
would merely protect individual depository 
institutions against failure. There is no more 
justification for protecting individual banks and 
thrifts from failure than there is for protecting 
any other retailer of goods and services.
Instead* the Federal Reserve* FDIC and FSLIC were 
created to protect against the externali ties, or 
larger social costs * caused by widespread ru n s .
"Social costs from widespread * as distinct 
from individual* bank runs result from a breakdown 
in the i ntermed i at i on function and (what has 
traditionally been viewed as more important) a 
disruption of the payments s y s t e m . The costs can 
arise in the following chain reaction- Depositors 
withdraw funds from both solvent and insolvent 
institutions. Withdrawals force solvent 
institutions to liquidate assets precipitously in 
order to satisfy depositors. The hasty sale of 
assets can result in prices below those that 
orderly sales can produce* thus driving solvent 
banks into insolvency. If the chain reaction
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continues long enough the intermediation process 
and payments mechanism can falter." (Thrifts Under 
Sieoe, p34 )
It is not hard to see that without the use of banks the 
fluidity of payments would indeed be hindered. Individuals 
and businesses do not like to be unsure whether they will 
collect their receivables. Delayed reward dampens 
motivation» and undermines the work ethic. A man painting a 
fence who knows he will be paid in full right after the last 
brush-stroke will make a far more reliable worker than one 
who knows he has no hope of being paid for at least six 
months. Any element of delay or uncertainty in the flow of 
payments undermines the effectiveness that payments normally 
have to provide positive reinforcement to conscientious 
effort. By keeping payments flowing smoothly banks help to 
stimulate commercial activity» so Brumbaugh is correct in 
stressing this extremely important function.
Brumbaugh contends that the protection from irrational 
runs and payment logjams now provided by deposit insurance 
could just as effectively be provided by emergency backup by 
the Federal Reserve Bank. He suggests that accounting be 
market-value based and that solvency be strictly defined so 
that in the event of a run the Federal Reserve would know 
right away whether the beleaguered thrift was qualified to 
receive the backing. Those falling short of the required 
net worth would instead face immediate shutdown with
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equitable distribution of net worth to the various 
c 1 aimhoIders.
Brumbaugh is a highly e s t e e m e d , exceptionally well 
informed thrift commentator whose suggestions must be 
considered with respect- Even if the nation is not yet 
ready to go as far as he suggests in insurance pha s e - o u t > 
his immense faith in the power of the Federal Reserve Bank 
makes one wonder if this institution could not perhaps play 
a greater role in future thrift affairs. Indeed» it may 
well be true that emergency lending by the Federal Reserve 
could contain a small-scale rash of unfounded bank r u n s . 
However, to accept as fact B r umbaugh’s untested assertion 
that the central bank could contain a nation-wide bank run 
requires a leap of faith the nation cannot afford to take.
If a crisis occurred and the central bank were not able to 
cope » the Treasury would be forced to choose between two 
very bad a 1 ternat i v e s . The first choice would be to print 
whatever amount of money were needed to cover deposits.
This would trigger hyperinflation and create a permanent 
distrust of United States paper currency, a n d , as a result, 
the dollar would be impaired as a unit of excha n g e , creating 
not only payments problems, but also credit problems, since 
prudent lenders would no longer be willing to grant dollai—  
denominated loans. The second unpleasant choice available 
to the government in the event of a sudden nation-wide 
liquidity crisis would be immediate distress borrowing from
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■foreign sources at exorbitant rates. The main complication 
to this alternative is the probability that any nation-wide 
bank run here would be part of a world—wide financial panic» 
in which case funds from abroad would not be readily 
available. It goes without saying that in an emergency the 
Federal Reserve would have to relax its stringent collateral 
rules which currently require collateral far greater in 
value than the amount loaned» since no besieged thrift could 
afford to provide this level of collateral.
As improbable as a nation-wide bank run might s e e m , it 
is not impossible that one could occur at some time in the 
future : perhaps in the next year or t w o , perhaps not until 
fifty or sixty years hence. However the fact is that 
judging by the historical record a banking industry without 
deposit insurance inevitably does have a problem with bank 
runs » and should one occur » the financial community should 
brace itself for the worst » for in an era of instant 
communicat ion and advanced technology bank runs are certain 
to be far swifter and deadlier than they were sixty years 
ago -
In the crash of November 1987 the financial community 
witnessed the awful power of destruction which can be 
unleashed when modern technology is turned loose onto an 
institution which has not yet adapted itself to the new 
technology. Just as electronically programmed sell orders 
run amok threatened to paralyze the w o r l d ’s largest stock
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mar ket , BO a frantic use of electronic funds transfers and 
electronically programmable account wi thdrawals, perhaps 
triggered by negative movements in thrift share prices» 
could wreak havoc in the thrift industry. When one thinks 
of a bank run one visualizes long » slow—moving lines of 
people closing their accounts in t u r n . In olden days there 
were no automated tellers or withdrawals by telephone» not 
to mention electronic funds tra n s f e r s . It has to be a cause 
for worry when one considers that all the withdrawals made 
over two or three hours by a long line of people could now 
be made electronically in a second or t w o . Those who 
suggest completely abolishing deposit insurance do so in the 
name of stamping out risk, and yet the untried and unproven 
extreme remedy which they propose is the riskiest measure 
imaginable. Once one recognizes this inherent inconsistency 
one realizes that the nation cannot acquiesce to Brumbaugh's 
and Bryan's proposal, as admirable as their writing may be 
in terms of thorough scholarship and w e l 1-construe ted 
arguments- Nothing is so likely to produce a banking 
environment characterized by panic and hasty actions as a 
complete withdrawal of insurance, for although most people 
can cope with taking a small investment loss, there are few 
who can "keep their cool" when confronted with the specter 
of total ruin. In short, total abolition of coverage would 
create a financial tinderbox. A great many people would 
quit using banks altogether, keeping their money at home,
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resulting in a severe u n d e r a v a i 1a b i 1ity of credit* and 
inconvenience in making p a y m e n t s . Perhaps in the distant 
future * after a cautious ste p —b y —step phase-out* coverage 
can be safely brought down to 0% * but in the meantime 
neither this nor any other precipitous action should be 
taken since so much is at stake.
What Less Radical Measures Are Available?
If total abolition offered the only hope* it would have 
to be adopted in spite of the risks. If* however, the 
moral—hazard problem could be largely brought under control 
with less drastic a change* this would offer a more prudent 
course of action. Perhaps there is some level of coverage 
between 0% and 100% which would at the same time leave open 
enough possibility of loss to reduce the moral—hazard 
problem and yet which would be reassuring enough to 
depositors to offer society continued protection from bank 
runs. As was pointed out above* fear of total loss would 
cause many people to quit using banks altogether and start 
keeping their money at h o m e , but if the potential loss were 
only very slight then the vast majority of people would 
continue to use banks, since it would be well worth the 
slight risk of a minor loss to have o n e ’s money earning 
interest and protected from theft. As long as the penalty 
is kept small, there should not be m u c h , if any, additional 
danger of bank runs- A saver who stands to lose at worst 
only a small portion of his savings is not likely to be
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provoked by highly uncertain rumors into dropping whatever 
else he is doing at the moment and running to close his 
account. The challenge» then, is to strike the right 
balance. The penalty must be small enough not to provoke 
runs » but large enough to encourage at least some depositor 
monitoring of thrift activities.
A good first step in insurance phase—down would be to 
cease the present practice of fully paying out uninsured 
depositors when bank failures occur. This practice, of 
course, is de facto insurance, and is especially costly to 
the nation in that such coverage is not assessed premiums. 
Paul D u k e , Jr. reports that "many [bankers] support
proposals to give depositors a 'haircut’ a 10% or 15% loss
on deposits above the ^100,000 level— when a bank fails.
Two of b a n k i n g ’s biggest g u n s , Citicorp Chairman John Reed 
and Chase Manhattan President Thomas Lebrecque, support 
variations of this proposal." (W S J , Aug 3 ’S9, A16> William
Seidman has spoken favorably of penalising uninsured 
deposits with a 10% loss in case of bank failure. ( NYT,
Feb 22 ’90, Cl) Such a shift in policy should not encounter
insuperable opposition since it falls far short of enforcing 
the insurance limitations which legally already exist.
Since the Continental Illinois bankruptcy the federal 
banking and S&L authorities have adopted a too—big— to-fai1 
policy. The policy is closely related to the unwritten 
policy of rescuing any faltering American corporation if it
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is large enough. The most notable cases so Tar have been 
Continental Illinois and Chrysler. Had Chrysler been 
a 1 lowed to 'fail* so the just if i cat ion g o e s , then so many 
thousands of people Mould have been put out of work that 
there would have been a harmful ripple effect which would 
have been costlier* in the end* than saving the company. 
Similarly, when Continental Illinois became insolvent it was 
argued that confidence in U.S. banking was at peril, and it 
was deemed prudent to pay off all deposits in full, even 
those not insured, so as to preserve faith in the system.
This new policy was probably a justifiable experiment 
at the time. Certainly the rescue of Chrysler has proven to 
be a thrilling success story, and had the rescue of 
Continental Illinois been a one-time expense, as it then was 
probably expected to be, then it probably was the sensible 
thing to do, given the importance of maintaining confidence 
in American b a n k s .
Unfortunately, the event proved to be a precedent for 
numerous other bank failures. Ever since the uninsured 
depositors were paid off in that c a s e , it has been assumed 
that the government will never allow any very large bank or 
S&L to default on any deposits, insured or not, and in order 
to maintain faith in U.S. banking it is generally understood 
that the government will also fully cover foreign deposits, 
repurchase agreements, advances from the Federal Reserve 
Bank and letters of credit, none of which are insured.
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In the beginning this de facto extension of coverage 
only applied to the banks and S&Ls which were large enough 
to have a wide financial influence. According to Koch 
(p 193) only the eleven largest banks were originally 
co v e r e d , hence the designation "too-b ig— to— fail". The 
government however was rightfully criticized for this policy 
on the grounds that it put smaller banks at a competitive 
disadvantage, so, to correct this inequity the government 
has for several years made it a general policy to pay off 
all depositors in both large and small failed b a n k s . The 
too—big-to—f ai 1 policy may not be entirely a thing of the 
past, h o w e v e r . Up to quite recently the government has 
allowed some depositor losses to occur, most notably in 
connection with some smaller banks seized in the Southwest 
Plan, a foreclosure and resale campaign which preceded 
F IAREA. While the payment of uninsured deposits at small 
banks is done purely on a discretionary case-by—case b a s i s , 
the tendency has been more and more to do so.
William Isaac, the regulator who made the original 
decision to rescue Continental Illinois, now admits that he 
wonders whether his decision was for the best, in view of 
the weakening of depositor monitoring that has since 
occurred. One thing is certain : anyone who has coverage
should expect to pay premiums. If present policies are to 
be continued then actual payout practices should be made 
explicit and appropriate premiums collected. If, for
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e X amp le, it were decided that accounts not qualifying for 
the basic $1OO,000 full protection were henceforth to be 
paid ninety—five cents on the dollar, then they should 
accordingly pay 95%—proiated premiums, or something very 
close to it, and not continue to receive free cover age. 
Concern that some are not paying their fair share led the 
Independent Bankers’ Association of America at its March 
1989 convention to pass a resolution recommending that 
foreign deposits be assessed premiums for their de facto 
insurance- (WSJ, March 1 ’89, Cl9)
Since insurance premiums are a mere pittance compared 
to the true value of deposit insurance, it is probably not a 
major issue whether uninsured deposits should be assessed 
premiums or not. A far more important question is whether 
these uninsured accounts should continue being paid out in 
ful 1 .
Since there is general concurrence that there ought to 
be a move in the direction of insurance phase—down, and 
since these accounts are legally uninsured, and therefore 
legally not entitled to anything, it is clearly the logical 
place to begin any overall phase—down. There would not have
to be legislative approval, nor would there be serious 
comp 1ications of any kind- For the sake of being fair to 
all concerned, clear statements of intent sfiould be made .
It would probably be a good idea to require that all 
uninsured account—ho 1ders be given several months’ notice in
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writing of the policy change. Since the chief goal of such 
a change Mould be the encouragement of better monitoring by 
large» sophisticated investors» and since such investors are 
very sensitive to rate changes» there would only have to be 
a slight reduction in payouts to provide the necessary 
incentive. Even a 5% penalty might be sufficient. On 
February 21» 1990 Willi am Seidman advocated phasing out the
too—big — to—f ai 1 policy but emphasized that great care should 
be taken not to make any changes radical enought to disrupt 
financial markets. ( NYT, Feb 22 '90» Cl) For this reason »
it is important for regulators to maintain great flexibility 
in this matter. There is no absolutely certain way of 
predicting how markets will react. The imposition of a 
small 5% penalty sounds safe» but even a 5% penalty might be 
sufficient provocation for irrational runs by some uninsured 
depositors, and » as previously noted» any run on a bank can 
wreak so much havoc that what starts out as an irrational 
run can end up as a rational run » so the large, 
sophisticated investors who would never start an irrational 
run might find themselves caught up in one as a b a n k ’s 
weakening condition made it in their best interests to 
withdraw their funds while there was still some money left.
With a view to encouraging monitoring and at the same 
time preventing irrational runs, it is hard to suggest what 
the exact penalty ought to be. In order to keep the 
greatest flexibility, such partially uni nsured depositors
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should only be assessed premiums for 90%-or-so coverage even 
though actual payouts are higher- That way the depositor 
would only have a legal claim to ninety cents on the dollar* 
and coul/d not interfere with or hold up any upward or 
downward adjustments in the 90% to 100% range.
After the uncomplicated first measure of slightly 
reducing the generosity of uninsured payouts» the next 
phase—down step would be to limit the coverage of $100,000 
to each citizen rather than to each account. This is the 
major recommendation of Paul Piisen's soon— to—be—released 
book Other People's M o n e y . Under this sort of a scheme » 
joint accounts would be prorated and each person's share 
should count against his $100,000 total allotment.
The present system makes a mockery of the nominal 
$100,000 limitation in that a wealthy individual can obtain 
any amount of coverage he wants merely by opening numerous 
accounts— usually, but not necessarily, at different banks.
The Congressional approval required for this change 
should be fairly easy to obtain, since most voters, and 
perhaps some members of Congress, believe that deposit 
insurance exists for the protect of the individual, and 
would consider $100,000 coverage to be ample to satisfy this 
need. Indeed, this microeconomic social role, though 
subservient to the macroeconomic function, is not entirely 
without expert support. Karen Shaw, of the Washington,D .C .- 
based Institute for Strategy Development says, "I like the
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concept of government protecting only those who cannot 
protect themselves." ( NYT, Nov 27 '80» Sec 3 pi) W . Lee
Hoskins, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
said in recent s p e e c h , "The justification for deposit 
insurance is based on the premise that society should 
protect people who are not able to protect themselves. It 
would appear that the present federal insurance system, 
which insures each deposit account up to $100,000, offers 
much more insurance than is necessary to protect those who 
are unable to protect themselves." (American B a n k e r , July IB 
’89, p 4 )
It has been pointed out that in order to limit each 
p e r s o n ’s total coverage it would be necessary to keep track 
of all the thrift, b a n k , and credit union accounts 
throughout the c o u n t r y . The information would probably be 
filed under each person's social security number. Many 
other facts and statistics are recorded in huge computer 
files, so on the face of it, the suggestion sounds easy to 
implement. In fact it would be a formidable ta s k .
If an individual has $100,000 in each of two thrifts 
and one fails, which of the two accounts shall be considered 
the one that is covered? If the policy is one of prorat i o n , 
then each would be 50% protected, but the s a v e r ’s file would 
have to be constantly u p d a t e d , to facilitate the prorat i o n , 
every time any transaction occurred affecting any of his 
balances. If, on the other h a n d , there were a last— in-
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first-out approach to the problem, there would be an 
additional complication in that not only would it be 
necessary to keep track of all balances, but it would also 
be necesjsary to know the exact times of all past 
transactions so that it could at any time be determined 
which funds were the longest held. Without these 
complicated records dishonest claims would be made. For 
example, suppose the saver has $1O O ,OOO on deposit at Bank
A, his older account, and also has a similar deposit at Bank
B . Bank B fails- As soon as the failure occurs the saver 
closes his account at A and swears that at the time of the 
failure of B, the deposit at B was his older deposit, and 
therefore qualifies for coverage. To defeat such false 
claims the government would have to have a record not only 
of the account at A but also the exact time of the closing 
of the account. Thus the precedence approach to insurance 
limitation would require that the central insurer maintain a 
listing of all of the p e r s o n ’s accounts complete with exact 
times for all transactions so that at all times it would be 
possible to make a sequential listing of which exact monies 
were in fact the oldest- This fracturing of the various 
monies into intermeshing layers of various ages would occur 
whenever there was intended or unintended rotation of 
deposits and withdrawals among two or more b a n k s .
It is complications such as those just outlined that 
cause many authorities to decry the feasibility of
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restricting the limitation to individuals rather than 
accounts. This, h o w e v e r , need not be an insurmountable 
obstacl e .
If t is true that government—provided deposit
insurance is a privilege, not a right and the fact that
such insurance could legally be abrogated leads us to
conclude that it is a privilege then the individual should
not think that it is something to which he, as an American 
citizen, is automatically entitled. Instead he should 
recognize it as a favor received from the rest of society. 
Since it is a favor, he should not complain if asked to fill 
out certain forms and conduct his banking affairs around the 
parameters of the p r o g r a m .
One workable scheme would be to have each individual 
designate one bank as the one he intends to use for 
insurance purposes, and accounts at all other banks would be 
uninsured- If no designation were made there would be no 
c overage. After making the designation, it would then be 
the individual's own responsibi1ity to keep his deposits at 
the designated institution as close as possible to the full 
insurable amount, if he wished to fully avail himself of the 
insurance privilege. Any individual who wished to have 
insurance at more than one bank could designate more than 
one bank, allocating the $100,000 coverage any way he wished 
among the chosen banks.
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The slight inconvenience of making a designation and 
remembering to keep one's savings at that particular bank is 
not an onerous burden. For the sake of comparison» it is 
interesting to consider the annual income-tax obligation. 
Those lacking the time» ability» or inclination to 
personally handle this procedure are expected to obtain 
outside help. Often for income-tax purposes an individual 
or business may be required to make an election regarding 
how he wishes to handle a certain matter. Such elections 
are binding» and once declared are usually irreversible. It 
is the individual's responsibility to remember and adhere to 
whatever arrangement he has agreed to. Seldom is this 
practice of income-tax elections impugned as onerous or 
oppressive. Similarly, wealthy m u 1t i-account holders could 
just as reasonably be expected to decide which bank they 
intend to use for insurance purposes, to make the required 
designation, and to keep their balance at that bank as close 
as possible to the insurable limit. Procedures could easily 
be set up for allowing a depositor to cancel an old 
designation in favor of a new one » should he find it more 
convenient to switch most of his business to a new b a n k .
The great advantage to a plan along these lines is the 
reduced invasion of privacy such a plan would permit. There 
would not have to be any centrally kept record of an 
individual's transactions or balances, only of the name of 
his designated bank.
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There is good cause for concern that too much 
information about individuals is already being kept in 
central computers with inadequate safeguards against 
unauthorized access. The establishment of a central file 
capable of revealing to a corrupt government each c i t i z e n ’s 
bank balances and daily transactions would be a repugnant 
Orwe111an assault on individual dignity» and must never be 
allowed to happen. A system based on individual 
designations would have no such privacy ramificatons> 
h o w e v e r , since no balances would be centrally recorded » only 
the list of designations.
The greatest obstacle to the perfect implementation of 
this plan will be getting rid of the double counting which 
arises from pension—p 1 an p a s s-through. This refers to the 
privilege which is granted to pension funds of allowing 
$1OO » OOO coverage for each individual covered by the pension 
plan. Because it is backed by banks » labor unions and the 
influential House Education and Labor Committee» this 
particular problem is likely not amenable to immediate 
correction. Even Congressman Schumer <D - N Y > » the most 
influential member of the House in thrift matters» has found 
his colleagues intractable on this point. (See Cranford» 
Congressional Quarterly» June 17 ’09» p 1451.> Although a
designation s y s t e m , with no pass-through double counting 
allowed would be the ideal » it is not going to happen now. 
However » even with this pension double counting, the
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designation system would be a vast improvement over what has 
existed up to n o w .
Since pension—fund administrators are highly 
sophisticated investors capable of especially effective 
thrift monitoring» it would be particularly beneficial to 
make these pension deposits subject to the same penalty 
assessed against uninsured deposits. With no such deterrent 
the vast and ever-growing pension monies will continue to 
gravitate to the thrifts paying the highest rates» 
regardless of risk. It is unfortunate that the current 
Congress is so adamant that no penalty shall ever be 
assessed against pension monies. Perhaps in two or three 
years the matter can raised again with better results.
Some thrift commentators have suggested lowering the 
coverage limit. As long as the limit applies per account 
rather than per depositor such reductions would be 
meaningless» since any level of coverage desired could 
easily be obtained simply by opening more accounts. James 
K. Glassman suggests allowing each individual full coverage 
up to $50,OOO with 50% coverage provided on the next 
$150,000. < The New R e p u b l i c # March 20 ’89» p29>
Unfortunately, in the wake of recent thrift losses there is 
so much nervousness about safety of deposits that 
Mr. Classman's suggestion could not possibly receive a 
dispassionate consideration at this time. Peter T . Kilborn 
reports "one C opt ion] that was abandoned early was lowering
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the $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  limit....In the face o f  the ensuing outcry from 
Congress» the Treasury immediately rejected the 
suggestion..." (NYT » Feb 9 ’09» pi) Such a reduction could 
be achieved* however» simply by never raising the $ lOO » OOO 
limit and allowing a number of years of inflation to 
gradually bring coverage in real value down to a more 
moderate level-
Should the Basic Payouts 
Also Be Assessed a Slight Penalty?
It would be a sobering influence on investment 
decisions to confine all deposit insurance to 95%. A desire 
to protect less affluent savers might be satisfied by 
allowing the first SE5.000 or so to continue to be fully 
covered. The next $75 » OOO would be not quite fully covered — 
-95% coverage being a possibility. If no arrangement is 
made to have formal insurance arrangements with appropriate 
premium charges for amounts beyond $100*000 and continued 
payouts are deemed p r u d e n t , then these uninsured payouts 
should be at a lower rate than that paid on any insured 
holdings, otherwise there would be no point in carrying 
i nsurance.
The question has been raised whether there would really 
be any point in penalizing ordinary savers who have $100,000 
o r  less- As a group » they lack the sophistication to judge 
for themselves whether a thrift is properly run and 
therefore would have to rely on printed reports, which could
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be based on information three or four months old. William 
S e i d m a n , the head of FDIC and the Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC) has commented that it is hard enough for 
the regulators to Judge the soundness of a b a n k , so to ask 
an untrained depositor to do so is unreasonable. Even if 
savers are not quite as hapless as Mr. Seidman f e a r s , he may 
be largely correct in doubting the efficacy of relying on 
small savers for market discipline- Whatever one's opinion 
of small savers may be» of one thing there can be no doubt—  
-the large account-ho1ders are far more sophisticated and 
better able to Judge— and influence— management practices. 
Therefore if society wishes to move in the direction of 
greater depositor discipline but only wants to take one step 
at a time, it is certainly wiser, as well as politically 
easier, to begin by imposing a slight penalty on the 
uninsured deposits before touching the $ 1OO » OOO allo ted to 
each ordinary saver. It was not the ordinary saver who 
caused numerous n ow—defunct thrifts to increase in size by 
1,000'/.. but rather the sophisticated Wall Street 
professional purveying brokered deposits.
Even though one may doubt the wisdom of inflicting any 
severe penalty on insured depositors, it is nevertheless 
somewhat tempting to throw some inconveniences in their path 
to deter them from again investing in a poorly run bank.
The only slight inconvenience which is currently in force is 
the loss of expected interest. Following a thrift takeover
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 8 3 -
the holder of a CD is only guaranteed the former rate of 
interest for two weeks. The holder» does » however » have the 
privilege of being paid out in cash if there is any change 
in interest rates » so depositors all in all are not badly 
treated at the time of a default. Possible actions of a 
more severe nature could include the imposition of long 
delays in making deposit payouts » perhaps with complete 
cessation of further interest earnings during these long 
delays» and the requirement that all depositors fill out 
complicated application forms » perhaps requiring 
notarization, before they receive their money.
If M r . Seidman is right about the smaller insured 
depositors lacking the ability to judge thrifts, then such 
measures would not likely achieve very m u c h . However, even 
if there were something to be gained by taking such 
measures » or else by lowering payouts to ordinary savers, 
there are some marketing and ethical implications which 
ought to be considered before taking any negative measures 
against thrift c u s t o m e r s .
One of the most valuable lessons taught by modern 
marketing is that all successful businesses must be demand- 
driven. i.e. customer oriented. This is the ethos behind 
the old adage "the customer is always right." S&L account— 
holders do not have to do their banking at thrifts. For 
that matter, they do not even have to keep their savings in 
the United S t a t e s . To talk of thrift reform is pointless.
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unless there is going to be a thr i f t industry, and there 
will be no thrift industry if vast droves of depositors are 
permanently driven away by negative actions. To give 
customer^ the VIP treatment is not an only an appropriate 
recognition of their past patronage, it also makes good 
business s e n s e . If customers have caused problems by 
indiscriminately pursuing high r a t e s , that is only because 
the government allowed them to. The last thing a reformed 
thrift industry needs is depositor disenchantment. Since 
the good achievable by inflicting inconvenience and slight 
payout penalties is probably small, and the potential loss 
of good will is very great, such tactics are not to be 
recommended. In fact such a strategy could backfire right 
away if payout delays spawned negative rumors leading to 
bank runs.
Whether one considers depositors to be customers, or, 
more accurately, crucial suppliers of lendable money, they 
cannot with impunity be antagonized. It is bad enough to 
have to reduce payouts on uninsured deposits, but this step 
is probably necessary. A firm line should be drawn, 
however, on the matter of reducing payouts to, or otherwise 
inconveniencing, the 99% of thrift customers who as ordinary 
savers are the mainstay of the industry- Their continued 
loyalty is more important now than ever.
In summary, then, the only deposit insurance phase—down 
measures that may be confidently recommended at this time
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are 1) the effective limitation of deposit insurance to 
$100,000 per citizen, possibly with reluctant toleration of 
additional pension pass-through coverage and 2) the 
imposition of a slight penalty, perhaps 4 or 5% in the case 
of payoffs of uninsured deposits.
The Role of Risk-Based Premiums 
The problem with risk—based premiums is that it is 
exceedingly difficult to rate the risk of bank—held assets. 
Benjamin Graham got to the nub of the matter many years ago 
when he pointed out that a warrant or option might be of the 
finest investment calibre while a bond could be no better 
than a rank speculation. Generally speaking, a loan for an 
ownei— occupied sin g 1e —f a m i 1 y dwelling is considered the 
safest possible real— estate loan, so, this being the case, 
a thrift having 1007. of its loans in that category should be 
an ultra—safe thrift and therefore qualify for very low 
insurance premiums. If, h o w e v e r , the loan officer had 
little understanding of real estate and no understanding of 
local markets, and to make matters worse, if the loan 
officer were a poor judge of character, and little aware of 
the proper methods of conducting a credit check, then the 
true risk level of that t h r i f t ’s portfolio would be 
extremely high. Similarly, one can depict a knowledgeable 
loan officer prudently approving loans for astute bargain
purchases of raw land normally an extremely risky asset.
In a risk-based system such a thrift would, of course, pay
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■far higher premiums than the other thrift although in 
reality its loan portfolio would be of far higher quality.
Professor Frederick E . Balderston of the University of 
California» Berkeley» has pointed out that
"..to enact statutory changes that would enable 
risk—related premiums to function would require 
statutory specification» in exquisite detail» of 
the different elements of risk and the consequent 
sizes of premiums for risk categories» and the 
counterattacks from the financial industry lobbies 
would be intense. The political practicality of a 
risk-related premium system for deposit insurance 
is in grave doubt." <Thifts in C r i s i s . 1905, pi72)
Niskanen and England contend that risk—based premiums 
"would require more information than is realistically 
available to federal authorities." (National R e v i e w » May 19 
’89» p39)
Professor George J. Benston» of the University of 
Rochester, explains how complicated a reliable risk—rated 
system would be :
"As long as deposit insurance is underpriced 
with respect to the risk imposed on the FSLIC, SLA 
manangers and owners have incentives to take more 
risks than they would take were the insurance 
correctly priced. Unfortunately, determining a 
risk-adjusted insurance rate is difficult, in 
large part because of the difficulty of measuring 
the effect of specific assets » liabilities, and 
activities on the probability that the FSLIC will 
have to expend funds. Such holdings and 
activities include fraud and self-dealing, the 
holding of dur at i on—u n b a 1anced portfolios, growth 
without a well—managed and monitored investment 
program, and insufficient economic net worth to 
absorb losses. The variance of returns on and the 
costs of i nd i v idua1 assets and liabilities is not 
a sufficient measure of risk; rather » the totality 
of the variance and the extent to which negative 
total returns may be incurred should be
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considered. In any event, the FHLBS should not 
simply assert that a particular activity is
'risky' it first should conduct adequate
research," (An Analysis of the Causes of Savings 
and Loan Assoc i ation Failures, 1986, p 174)
On^ wonders whether the attainment of such a level of
refinement could ever be cost effective, although this could
depend upon the learning curves applying to the various
auditing chores and the amenability of such audits to being
organized into repeatable routines which could be used on
numerous occasions.
Although most authorities are discouraged by the
difficulties inherent in ris k —based premiums, there are
others who downplay these difficulties. Professor Allan
M e 1tze r , of the Carnegie Mellon Institute, believes that
such sliding premiums would be one of the most effective
means possible to impose discipline on the industry (NYT ,
Aug 17 '89, A 1 8 ) and David G . Hoffman of Young & Associates,
in an editorial entitled "Why the Fuss over Risk—Based
Premiums?" points out that most providers of insurance gauge
the price of coverage to the risk of loss, and asks why
federal bank insurance agencies should not be able to do the
same. (American B a n k e r . April 19 '89, p 4 )
In all probability there will be, and perhaps ought to
be, some premium surcharge for risky assets held in the 30%
of the portfolio which FIRREA allows to be non-housing—
related- Even though crude criteria and measurement
techniques will inevitably result in numerous large
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individuâl errors» if the overall influence is likely to be 
beneficial then in today's crisis situation it is probably a 
good ide a , from a practical viewpoint » to adopt such a 
scheme » yii th a view to later refinement and improvement.
Another factor that makes the adoption of risk-related 
premiums desirable from a practical point of view is the 
present existence of risk—related capital standards. A 
schedule already exists for rating the supposed risk 
attached to various assets commonly held by banks and 
thrifts. All banks and thrifts must attain owner capital 
amounting to 8% of the risk—ad justed asset levels. It would 
be a logical extension of this present practice to require 
similar risk—related adjustment to insurance premiums, and 
since there has not been much opposition to risk—related 
capital stan d a r d s . there probably would also not be much 
resistance to risk-related premiums. If such a plan did not 
prevent excess risk altogether, at least it would make the 
risk— takers pay a fairer price for the insurance they are 
recei V i n g .
Related to. but not the same thing as. the risk—related 
premium issue is the question of continued government 
subsidization of deposit insurance. Even at the newly 
raised levels, deposit— insurance premiums are far below what 
a private insurer would charge. Savers demand between 1.75*/. 
and 2% additional interest on uninsured money-market 
accounts. If this differential may be legitimately taken as
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the imputed market value of deposit insurance, then deposit 
insurance, even at the new rate of .23%, is a remarkably 
underpriced g o o d .
Arguments against this subsidization focus on the fact 
that thrifts and banks are privately owned businesses which 
exist for the profit of their owners. By giving insurance 
coverage at such cheap rates the government is enhancing the 
private profits of the o w n e r s , and this can be argued to be 
an abuse just as much as would be the provision of any other 
underpriced supplies to any other private business.
While this is a strong argument, an even stronger one 
can be raised for continuing the subsidization of deposit 
insurance. The universal provision of well structured 
deposit insurance is conducive to nationwide finacial 
stability, which is a public good. Once the flaws in the 
insurance are r e m o v e d , it is virtually certain that it will 
prove to be of great benefit to the United States and for 
that reason it is not unreasonable to expect the United 
States to contribute to its cost- Just as the government 
contributes to the transportation i nfr as truc ture of roads 
and bridges, because their construction and maintenance are 
for the good of the nation, so subsidized deposit insurance 
can be regarded as a necessary aspect of the financial 
i nf rastructure, and equally deserving of public support.
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Other Suooested Insurance Reforms
Discussion of insurance reform has brought forth a 
number of unusual ideas which have no hope of adoption, and 
perhaps .^are not really practical , but which nevertheless ar< 
though t—proVOk i n g . John V . Lyons of Phoenix suggests that 
if a thrift pays more than 75% of the prime rate then any 
insured p a y o u t s , in case of failure» should be limited to 
50% of deposits. If the thrift paid over 125% of prime, no 
insurance would be in force. < WSJ, Nov 23 ’88, A13) One 
wonders whether a low rate on savings accounts is an 
infallible guide to the soundness of a t hrift’s activities, 
as seems to be implied by the suggested plan, which is 
reminiscent of the long—expired Regulation Q, which in 
former days restricted the interest rates that thrifts were 
allowed to pay.
A suggestion which, for a while, received much 
consideration was the merger of thrift and bank insurance 
monies, a plan supported by Representative Gerald Kleczka 
(D—WI>. This suggestion was naturally enough strongly 
opposed by bankers who correctly anticipated that such a 
merger would wipe out their fund. Comptroller of the 
Currency Robert L. Clarke no doubt made his audience very 
uncomfortable when he also advocated this measure in a 
speech given at the annual convention of the American 
B a n k e r s ’ Association in Honolulu on October 10, 1988. He
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very imaginatively drew a comparison between the thrift 
crisis and the occurrence of a house fire :
"When your neighbor's house is on fire, the fire 
fighters responding to the alarm won't ration 
waiter to make sure there is enough for you should 
your house go up in flames, t o o . They will pump 
until the fire at hand is o u t . And they will tap 
your private well to finish the job." ( Vital
Speeches of the Day, Jan 15 '89, p 2 0 5 )
This suggestion had enough support that the nonthrift 
banking industry heaved a collective sigh of relief when 
FIRREA did not make FDIC money available to cover thrift 
losses. Probably this had less to do with sympathy for 
bankers than realization that FDIC funds were so inadequate 
for the job as to be not worth expropriating.
Yet another reform suggestion that was not acted upon 
was the suggestion by the director of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (F H L B B ) » M. Danny Wall, that a super-insurer be 
established to receive premiums from and r e s c u e , when 
necessary, FSLIC, FDIC, and the credit—union insurance fund 
< NYT. Dec 20 '88, p 3 4 ) Tremendously huge insurance
companies, which only insure other smaller insurance 
companies against catastrophic runs on claims, do indeed 
exist, many of them being based in Switzerland. However, 
Mr- Wall's suggestion would in this case only create more 
unnecessary bureaucracy in that there is already a de facto 
super— insurer of the three funds, namely the Federal 
Government, i.e. the t a x p a y e r .
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A1though these last—cited suggestions offer little 
promise at this time they should not be completely 
forgotten. It is always possible that at some time in the 
future they may prove valuable.
To What Extent Was the S&L Crisis 
Caused by Inadequate Accountino?
There is general agreement that GAAP has been an 
unsatisfactory source of information for thrift regulators 
and investors, and that regulatory accounting principles 
<RAP) proved to be even more unsatisfactory . According to 
Hendriksen and most accounting theorists, the main goal of 
accounting is the provision of financial information which 
is timely, accurate, and complete and which can effectively 
aid m a n a g e r s , regulators, creditors, investors, suppliers, 
customers and all other interested parties in making 
appropriate decisions thereby serving society by expediting 
a more productive allocation of resources.
Edward Kane compares the regulators who must keep ahead 
of risk-prone managers to a car driver trying to win a race 
despite being handicapped by a muddy windshield, ("No Room 
for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit— Insurance Reform", 
Journal of Financial Services R e s e a r c h , 1 : 1987, p94 >
According to Professor K a n e , the unavailability of necessary 
steering information which is caused by a muddy windshield 
may be compared to the unavailability to regulators of
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essent i al financial information which exists because of 
weaknesses in GAAP and RAP.
Proponents of the efficlent—market hypothesis have 
demons t fra ted that despite the shortcomings of G A A P , enough 
surrogate information is usually available to permit 
interested parties to correctly assess the value and 
solvency of any organization. Unfortunately* it is not the 
realistic investor view of net worth and/or solvency that 
affects the legality of regulatory takeovers, but rather the 
outdated figures embedded in GAAP s t a tements. Many thrifts 
that are millions "in the hole" are shielded from regulatory 
takeover by having the required minimum GAAP net worth.
This unfortunate situation gives money— losing thrifts extra 
time in which to take desperate gambles which occasionally 
pay off* but which usually only increase their losses. 
Typically* by the time such an institution becomes GAAP— 
insolvent its losses have reached staggering levels. Thus* 
far from being a useful tool* GAAP and RAP actually get in 
the way of corrective action.
This failure on the part of GAAP to reflect declines in 
S&L net values that often occur after interest—rate rises 
and/or r e a l —estate declines is in sharp contrast with the 
tendency of GAAP in other businesses to nearly always 
underrepresent net worth. This underrepresentat ion occurs 
because inflation as a rule gradually raises the potential 
sale price of buildings* land and other major assets above 
the acquisition cost embedded in the GAAP statements.
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Although there may be a few items having exit value (i.e. 
net realizable value) lower than acquisition c o s t , in most 
businesses the value of these untypical declining assets is 
vastly outweighed by the value of assets increasing in exit 
v a 1u e .
When applied to b a n k s , h o w e v e r , GAAP does not have this 
built-in consevative b i a s , for banks have a smaller 
proportion of their wealth in fixed productive assets 
subject to inflationary g a i n , and to make matters w o r s e , 
they usually have a large number of assets which in times of 
high interest rates are subject to strong market decline, 
but which are allowed by GAAP to be carried at face v a l u e .
One occasionally hears GAAP condemned because after the 
collapse of a real—estate boom it supposedly permits direct 
investments in land and buildings and seized collateral to 
be carried on the books at the old unreaiistically high 
levels. This, however, is not the fault of GAAP, for GAAP 
does indeed require the immediate write—down of any asset 
which has undergone a permanent impairment in value. When 
these real—estate declines are not recognized, it is the 
fault of the m a n a g e m e n t , who are, of course, the issuers of 
financial statements, and the auditors, for not disputing 
the unadjusted values.
Similarly one occasionally hears criticisms directed 
against traditional accounting methods in connection with 
failure to establish sufficient reserves for bad loans, or 
failure to write off bad loans- Neither of these abuses has
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ever been sanctioned by GAAP or RAP. The fault for their 
occurrence lies not with any particular method of accounting 
but with unconscientious m a n a g e m e n t s , careless auditors and 
overworked and thinly spread e x a m i n e r s .
Two practices which off end the accounting principle of 
conservatism have been permitted by GAAP, h o w ever. The 
first, and less important of these, has been the failure of 
GAAP to forbid the practice of recognizing as interest 
income monies not externally generated but taken out of the 
loaned amount. ( NYT, Dec 28 *89, Cl > This, of course, is a
patently preposterous misrepresentation. If a man hands his 
friend money and the friend gives it right back, it is 
hardly an arm's— length transaction. These so-called 
interest earnings are really only a return of part of the 
loaned money, and these receipts should be recorded as 
adjustments to the principal outstanding. Not being 
externally g e n e r a t e d , it would be misleading even to call 
them payments on the principal, since this would suggest 
that the borrower is at least starting out as a reliable 
debt payer when the fact of the matter is, he is only giving 
back money which the bank gave him and which never left his 
h a n d s . Any bank that books this type of interest income and 
then boasts about its great earnings is as ridiculous as the 
unloved landlady who gave all her tenants the money they 
needed to buy her a Christmas present, and then afterward 
bragged to all the other landladies that she was so popular
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with her tenants that each of them bought her a Christmas 
p r e s e n t . It is surprising that the normally conservative 
GAAP should be so permissive in this one aspect of income 
recogni ti on.
Of more serious financial consequence has been the 
failure of GAAP to require that long-term financial 
instruments such as bonds and mortgages be carried at 
current market value. This failure to acknowledge changes 
in the value of these assets which dominate the portfolios 
of virtually all thrifts has caused a much greater magnitude 
of net—value misrepresentation than any other accounting 
abuse, simply because mortgage assets loom so large in the 
affairs of S & L s .
In addition to these two a b u s e s , several others were 
sanctioned by regulators in the now discredited RAP. Koch 
(p p 194—5) cites several of these. First of all there was 
the recording at face value of net—worth certificates issued 
to ailing thrifts by the FHLBB. Although technically 
promissory notes* these spurious assets should not have been 
recorded since there was legitimate doubt that FSLIC* itself 
insolvent* had the means to pay these notes. The second RAP 
abuse cited by Koch is the asset known as appraised equity 
capital. This was the difference between book value of land 
and buildings and estimated market value. Although it 
sounds reasonable to give recognition to demonstrable 
increases in asset values* to apply these value updates only
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to assets that have increased in value while ignoring the 
market declines affecting other holdings certainly offends 
the principle of co n s i s t e n c y , and exacerbates the 
overvaluation bias. The third RAP abuse cited by Koch was 
the unconventional creation of goodwill» known as regulatory 
goodwill» which often accompanied thrift mergers. Yet 
another RAP-sanctioned abuse » which had both balance-sheet 
and income—statement ramifications was the proration of 
realized mortgage— sale losses over the remaining term of 
the mortgage.
Edwin Gray» former chairman of the FHLBB » conceded that 
these RAP—sanetioned practices enabled the thrift industry 
to report an aggregate net worth of $32 billion at the end 
of 1983» instead of the $4 billion net worth which it had 
according to G A A P . (Koch» p 195) No doubt» with market 
write-downs of mortgages» the true aggregate net value of 
the industry would have been deeply in deficit. Already 
saddled with the valuation biases inherent in GAAP » the 
thrift industry only made problems worse by adopting RAP. 
According to Edward Kane » "arguably the a g e n c y ’s single 
greatest mistake was to adopt irregular and misleading 
regulatory accounting principles (RAP) that served to create 
important new opportunities through which insolvent and 
unprofitable thrifts could legally conceal their ongoing 
weakness." ("The High Cost of Incompletely Funding the FSLIC 
Shortage of Explicit Capital"» unpublished paper written in
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1989 by Professor Edward Kane of the University of Ohio, 
C o l u m b u s )
Brumbaugh <1988, p p 132—3) makes similar observations 
about the bad results of both historical accounting and RAP. 
He urges that contrary to GAAP interest—sensitive assets 
such as mortgages and mortgage—backed securities be 
continually marked to market. If one makes the reasonable 
assumption that unearned ’’front—end" interest and fee 
revenues are relatively small, perhaps almost immaterial, 
then we can conclude from the calculations in Table 2 —7 of 
Brumbaugh's study that failure to mark mortgages to market—  
although permitted by G A A P — is a far greater cause of net- 
value overstatement than all the R AP—sanetioned ornaments 
combined, and conceding that his calculations are probably 
correct, this GA A P —sanetioned practice must be considered 
far and away the greatest cause of unreliable thrift balance 
s h eets.
Brumbaugh dismisses possible objections that interest- 
caused problems, being s e 1f —cor r e c t i n g » should be ignored. 
Brumbaugh would not agree that Newton ' s famous maxim ’’what 
goes up must come down" applies to interest rates. He 
argues that the market has a better idea than the regulators 
about future interest movements, and that the various 
probabi1ities are already impounded into the interest rate 
in force at any given time. While Brumbaugh does not prove 
that this is true, the mere fact that this possibility can
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be plausibly raised leads one to suspect that it may indeed 
be risky to provide any kind of forbearance or subsidization 
to thrifts hit with interest—rate misfortunes. If it were a 
certainty that every time interest rates rose they would 
eventually return to former levels then it would make good 
sense to keep interest— induced fluctuations off the books on 
the grounds that such changes were of a purely temporary 
nature- If, however, this is an unjustifiable assumption, 
as Brumbaugh suggests it is, then failure to mark to market 
cannot be defended on these pragmatic grounds. Indeed, to 
ignore the fluctuations only guarantees that if and when 
there is a secular move in interest rates there will be many 
years of severely misstated thrift net values pending the 
gradual retirement of all the old mortgages recorded on the 
books at the old values.
Marking mortgages to market would create certain 
complications, however. For one thing, it would have to be 
decided whether to mark to market even if values rise above 
acquisition cost, or instead to use the more commonly 
accepted 1ower—of—cost—o r —market valuation. The problem 
with the latter is that it could result in secret reserves 
if interest rates fell and thrifts were forbidden to raise 
the carrying value of mortgages higher than original value,
A shareholder has a right to know the full value of any 
thrift lest he sell his shares at too low a price, so, in 
order to give a shareholder a conservative estimate of what
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ought to be a satisfactory selling price* mortgages should 
be marked to market with no upward limit if interest rates 
fall. Of course* the same arguments could be made that 
marketable^securities should be marked to market rather than 
lower of market or c o s t , and they probably should be, but 
since they constitute a much smaller portion of a thrift's 
a s s e t s , they pose much less of a threat in terms of creating 
secret reserves.
Another problem with recognizing market changes in 
mortgage values is that mixed in with operating income it 
would disguise management performance, and destroy the 
validity of financial ratios. Changes in market value 
caused by interest—rate movements do not meet the criteria 
of extraord inary income or loss, so they must be included in 
current income, even though these changes are dictated by 
something beyond the control of m a n agement. The value of 
the income statement as a commun!cat ive and motivating 
document lies in its being a reflection of good decisions, 
skilful management and dedication on the part of w o r k e r s . 
This is the main reason for keeping extraordinary gains and 
losses out of the main body of the income statement. If a 
lazy manager and a group of unmotivated employees lose a 
million dollars in the course of a given year, but an 
extraordinary gain of $10 million that they had nothing to 
do with comes a l o n g , and is incorrectly mixed in with 
operating income then shareholders would be misled into
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- l O l -
thinking that all is w e l 1, and the staff would not learn the 
lesson they should from their poor results. With similar 
concerns in mind» gains and losses arising only from the 
extrinsic factor of interest—rate movements should be 
separated out. Since interest— induced profits or losses on 
bond holdings are classified» when realized» as investment 
income* it would seem natural to treat a n a 1agous changes in 
mortgage values as investment income as well» but perhaps 
both of these ought to be given a category of their own 
since unlike most other investment income such profits and 
losses are of extrinsic origin and do not reflect the good 
or bad judgment of management » assuming» of course» that 
Brumbaugh is correct that interest—rate movements are not 
subject to rational prediction. Probably the best solution 
would be to report such interest— induced income on the 
income statement after investment income but before 
ex traordinary income.
Although it might seem irrelevant to thrift regulators 
to worry about secret reserves and the effectiveness of 
income statements as communicators of earning ability» both 
do in fact have an impact on thrift regulation. If interest 
rates crash t h e n , even making ample allowance for mortgage 
prepayments, the mortgage portfolio become more valuable» 
and if market value sufficiently exceeds acquisition value 
it might not be necessary for regulators to shut down a 
thrift which according to GAAP does not have the minimum net
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worth. Since such mark-ups represent real economic changes 
providing owners and insurers with a real source of wealth 
there can be no economic justification for treating this 
particular ^ y p e  of increase in capital any differently than 
any other infusion of capital.
Clearly distinguishing mortgage gains from operating 
and investment income would reveal both to regulators and 
the public which managements need close supervision. Of 
course, regulators know that anyway, without such an income 
statement refinement, but if they were required to defend 
any particular action to politicians or to the public, they 
would have something in black and white that they could 
produce to defend their actions. Since Charles Keating and 
other thrift operators have accused regulators of conducting 
witch-hunts and vendettas, it would be a good idea to 
provide future regulators with impartial management— 
descriptive income statements shorn of interest—rate— induced 
profits for potential use as a public—relations tool. Of 
course, such a tool can be of use to managers, as well. If 
operating profits have been very strong but a spike in 
interest rates has brought net market value below the 
required level, it is only fair to provide competent but 
unfortunate managements with the same b 1ack—and—w h i te 
documentation that would enable them to argue that seizure 
would be poor public policy.
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A slight problem with GAAP not likely to receive 
immediate attention is the inducement which it often 
provides to take uneconomic decisions for the purpose of 
producing more favorable financial s t a t ements. In 
particular» there can be pressure to time one's actions 
according to the dates of financial statements. The same 
deleterious pressure can arise from observing budget 
deadlines. For example» Robert E. Taylor once reported that 
"Bank Board Chairman M. Danny W a 11 has said he is eager to 
complete as many deals as possible by Friday so that they 
d o n ’t count against his a g e n c y ’s spending in the fiscal year 
that starts Saturday." (W S J » Sept 26 *88» p 4 ) It goes 
without saying that when a seller wants to complete deals 
before a certain date there is a shift of bargaining power 
from the seller to the buyer and in this way there are 
arbitrary economic effects which would not exist if the 
deals struck after the deadline date could be backdated to 
be included in the previous period. Such a negative shift 
in bargaining power must be considered economically 
unjustified in that it has not in any way been earned by the 
those who gain by it» but only occurs because of arbitrary 
rules which the disadvantaged side has inflicted upon 
itself. A similar uneconomic action was carried out by 
Columbia S&L » which, wishing to comply with certain 
limitations on " junk-bond" holdings, once sold the bulk of 
its "junk—bond" holdings to Drexel Burnham Lambert very
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close to its year—e n d , with the tacit understanding that it 
would buy the bonds back as soon as it had completed its 
balance s h e e t , which» of c o u r s e , in GAAP only describes the 
holdings existing on one d a y . (N Y T , June 12 '89, Cl) It 
could be argued that GAAP is highly dysfunctional and ought 
to be scrapped since in instances such as this it is itself 
the cause of actions having no economic justification, and a 
good accounting system should only give a fair report of 
economic e v e n t s , not itself be the cause of t h e m . However, 
a rebuttal could be furnished that the admittedly foolish 
situation just described, and others like it, are the fault 
not of G A A P , but of regulators and legislators for not 
requiring a standard of compliance based on weighted—average 
continuous holdings. GAAP was never intended to be used as 
an ongoing asset monitor. It is meant to descri be economic 
activity, not to presc r i be it. Nor should Columbia be 
excoriated for availing itself of a loophole- Virtually ail 
businesses avail themselves of loopholes if they are able to 
find them. If regulations are better written and compliance 
better monitored there should be less problem in the future 
of thrifts indulging in uneconomic accounting—driven 
behavi o r .
Although it is generally true that it is not GAAP but 
the abuse of GAAP that causes the type of problem just 
mentioned, in one pervasive problem area GAAP is itself an 
unwholesome influence! in hol d —o r —sell decisions- Because
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BAAP does not require continuous marking to market of 
readily saleable securities* and allows gains or losses to 
be recognized only when realized* i.e. when a sale has 
occurred * managers have considerable opportunity to indulge 
in income manipulation. An asset which ought to be kept 
will be "cashed in" so that the gain may be counted in 
income, and an asset which ought to be soId, perhaps certain 
mortgages, will be kept in order to avoid booking the loss. 
According to G- Christian Hill and Paulette Thomas this is 
currently a problem with many capital—short thrifts. ( WSJ, 
Aug 7 ’09, A i > If assets were continuously marked to market
then the losses and gains would be recorded whether or not 
the assets were sold, so accounting would not influence the 
hold—sell decision.
Since the overly lenient RAP has already been 
abolished, the only remaining problem areas are all aspects 
of GAAP. In particular, two changes are to be recommended :
1) Mark mortgages to market.
2) Disallow front-end fees and early interest payments 
from being recognized as income if such monies have
come out of the loan and were not externally
g e n e r a t e d .
Less urgent, but still worth considering, would be the 
recommendation that capital requirements, portfolio 
requirements and the like not be couched in terms referring
only to GAAP financial s t a t e m e n t s , if doing so leaves room
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for evasions or provides incentive for uneconomic actions.
In many situations GAAP would have to be supplemented with 
or replaced by other written regulations better designed to 
unmistakably prescribe desired economic behavior.
To What Extent Did Weak Auditing 
Standards Contribute to the Crisis?
Weak auditing standards cannot be considered one of the 
major causes of the crisis» but they did contribute a 
certain amount to the problem. Auditors who followed 
current standards of testing on some occasions did not 
discover problems which would have been uncovered had more 
rigorous standards been in f o r c e .
Auditing is an expensive p r o c e s s , and in this branch of 
applied statistics there is an especially pronounced problem 
of diminishing returns. Extremely rigorous standards would 
make audits vastly more expensive and probably not correct 
enough additional problems to make the added expense 
wor thwh i1e .
At present» the auditing standards that apply to banks 
are the same as those that apply to other businesses. In 
the wake of the current S&L crisis» it would seem wise to 
tighten up these standards somewhat » despite the additional 
cost of doing so. In a special report issued on April 6, 
1990» "the GAO said it is considering recommendations of
extraordinary auditing requirements» particularly for large 
b a n k s . Those would include more frequent on-site
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examinations by banking regulators as well as double teams 
of outside auditors.’* < WSJ, April 9 '90, Al 6 )
Before one condemns present auditing sta n d a r d s , it 
would bet well to remember that they already do require a 
high level of sampling and testing, as well as conservative 
provisions for loan losses and write-offs. The function of 
auditing is not to prevent the granting of bad loans, but 
only to verify that the financial statements accurately and 
fairly represent the financial affairs of the auditee.
Since the necessity of submitting financial statements to 
auditors abiding by present standards did little to deter 
the more risk—prone managements, it is hard to believe that 
the existence of somewhat tighter auditing standards would 
have been much more successful in holding back these risk- 
prone managers. For that r e a s o n , the strengthening of 
present auditing standards should be considered only a minor 
remedy for the crisis- This does not mean, however, that 
the standards should not be tightened as recommended by the 
G A O , for that agency would not have recommended these 
changes unless it had determined that such changes would be 
cost ef fee t i v e .
To What Extent Did Neolioent 
Auditors Contribute to the Crisis?
Although current auditing standards are already very 
high, these standards have not always been lived up to by 
auditors- There have been numerous reports of auditors
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accepting all management statements at face value» and 
accepting suspicious real—estate valuations without so much 
as a superficial on-site inspection. C a r e l e s s , overly- 
influenoed auditors have in many cases failed to meet the 
requirements for impartiality; adequate testing, sampling 
and inspections; and conservatively computed provisions for 
losses as well as timely write-offs.
Nearly all of the Big Six firms are being sued by RTC 
for purportedly negligent audits conducted by one or more 
member firms. Allowing undue dominance by clients, and 
taking unprofessional shortcuts are only two of the p r o b 1ems 
that occurred time and time again.
In spite of these embarrassing charges, it still holds 
true that the great majority of thrift losses arose from bad 
credit decisions, pure and simple. A good auditor will make 
sure that loss provisions and loan write-offs are adequate 
but he cannot prevent bad loans from being m a d e . For this 
reason, it is unreasonable to consider careless auditing to 
be a major cause of the crisis. There is, however, a 
reasonable charge that had some of the auditors done a more 
thorough job, then some of the more reckless managers would 
have been replaced earlier and losses would have been 
curtailed. Since it is only a small minority of the 
auditors that is being accused of carelessness, and since it 
is debatable how much additional money was lost because of 
them, or how much sooner miscreant managers might have been
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replaced» unprofessional audits must be considered a 
significant but not overwhelming negative influence in the 
crisis.
It /is well to remember that much of the impugnment of 
auditors arises from audits of fraudulent firms. It is 
unfortunately true that a criminal element was present in 
many failed thrifts. According U.S. News and W o r 1d Report » 
"One New York mobster turned up in deals in 130 thrifts» of 
which 125 failed." (See Zuc kerman » June 18 *90» p 9 2 .) An 
auditing team does not pretend to be a fraud squad. That is 
a different type of task requiring a different type of 
skills. It is so difficult and expensive to detect fraud 
when there is skilful collusion that detection of fraud is 
an unreasonable expectation of a normal team of CPAs.
Edward Kane has warned us against assuming that since fraud 
was involved in over half of the thrift failures that this 
means that half of the thrift losses were caused by fraud.
("The Unending Deposit— Insurance M e s s " » unpublished 
manuscript to be published in Sc i ence, p4 ) According to 
Professor Kane » in most of the failures where fraud was 
involved it was only a few deals that were tainted with this 
crime. Professor Kane estimates that losses due to fraud do 
not exceed 20% of industry losses» and may be as low as 10%. 
Thus even if auditors had been so spectacularly successful 
as to expose half of this fraud in time to recover the money 
< no mean feat even for crack law enforcement officers!) at
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least 90% of thrift losses would have remained unaffected- 
Bert Ely estimates that losses attributable to fraud are 
about 5%. (See M a h a r » B a r r o n 's » Sept 11 '89, p 2 4 .) Although
at th i s fpo i nt there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
belief of Professor Kane and Bert Ely that fraud has been 
one of the lesser causes of the crisis» nevertheless it is 
important to keep an open mind on this point» especially 
since Willi am Seidman contends that it was the main problem 
in 30% of the shutdowns that have occurred so f a r . (NYT»
June 6 ’90» A l ) On June 22, 1990 Representative Schumer <D—
NY) stated that losses due to fraud would total about $20 
bill ion » an estimate that concurs with the lower figures of 
Kane and E l y .
Robert Elliott of Peat Mar w i c k » a nationally known 
auditing expert» maintains that CPAs are being "used as a 
scapegoat for bad laws» poor regulation and incompetent 
management ...Congress deregulated the left side of the 
balance s h e e t .... now legislators are blaming accountants for 
creating this mess." (WSJ » Feb 6 ’89» B3>
Perhaps the greatest favor that could ever be done for 
CPAs to rid them of management pressures would be to 
institute some hiring system in which auditors would not 
work for management and in that way be subject to tacit 
threats of dismissal. Like any other business» an 
accounting firm cannot afford to lose a big client. If a 
situation comes up in which it is professionally defensible
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to take two positions the natural temptation will be to take 
the position more favorable to the client. This would be 
innocuous if it only happened in one or two small matters in 
an ent i ne aud it, but when it occurs numerous times it can 
result in an overall bias which does indeed compromise the 
validity of the aud it, though individually each of the 
discretionary actions could be successfully defended.
Since the taxpayer is deeply involved with the thrift 
industry, and since undue influence has been a problem, 
perhaps the Office of Thrift Supervision (GTS) might 
consider appointing itself the employer for all thrift 
audits. Individual thrifts would be assessed an annual fee 
to cover costs but all hiring and dismissal authority would 
reside in the Office of Thr i f t Supervision. This is an 
extremely radical suggestion, and since poor audits are only 
a secondary or tertiary cause of the thrift crisis, it might 
not be a good idea to bring in such a plan right aw a y , there 
being so many other areas of concern requiring more 
immediate attention. In the meantime, however, regulators 
and legislators should give long and careful thought to 
possible measures along these lines if there appears be a 
chronic problem of managements intentionally or 
unintentionally undermining the independence of auditors.
Perhaps lawsuits against accounting firms, although 
sometimes merited, are also in large measure motivated by 
the desire to pursue deep pockets. All too often there is
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iittle point in pursuing -fraudulent managers. They usually 
have dissipated their ill-gotten gains, making civil remedy 
■futile, although their lack of honesty makes one wonder if 
some of/these corrupt former managers might not have hidden 
much of their booty for later recovery.
Criminal charges have been brought against a number of 
allegedly fraudulent managers. Convictions, h o w ever, are 
extremely difficult to obtain, given the complexity of these 
white-collar crimes and the need to prove criminal intent. 
Willi am Seidman has wryly noted that a theft of $500 out in 
a public street is usually severely punished while a multi- 
mi 1 1 ion—do 1 1 ar— thef t perpetrated by a polite, well-dressed 
thrift manager is often dealt with sympathetically, 
especially by a jury.
The Special Problem of What 
To Include in Owner Capital 
Everyone agrees that undistributed profits, i.e. 
retained earnings, and contributed capital, i.e. cash 
originally invested, are true owner capital, in substance as 
well as in form. However, controversy arises as soon as a 
suggestion is made to recognize anything else as owner 
cap i ta 1.
Because GAAP statements are not directed at any one 
group of interested parties but aim to provide reliable 
financial information for use by all, it is understandable 
that GAAP is conceived in extremely general terms and
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occasionally must be modified to meet the specific needs of 
a particular user g r o u p .
No better example of this can be found than the varying 
ways owner capital must be computed to suit the various 
groups. An uninsured depositor will be mainly concerned 
with the safety of his deposits. For his purposes, owner 
capital can be very broadly defined since all that concerns 
him is the priority of claims in case of bankruptcy, and for 
that reason bonds, preferred shares, deferred taxes, 
contingency reserves and common equity all may be grouped 
together under the general designation capital, since all of 
them have a claim subordinate to his own. Of course, this 
improvised change in the definition of capital results in a 
misnomer, capable of creating communication snags, but the 
needs of this particular user are better served when the 
account called capital is, for him, computed in this way. 
This broad definition of capital is in sharp contrast to the 
narrow one which would best serve the investor in search of 
leverage- This individual would only want to count that 
portion of equity having claim to residual earnings. 
Preferred shares are certainly capital, legally speaking, 
for they do not confer upon their owners the power to force 
bankruptcy, and yet <assuming they are of the usual 
nonparticipating variety) such shares have the same effect 
on leverage as b o n d s , since they only have a fixed claim on 
profits- For this reason the computation of capital that
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Mould best serve a leverage seeker would only include the 
value of common shares fully diluted* and would even exclude 
preferred shares.
These two examples serve to demonstrate that GAAP is 
not an end unto itself, but only a tool to be used by 
decision m a k e r s , who will usually not hesitate to make 
whatever modifications are dictated by the specific 
application at hand.
Since the imposition of higher capital standards has 
been widely proposed as a measure to help prevent future 
thrift insurance losses, an important question is : what 
definition of capital is the most relevant to the financial 
interests of the insurer?
There are two quite distinct ways in which high capital 
standards can protect the interests of the insurer, and each 
requires a slightly different strategy to be made fully 
effective. The first and by far best known function of high 
capital standards is the cushion it provides against 
insurance liability. If the main point of imposing higher 
capital standards is to put in place a financial b u f f e r , 
then it would make sense to include any monies which would 
be available to depositors before insurance money had to be 
resorted to. This would include bonds, debentures, 
preferred shares, common equity, loan— loss reserves and 
other contingency funds, and deferred taxes (which, of 
course, in a bankruptcy are permanent 1 y d e f e r r e d , i.e.
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cancelled» with the value of the account reverting to the 
thrift o w n e r s ) . These are the credit accounts that have 
claims subordinate to the claims of depositors and hence may 
be included in capital if the cash—cushion approach is to be 
used -
Certain adjustments» however, must be made for the 
values of the intangible assets which as a group tend either 
to be unmarketable or else of very uncertain value. 
Obviously, goodwill is meaningless in a normal bankruptcy, 
unless a buyer intends to keep the thrift operating as 
before, in which case the franchise value, or marketing 
value of the thrift might have ongoing value. Even in this 
case it seems improbable that the recorded value of the 
goodwill would be accurate. By definition goodwill 
represents the ability of a business to earn excess profits 
over and above what is normal considering the value of its 
other a s s e t s . If a thrift is bankrupt, it, by definition, 
has had negative earnings, and if there are negative 
earnings how can there be excess earnings? Although unusual 
conditions can occasionally reconcile the coexistence of 
goodwill with negative net worth, a far likelier explanation 
is that the goodwill recorded on the company's books, which 
may at one time have really existed, has been dissipated 
regardless of the number of years remaining in its 
amortization. This is why lenders generally draw a line 
through the goodwill account and immediately make a
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deduction from owner equity. It is an evanescent asset. It 
can go on for years pulling in superior earnings» or it can 
disappear in a flash. The lenders who draw a line through 
the goodwill account are not saying that the goodwill is not 
real at the time, or that it does not have commercial v a l u e . 
All they are saying is that its value as collateral is zero 
because if a loan becomes nonperforming then it is highly 
probable that the superior performance embodied in the 
goodwill account has vanished, and, by definition, the 
goodwill along with it.
This is why FIRREA is requiring that goodwill be 
deducted from capital. In a distress situation requiring 
insurance payouts any goodwill recorded on the books is 
highly unlikely to be real, and this fact will be reflected 
in the prices bid for the troubled thrift. On occasion 
bankruptcy is caused by extreme mismanagement or fraud, and 
the unfortunate thrift really does have goodwill, i.e. 
strong franchise value, which will induce a bidder to offer 
more than he normally would in such distress circumstances. 
Usually, however, when there is a bankruptcy, goodwill as a 
real asset is long gone, and its precautionary advance 
deduction from capital is entirely logical.
Another asset that presents problems is mortgage- 
servicing rights. These rights are not as liquid as most 
financial instruments and their net realizable value is hard 
to estimate. Because the exit value of servicing rights is
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very indefinite they cannot be relied upon as contributing 
to a cash buffer and accordingly should normally be deducted 
from the capital account. If* h o w e v e r , the market value of 
these servicing rights has been established through an 
arm's— length transaction* then there is no reason for them 
not to be accepted as a valid a s s e t . Eric H e m e 1, an analyst 
with First Boston Corporation, believes that it is 
acceptable to give mor tgage —serv ici ng rights the same 
recognition as any other asset * provided they are fairly 
priced, which he concedes is not always the c a s e . < American
Banker* July 31 '89, p 12) FIRREA only allows the inclusion
of these rights if they have been purchased* and therefore 
have a demonstrable value.
Although deductions for these two accounts are not 
likely to arouse much controversy, a rather surprising 
objection to the inclusion of deferred loan losses* a credit 
account, has been raised by William Seidman. ( NYT, May 25 
'89, pi) Since there is no GAAP requirement to maintain 
such an account, Mr. S e i d m a n ’s position, on theoretical 
grounds would seem to be untenable* in that at any time this 
type of account may be closed out into owner equity.
However it seems likely, given Mr. Seidman's attitude on 
this issue, that in his many years as a bank regulator he 
has seen this type of account abused. The most likely abuse 
would be to use the existence of this account to justify not 
having a sufficiently large c ontra—asset adjustment account
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to the receivables a c c o u n t . It is likely that in many cases 
the credit account "deferred losses" should be closed out to 
the account "allowance for bad d e b t s " , also a credit 
ac c o u n t »/ but structured as a contra—asset a c c o u n t , or» if it 
is deemed appropriate to take care of the matter in such a 
way that loan losses are deducted from current income then 
the account could be closed out to equity after which there 
could be an entry debiting loss expense and crediting 
allowance for loan losses which would put the account where 
it belongs» give current— income recognition to loan write­
off expense » and get the account removed from the o w n e r ’s 
equity section of the balance sheet where it is likely to be 
claimed» in many cases w r o n g f u l l y , as an available cash 
cush ion.
In s u m m a r y , then » if the sole purpose of requiring 
strong capital standards were to have access to a strong 
cash buffer then all bond and debenture debt, all equity, 
deferred taxes and perhaps some reserves could be included 
with deductions being made for goodwill and any asset having 
unusually uncertain sales values, most notably mortgage- 
servicing rights.
There is much merit in wanting to see a built-in cash 
cushion to protect the insurer in case of insolvency, and 
this is deemed by Brumbaugh to be the main reason for 
imposing higher capital standards- However there does exist 
a second » perhaps equally important, reason for requiring
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higher capital s tandards: reduction of moral hazard. When 
owners and managers have more of their own money at stake 
they tend to operate the thrift in a more responsible 
m a n n e r ./ Experience has shown that when risk—prone managers 
are operating at their worst» there can be such a 
precipitous rate of decline in thrift net value that even a
10% cash buffer very high by modern investment standards—
can be quickly wiped out. While FIRREA has endeavored to 
reduce the opportunities for excess risk taking by means of 
greater regulation, the thrift crisis has furnished so many 
examples of managers able to get around regulations that it 
would be extremely optimistic to hope that the new lending 
requirements in FIRREA all by themselves can end imprudent 
management behavior- As praiseworthy as FIRREA may be, just 
in case it turns out not to be quite strong enough medicine 
to cure the risk problem, the thrift industry should also 
avail itself of whatever additional r i sk-deterrence can 
arrived at by limiting the number of items that may be 
counted in owner capital.
If reduction of moral hazard is to be the main focus of 
capita1—standards reform then what matters most is that 
capital be defined in such a way as to discourage excessive 
common— shareholder leverage. When those persons who have a 
vote in the running of the thrift have relatively little of 
their own money to lose, and yet are positioned to reap ail 
the residual benefits of any gains, they have an incentive
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to take risks. If such i terns as subordinated debt and 
preferred shares are allowed to be counted as capital then 
the perverse situation will frequently arise in which a 
thrift v̂ i 11 have a positive market net value and yet the 
financial interest of the decision makers will be virtually 
zero- Of course» this situation creates the same nothing— 
to— lose incentive to gamble that has been the main cause of 
the crisis.
A further problem is that of adverse selection. If 
thrift capital is too inclusively defined then the type of 
common—stock investor that is needed will be deterred while 
the type of investors most dangerous to the thrift will be 
attracted» hence the expression adverse selection. As a 
thrift begins to lose value the common stock will be the 
first thrift securities to undergo a deterioration in market 
value. This increases the leverage » while debasing the 
quality of the shares to a low speculative grade. Even 
though the thrift may still have a positive market net 
value» tKe residual value, i.e. the market value of the 
common shares » will be very low. At this point what is 
needed is prudent management to stem the losses. But this 
is not the type of management the thrift is likely to get in 
these circumstances. Because the shares are of a highly 
leveraged speculative grade the only investors who will 
continue to hold such shares or willingly buy them will be 
persons of a strong gambling temperament. More prudent
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investors— the kind sorely needed— will shun these low-grade 
s h a r e s . And in this way control will pass to those least 
likely to exercise it wisely.
If fthe purpose of capital-standards reform is 
behavioral change on the part of managers» then the only 
owner capital that matters is that possessed by those who 
control the m a n a g e r s , i.e. holders of common shares. The 
existence of large numbers of preferred shares and/or 
subordinated debentures is irrelevant to the interests of 
common shareholders» and therefore potential losses by such 
senior claimholders cannot be reasonably be expected to 
worry common shareholders who control management any more 
than potential losses by the insurer have worried them in 
the past. To avoid this moral hazard » and to avoid the 
problem of adverse selection» thrift capital should be very 
narrowly defined to include only common stock plus whatever 
residual accounts would revert to the common shareholders in 
case of breakup $ such as deferred taxes and perhaps certain 
discretionary reserves. A case can be made even for 
excluding nonvoting common stock from capital in that such 
holdings do not represent wealth that is subject to loss by 
those in control- They do however dilute the potential 
payoff of any gambles so they do in this way deter risk- 
taking» and reduce the problem of excess leverage which is 
the main cause of adverse selection and much of the cause of 
moral h a z a r d . Because gains and losses by nonvoting share­
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holders cannot occur without corresponding gains and losses 
by the voting shareholders» owner—managers will not be as 
unconcerned about protecting the financial interests of 
these security holders as they might be about protecting the 
fincancial interests of preferred shareholders or 
bondholders. This being the c a s e , a heavy weighting of such 
shares in a firm's capital structure, with less reliance on 
bonds and preferred s h a r e s , will affect in a positive manner 
the behavior of the owner—managers. Because nonvoting 
common equity does in this way help to reduce the moral 
hazard problem, it would probably not be any great mistake 
to allow it to be included in owner capital, although it 
might be wise to only allow it to be counted on a partial
basis perhaps 5 0% the reason for this being that although
it dilutes the potential payoff of imprudent gambling by 
m a n a g e m e n t , it also dilutes the potential downside to voting 
share—h o i d e r s , making risk— taking less dangerous.
Whether one takes the moral—hazard approach to capital 
or the cash—cushion approach, the reasoning behind the 
deductions for uncertain assets such as goodwill remains the 
same, and the same deductions are appropriate in either 
c a s e.
Auditors and regulators will not always find it easy to 
keep ahead of imaginative thrift operators who can sometimes 
come up with surprising ways to comply with capital
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requirements. When the now—defunct Silverado Savings and 
Loan of Denver wanted to bolster its weak capital levels it 
loaned certain developers with whom it had close relations 
money with the stipulation either that all or part of the 
money be used to buy Silverado stock. ( WSJ, Dec 12 '88» C6> 
Of course this practice makes a mockery of capital 
s t andards. Using this approach to capital compliance 
anybody at all could open a new bank without investing a 
cent and yet be in full compliance simply by lending himself 
or a close relative or friend enough of the insured deposits 
to buy whatever amount of stock was required to meet capital 
requirements. The unfortunate incident at Silverado 
highlights the need for extreme examiner vigilance if non— 
arm's-length transactions and relationships are to be 
exposed and hopefully p r e v e n t e d .
How Much Capital Ought to Be Required?
The amount of owner capital needed to effectively 
inhibit excessive risk taking is quite low. Furthermore» 
the amount of capital that can be demanded of investors is 
also low since housing loans are not suffiently profitable 
to make investment in thrifts financially attractive without 
the benefit of fairly strong leverage. Paul DeRosa, of 
Eastbridge Capital » has pointed out that only 246 of the 910 
S&Ls that were solvent in 1988 earned the 12’/. return on 
equity that he maintains is generally considered the minimal
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acceptable level for commercial banks. (American Banker ,
July 21 ’89, p4)
According to Ned E i c h 1er, president of the investment 
firm of the same n a m e , 3% real market capital contribution
is about the going rate for an S&L that has no particular 
problems. (N Y T , Dec 10 ’88, Sec 3 p 2 ) Willi am Seidman also
advocates a standard of 3%. (N Y T , May 25 ’89, pi)
An amazingly stringent proposed standard was forwarded 
by Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a group of banking 
scholars. Their s p okesman, Professor Edwards of Columbia 
University, proposed bringing in a 10% requirement with 
government takeover mandated should the capital fall below 
3%. (WSJ, Feb 14 ’09, C 2 3 > Although according to Koch
(p 188) 20% owner capital was common at the turn of the
century, nowadays even this 10% proposal must be considered 
an out 1i e r .
Perhaps the best answer to the question of how much 
tangible capital ought to be required is furnished by Koch. 
Koch (p p 197-9) refuses to give a number, but only states 
that the greater the riskiness of a f i r m ’s operations and/or 
assets the higher the required level of capital should be. 
Since Koch refuses to commit himself to any particular 
number, it is probably safe to assume that the level of 
tangible capital which ought to be required is whatever 
level can be extracted from thrift investors. If the going 
rate for return on equity makes 3% unacceptable to
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investors , then regulators might have to be satisfied with 
1.5 or 2%. Because it has been conceded by investment 
authorities that 3% tangible capital is about the going rate 
for heal/thy thr if t s » this level would probably be a good 
point of departure. At present only 1.5% is in effect with 
phased— in increases to 3% planned.
Allowing such a period of adjustment is not 
unreasonable, considering the enormity of recent problems. 
Even the comparatively mild 1.5% tangible capital 
requirement should go a long way towards solving the moral— 
hazard problem since it will guarantee that owners and 
managers will at least have some real capital to lose 
whereas in the past they often had not a cent at s t a k e .
1.5% of assets is not a strong cash cushion, but it is far 
better than what has existed up to now, and hopefully if it 
is enforced as a threshold figure for swift and certain 
shutdowns then any liquidations will either cost the insurer 
nothing at all or else very little.
If money cannot be found to raise thrift equity levels 
to more desirable levels, and if the current transitional 
1-5% tangib1e —c a p i t a 1 requirement, combined with other 
FIRREA reforms, is proven by experience to be adequate 
deterrence to risk taking, then the ultimate goal of 3% 
capitalization might have to be reconsidered- GNMA and FNMA 
have much safer portfolios, having 100% in home mortgages 
instead of the 70% required of thrifts by FIRREA, but
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required tangible capital in these agencies is only 1%. 
Because thrifts* even after FIRREA* do have more leeway for 
risk-taking and often retain some credit risk for mortgages 
sold for securitization* it is only fair that they should be 
more c o nservâtively capitalized than FNMA and GNMA* but 
requiring three times as much equity seems somewhat on the 
high side. Fortunately the requirements in FIRREA are not 
carved in stone and if 3% proves to be somewhat excessive it 
can easily be moderated by legislative ame n d m e n t .
What Are the Pros and Cons of Risk—Related 
Capital Standards and Insurance Premiums?
The increased flow of capital across international 
borders has increased the pressure on bank regulators in the 
major western nations to harmonize their regulatory 
standards so that holders of wealth cannot play one nation 
off against another in their investment decisions thereby 
undermining world—wide banking standards. A recent meeting 
in Basel of the central bank regulators of the major western 
countries resulted in the adoption of risk—related capital 
standards to be enforced by all the signatory nations. All 
thrifts and banks covered by this agreement must by 1993 
have equity amounting to 8% of risk—ad justed assets.
Because the object of this calculation is to obtain more 
equity when there is greater risk, assets deemed to be of 
above-average risk are given a higher value. There are 
numerous multiples to reflect extra degrees of risk- For
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 2 7 -
example» if a house loan is made for more than 80% of market 
value then this particular mortgage asset would be carried 
at a higher r i sk—ad justed value. Interest—rate risk is 
recognized as well. The effect on net value of a two—point 
rise or fall in interest rates is calculated and the greater 
the potential fluctuation in net value> the greater the 
required percentage of owner capital. <WSJ, Nov 29 '88, A4) 
There are essentially two objections to risk—related 
capital standards <and by extension risk—related insurance 
premiums). First of all, risk is devilishly difficult to 
compute, as Professor Benston points out in the passage 
quoted on pages 86 and 87 of this paper. Secondly, adoption 
of risk—related capital stan d a r d s , according to some, 
confers upon government regulators illegitimately gained 
powers to influence how credit shall be allocated. The 
internationally set standards are only a minimum. Once the 
general policy is adopted there is nothing to prevent 
regulators from arbitrarily increasing the capital required 
for certain types of loans and in this way inhibiting 
certain economic activities.
Since successful crisis prevention will depend mainly 
on r i sk—prevent ion, and since risk—based capital standards, 
despite certain imperfections, overall will nearly certainly 
be a deterrence to risk-taking, it is just as well that the 
United States has signed the recent international agreement 
to adopt risk—related capital standards.
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It is true that this expansion of regulatory control 
may give regulators and legislators inordinate economic 
power. Perhaps from time to time a hidden social or 
ideological agenda may influence how assets are rated 
instead of the ratings being based purely on honestly 
perceived expected losses. Because this potential problem 
has been raised there must be close scrutiny and periodic 
re—evaluation of any program of this nature in order to 
expose any abuses which may arise* and perhaps to debate 
whether with proper controls such influences might not be 
legitimate* perhaps along the line of tax laws which often 
are constructed not merely to raise revenue but also to 
affect behavior.
Taking into account these pub 1ic-po1icy complications 
as well as the admitted difficulties of accurate risk 
appraisal * it must be admitted that risk —related capital 
standards are certain to be somewhat controversial * 
especially at first* but the severity of the current 
financial crisis is ample justification for having adopted 
this policy even though the problems have not all been 
entirely worked out.
In a sense risk—related capital standards have already 
existed for some time in that GNMA and FNMA are only 
required to have a 1 % rate of capitalization which is in 
sharp contrast with the higher rates applying to thrifts.
On the surface, this disparity seems very surprising since
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these agencies, and thr i f ts are all in the business of 
providing mortgage funding. The only reasonable explanation 
for this difference is that the two types of institutions 
have dil^fering levels of risk. If this is true then these 
disparate rates are manifestations of de facto risk-related 
capital standards.
Although risk—related capital standards involve certain 
practical difficulties, the involvement of the insurerer in 
potential losses makes it reasonable to want more of a cash 
buffer when additional risks are taken on. Virtually all 
insurers respond to increased risk by requiring a higher 
deductible (i.e. the cash buffer made available by the 
o w n e r s ’ equity) and/or higher premiums- Risk-related 
insurance premiums and capital standards viewed in the 
context of general insurance practices is not at all a 
radical suggestion.
Is There Any Leoi t imate Place 
For Capital Forbearance?
No matter how low the standards are set, whether in 
absolute terms, or r i sk —ad justed terms, there will be some 
deserving thrifts unable to comply, and in many of these 
cases it was the regulator that got them into trouble. 
Charles McCoy mentions a certain thrift in Chicago (Ta 1man 
S & L ) which was created in 1982 at the behest of regulators. 
This thrift has a negative net worth when regulatory 
goodwill is disallowed. According to McCoy this particular
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thrift is exceptionally well run and is improving its 
position every year. In spite of this, however, at the 
present rate of earnings it will be a number of years before 
it is in^ compliance with required tangible capital. McCoy 
relates that regulators have unofficially told him that 
because of its steady improvement they intend to go easy on 
this particular thrift, granting it exemptions to tide it 
over. ( WSJ, Dec 7  '89, A 1 ) This case brings to the fore the
question of forbea r a n c e , and in particular the ethical 
dilemma of whether the Government has the responsibility to 
continue honoring regulatory goodwill when it was granted as 
an inducement to persuade a thrift to take over a negative— 
net—worth thrift without the amount of the negative net 
worth being made up in c a s h , as would be done in most 
private a r m ’s-length transact ion s .
It does not seem like go o d —faith business or regulatory 
practice to shut down a thrift when the only reason the 
thrift got into trouble was that it previously took actions 
that were urged upon it by the regulators themselves. Using 
this argument Representative Hyde (R— IL> garnered 
considerable support from his colleagues in his efforts to 
protect these thrifts from losing this goodwill and being 
forced out of business because of capital noncompliance.
The day the unsuccessful vote was taken many of these 
Congressmen wore badges reading "A Deal is a Deal", and it 
is hard to refute the logic of their position.
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Legally» h o w e v e r , the thrifts that made these 
uneconomic acquisitions at the suggestion of the government 
have little ground to stand on. Richard B . Schmitt writes :
■/ "..Law professors . . C say ] . . that normal 
contract— law principles apply most rigourously in 
the procurement a r e a , but that when it comes to 
policy m a t t e r s , including the levying of taxes, 
the government has considerably more discretion.
* We all benefit from loopholes that at any moment 
may be withdrawn*' said W.F, Young, a law 
professor and contract— law expert at Columbia 
University School of Law in New York.
"A century ago, he s a i d , the U.S. Supreme 
Court backed the State of Michigan, which had 
granted a tax exemption to entrepreneurs to build 
railroads in the state and then decided to tax the 
railroads after they were built. The court held 
that *it was an inducemnt C sic3, and that although 
the investors had relied on it, they could not 
expect the courts to hold the government to 
maintain a tax advantage over a period of time,' 
according to Mr. Young, who said the case is still 
good law." (W S J . April 4 '89, A12 >
The words just quoted explain what the situation is, 
and has been for the last century. The ability of the state 
to abrogate agreements that between private parties would be 
binding should have been drawn to the attention of the 
complaining thrifts by their lawyers. Like the privilege of 
eminent domain, this unusual power to abrogate agreements 
is, according to the Supreme Court, conferred upon the 
Federal Government by the Constitution so that the public 
good may always receive the first consideration. Th u s , in a 
narrow legal s e n s e , the unfortunate thrifts that are losing 
their regulatory goodwill and as a result face a capital— 
noncomp1iance shutdown have no right to complain. They
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should have known right from the start that in the event of 
an overall thrift ciampdown they could lose this goodwill.
Because the current situation is an emergency, first 
considei^ation must be given to the tasks at hand : reforming 
the industry and cutting losses. One must feel sorry for 
the unfortunate thrifts who believed that the Federal 
Government would honor its word. Extending forbearance to 
these thrifts» who provided help in the p a s t , would under 
the circumstances seem the ethical thing to do. 
Unfortunately» moral probity for its own sake has no more 
place in thrift reform than it would have in extinguishing a 
house fire. In this present emergency the only possible 
justification for being charitable— i.e. granting capital 
forbearance— is that such a policy would pay in the long 
run -
If the only reason that a thrift folds is that it
trusted the Government, then the Government will be
seriously disadvantaged in any future negotiations with 
investors, since they will be able to point to these 
repudiations and demand a hefty premium as compensation for 
the risk of abrogation. In other words, even though the
Government can get away with doing this, it may not be in
its best interests to do so.
However » if leniency is granted to institutions such as 
T a 1man » which are in trouble mainly because they cooperated 
with regulators, there is a danger that leniency may also be
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shown to less worthy institutions setting the stage for 
large-scale losses. This is why Edward Kane opposes any 
forbearances w h a t e v e r . ("The Unending Deposit— Insurance 
Mess", «unpublished paper to be published in Sc ience , p 18)
It m a y , however, be excessively rigorous to completely ban 
any and all forbearance.
The importance of maintaining the reputation of bank 
regulatory agencies as good—faith bargainers suggests that 
the thrifts encumbered with large amounts of regulatory 
goodwill should be shown some extra consideration. Provided 
there is strict monitoring, and provided these capital 
forbearances are few and far between, it might not be 
incompatible with the public interest to hold certain 
closure actions in abeyance as long as there are positive 
real earnings. Nor is it asking too much to expect such 
favored thrifts to agree to certain "belt — t ightening" 
measures until compliance has been achieved. O n e ’s sympathy 
for T a l m a n 's plight is sorely tried by reports that it has 
continued right along to pay dividends. ( NYT, Dec 6 ’89, Cl)
Perhaps what is called for in these cases is a set of 
clearly outlined criteria stating under what exact 
circumstances extra time to achieve compliance may be 
granted, and what exact operational restrictions shall apply 
during the probationary period- Such restrictions would 
typically include limits on g r o w t h , tightened rules 
governing new lending, and limitations on salaries
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<including excessively generous severance agreements, often 
known as "golden p a r a c h u t e s " >, as well as limitations on 
dividends and subord inated—debt payouts (interest or 
principal). If there were c 1earcut rules governing 
eligibility for forbearance then it would not be a 
discretionary favor that would give a capita 1 —deficient 
thrift the right to remain open, but clearcut regulation. 
Kane feels that industry discipline is compromised if 
regulatory intervention is not certain and predictable.
These objections could be largely overcome by making capital 
forbearance automatically available to any thrift meeting 
certain stringent criteria, and definitely unavailable to 
any thrift not meeting them. Hopefully any such 
codification would be so strict that only the very most 
deserving would receive this favorable treatment— perhaps 
only a dozen or two out of the several hundred insolvent 
S&Ls.
What Role Has Interest-Rate Risk 
Played in the Crisis?
S&Ls have traditionally had dangerously high exposure 
to interest-rate risk. For years they were warned of the 
dangers of lending long and borrowing short. In fairness to 
the thrift industry, it should be pointed out that the chief 
hedge against interest —ra te risk, A R M s ? were no t legalized 
until the '0Os, so Congress must bear some of the blame for 
excessive exposure to i nterest —rate risk which affected the
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industry. Thrifts did not lobby very hard to have ARMs 
legalized» h o w e v e r , and the industry's former influence was 
so great that it is probable that had thrifts strongly 
demanded the right the issue ARMs this would have been 
gr a n t e d , so» to a large measure » it was the industry's own 
complacency that left the excessive interest—rate risk in 
place for so many years.
It is nearly always the c a s e , in borrowing, that long­
term rates are higher than short-term r a t e s . Although it 
may occasionally happen that the 90-day rate in force at a 
given time may exceed the rate being earned on some of the 
older long-term mortgages held in a thrift's portfolio, 
overall the portfolio of long-term mortgages nearly always 
earns enough interest income to adequately cover the 
interest payments that must be made to short-term 
depositors. This» combined with the former long-lasting 
interest—rate stability enabled thrifts to get away with the 
dangerous funding mismatches that had always worried the 
most conservative authorities.
In the late '70s, h o w e v e r , this long streak of luck ran 
out and the long—predicted interest—rate squeeze finally did 
occur. Had deposit insurance been more prudently designed, 
or else, had capital standards been stricter, then there 
would have been no public crisis, for the weaker S&Ls would 
have been swiftly put out of business by 1982 and the 
extreme costs to the public which ensued would have been
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avoided. T h u s , it was not interest—rate risk that caused 
the present crisis, but the failure of ineffective safety 
mechanisms to shut down the thrifts whose unpreparedness for 
interest— rate problems rendered them insolvent. Needless to 
say, even though other reforms are more u r g e n t , there is 
much to be gained in terms of greater industry stability if 
in the future thrifts are required to be better prepared for 
wide interest—rate swings-
What Can Thrifts Do to Protect 
Themselves From Interest—Rate Risk?
If one assumes that thrifts will continue by and large 
to hold mortgage assets, rather than selling them, then far 
and away the main hope for reducing exposure to interest- 
rate risk will be to issue as many ARMs as possible, rather 
than long-term m o r t g a g e s , which typically have fixed rates 
for thirty years. In an ARM the interest rate is adjusted 
at predetermined intervals, usually once a year. The 
borrower has the protection of a binding formula which 
anchors future rates to some publicly quoted rate, often the 
rate paid on 9 0 —day Treasury Bills or the more slowly 
changing cost of funds based on deposit rates demanded in a 
well defined market, e.g. the State of California. Further 
protection is usually provided by a cap higher than which 
the rates may never be raised. Sometimes there is also a 
maximum payment which will never be exceeded no matter how 
high the rates go. It is possible, if rates rose high
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e n o u g h t that the payment Mould not cover all the interest 
and the debt would actually increase each m o n t h , although 
this would hopefully be only a temporary situation 
r e s o 1v a b le either by lower rates or voluntarily raised 
payments. Normally the interest—rate cap would prevent this 
from happening. ARMs have been fairly well accepted and 
according to American Banker (Aug lO '09» 5A) now account 
for o n e — third of new mortgages. According to this 
publication this swingover to ARMs has enabled thrifts to 
cut their interest—rate risk» as measured by the funding 
gap » to half of what it was in 1984. (The funding gap is 
computed by dividing the difference between current 
liabilities and current assets by the value of the total 
a s s e t s .>
If every 30—year mortgage could be matched dollar for 
dollar by a 30—year CD then long-term mortgages would 
present no interest-rate risk, since interest paid and 
interest charged could be matched. Since very few savers 
are willing to have their money tied up for so long» the 
only way to arrive at a closer funding match is to issue as 
many ARMs as possible. Unf or tunately » this is easier said 
than d o n e . The public is very attached to the traditional 
fixed—rate 30—year mortgages. S&Ls usually must offer 
borrowers strong incentives to get them to switch to ARMs. 
The main incentive is usually a substantially lower rate of 
interest on ARMS. Currently the difference is about 1.75%
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(Consumer advisers generally consider 2% to be about the 
minimum difference in rates required to make ARMs the 
recommended choice.) Another common inducement is to make 
such mortgages available with very low handling fees.
Unfortunately * S&Ls have been so eager to persuade borrowers 
to take out ARMs that they have occasionally gone overboard 
in offering incentives» most notably in charging below— 
market rates for the first y e a r . Losses resulting from 
these giveaway policies do not in any way negatively reflect 
upon the intrinsic merits of ARMs. In an article entitled 
"Lenders Bid Farewell to Bargain Arms'* William Cel is III 
describes the problems lenders have had in striking a happy 
medium. <W S J » June 1 '89 » B 1 >
Although 3 0 —year mortgages are considered risky, they 
have a further flaw in that the risk is lopsided. Because 
there is no way to abrogate the contract as long as the 
borrower makes his payments as agreed, when rates rise the 
only way for the bank to get rid of the money— losing 
mortgage is to sell it on the secondary markets » usually at 
a great discount. If, however, rates fall, and the mortgage 
becomes a desirable source of high interest earnings the 
borrower is permitted to pay it off at any time, usually 
with no more than a slight penalty of three m onths’ interest 
or so. To remove this inequity it perhaps would be 
reasonable to greatly stiffen the prepayment penalty 
perhaps requiring six or nine m o n t h s ’ interest instead and
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h o p e f u l l y , in addition to dividing the risk more fairly, a 
stringent payout requirement of this nature might provide 
additional incentive for borrowers to switch to A R M s .
FIRREA Atrongly encourages the switchover to ARMs in that 
the newly adopted risk—related capital standards require 
that long-term mortgages must be backed up with a higher 
percentage of owner capital.
In addition to ARMs there are numerous other possible 
hedging practices, but none of these is likely to become 
widely accepted. For one thing, FIRREA only allows 30% of a 
thrift's assets to be non—housing related, which leaves less 
scope than before for hedging activities. Balderston (pl61) 
refers, with approval, to the suggestion of Professor Paul 
H. Horvitz of the University of Houston that exposure to 
intere st—rate risk be calculated and overcome by the 
issuance of subordinated debentures specially designed to 
counteract the i nterest—rate risk and so Id only to certain 
sophisticated investors willing to participate in such a 
hedging arrangement. More publicity has been given to 
hedging techniques involving such types of innovative 
securities as the interest—rat e —futures contracts sold 
mainly in the Chicago Futures Market. Barbara Donnelly 
reports that "while there are sophisticated futures and 
options strategies that can hedge a t h r i f t ’s interest—rate 
exposure, the cost of using them can be prohibitive." <HSJ , 
Jan 27 '89, Cl) Indeed hedging, which one would expect to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
— 1 4 0  —
be praised, since it is a risk-reducer, is often, with the 
exception of ARMs, criticized as being outside the 
legitimate scope of lending institutions whose purpose is to 
promote^home ownership. In a lengthy editorial entitled 
"Financial Vietnam" a certain strongly hedged thrift, 
Franklin S&L of Ottawa, K a n s a s , is condemned by the W a 11 
Street Journal which flatly states "..there's no reason for 
taxpayers to subsidize a hedging operation." (W S J , April 2 
'90, A14) On April 17 '90 the Journal published a letter 
from Professor Pyle of the University of California,
Berkely, who likewise condemns the hedging practices at 
Frank 1 in, and further points out that such sophisticated 
schemes are a drain on regulatory manpower in that it takes 
considerable study for a regulator to fully grasp all the 
fine points of such schemes.
Since a large-scale switchover to ARMs would probably 
provide adequate protection against interest—rate risk, it 
will not likely be necessary for thrifts to use the other, 
more controversial hedging devices.
How Good Is President Bush's Rescue Plan?
When one considers the importance and complication of 
the various S&L reforms already mentioned, one can see that 
an effective thrift— rescue bill is a massive undertaking. 
Mention has been made so far of the various reforms which 
are deemed likeliest to prevent future problems, but 
prevention of future troubles is only part of the task at
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hand. A good thr m f t bill must also set up ■funding and 
stipulate exact procedures for shutting down the hundreds of 
thrifts which currently are insolvent* many of them 
hopelessly so, and additionally must deal with the problem 
of how to dispose of the assets— many of them problem 
assets— which fall into the hands of the Government in 
connection with thrift bankruptcies.
With regard to future crisis prevention* experts agree 
that there need to be 1) adequate real—market—value capital 
standards and S> reduced insurance coverage. These are the 
two a l 1-important changes that are emphasized by virtually 
all experts. The imposition and strict enforcement of 
reasonable r e a 1—mar ket—va lue capital standards < even at a 
level of 1.5 or 2%) would prevent a recurrence of heavy 
taxpayer loss since strict enforcement of such standards 
would ensure that founder ing S&Ls would be shut down while 
still possessing enough net worth to pay off depositors. 
Insurance phase—down would also prevent a recurrence of 
trouble since it would make it impossible for unsound 
thrifts to raise money. This remedy has the further 
advantage of being less expensive to implement and monitor. 
All the government would need to do would be to announce the 
new coverage rules and savers and investors would do the 
res t . There would* however * have to be ongoing monitoring 
of the effectiveness of the terms in force* in response to 
changing market conditions, particularly with a view to
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preventing irrational bank runs. Since these two 
recommendations do not clash with each other» and have been 
so emphatically stressed by commentators» any plan which 
includd% both of these remedies should be considered likely 
to s u c c e e d . The Bush Plan is incomplete at present in that 
it does not adopt insurance r e f o r m . It d o e s , however, make 
provision for bringing in such reform very soon, pending the 
April 1991 report of a committee especially set up to study 
bank insurance. This being the state of affairs, FIRREA may 
be described as a very good first step. Although it may 
prove difficult to raise the required tangible capital to a 
level higher than 3%, stronger real—equity levels can 
probably be attained by making further accounting changes in 
future revisions of the Act » the likeliest change being a 
requirement that mortgages be carried at market. FIRREA 
does unquestionably have many shortcomings, but in spite of 
this it is a vast improvement over the previous state of 
affairs. What is important is that at long last thrift 
owners will be required to have some of their own money at 
stake, with no more accounting gimmickry being available as 
a means to evade this requirement. Hopefully insurance 
reform will be promptly adopted as well. Thus FIRREA, even 
in its present flawed state, goes a long way toward 
preventing any repeat of the unsound practices which led to 
the crisis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 4 3 -
Professor Edward K a n e , ir» the article "The Unending 
Deposit-Insurance Mess" (p p 18-20), decries the continuing 
danger of forbearances and political interference. Banking 
authority George Kaufman concurs regarding forbearance. He 
suggests that well before insolvency is reached regulators 
be absolutely required to forbid further dividend payments 
and additional loans. <N Y T , Aug 17 "09, A18) An even more 
sensitive issue is that of political interference in thrift 
affairs- There has been much public indignation at the 
efforts of a certain group of senators known as the Keating 
Five and House Speaker Jim Wright to obtain forbearance for 
certain insolvent S & L s . Professor Kane recommends requiring 
all politicians who intercede with regulators on behalf of 
any S&L to report their actions to the ethics and banking 
committees so that from time to time déterminât ion can be 
made whether any of these actions were unethical in any way* 
the likeliest impropriety being the acceptance of personal 
gifts or excessively generous campaign funding from the 
favored S&L. The mood of voters is particularly restive on 
S&L m a t t e r s . Representative St. Germain was voted out of 
office for alleged S&L improprieties* and Senator Cranston 
<D—CA>, who interceded for the notorious Charles Keating* is 
considered certain to lose his seat in the next election.
The other four members of the Keating Five* Senators McCain 
<R-AZ), DeConcini <D-A2), Riegle (D-MI) and Glenn (D-OH>, 
did not receive anywhere near as much campaign funding from
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Keating and are not blamed as much as Cranston -for getting 
regulatory favors for Keating. Although they are not 
politically crippled by the affair to the same extent as 
Cranstoh* the incident is a profound embarrassment to all of 
them. The RTC considers continuing political interference 
to be enough of a threat that it is considering keeping a 
log of all enquiries made by politicians about the 
regulatory treatment of any particular S&L, with special 
reference to sale of assets— which was a common problem in 
the HUD scandals. (W S J , Nov 6 '89, A10)
Despite certain ongoing weaknesses, such as those 
raised by Professor Kane, FIRREA is generally considered a 
promising beginning as regards prevention of future 
problems. Where FIRREA has been much less successful is in 
meeting the more immediate challenge of shutting down the 
insolvent thrifts and efficiently disposing of the seized 
a s s e t s . The two main problem areas needing amendment are 
1) an unwieldly structure of authority for thrift 
liquidation and asset disposal and 2) inadequate fund i n g .
On May 23, 1990 Treasury Secretary Brady advised Congress
that only with a vast increase in funding can the problem 
thrifts be dealt with. This new governmental frankness 
about the cost of the crisis offers hope that inadequate 
funding may not long remain a problem.
The structural problem that has most slowed down the 
first year of cleanup operations has been the existence of
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an overly powerful oversight board consisting of 
representatives of the Treasury, HUD, and the Federal 
Reserve B a n k . Such a division of power invites turf 
battles/ The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), which is 
responsible for thrift liquidations and asset dispositions 
is managed by FDIC but must also report to the Oversight 
Board, which has the power to veto directives issued by 
FDIC. According to Willi am Isaac, former chairman of F D I C , 
"The existence of the Oversight Board diffuses 
responsibility. There is no one to blame because it is a 
committee. It allows the Treasury to blame the FDIC and the 
FDIC to blame the Treasury, the Fed to duck responsibility 
and ail of them to blame the Congress." (N Y T , Feb lO '90, 
pi) In a similar vein Paulette Thomas complains that those 
who designed the bailout "sprinkled responsibility across 
the government, giving half a dozen top officials a role, 
but giving no one the final w o r d . The bailout lacks one 
'czar' to direct the charge, set the pace and resolve 
conflicts. The zeal to have prudent supervision has instead 
meant that the buck stops everywhere." (W S J , Oct 11 '09,
A 2 0 ) In early February 1990 the president of the Oversight 
Bo a r d , Daniel P. Kearney, resigned complaining that he found 
the constant interference from the Treasury to be 
intolerable. Subsequent reports indicate that the Treasury, 
sensitive to this criticism, has lessened its involvement in 
RTC affairs, but since no changes were made in the basic
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structure of command the potential for power struggles still 
exists. Although the Treasury Department was criticized as 
the main source of trouble in the controversy just 
described* there is no reason why HUD and the Federal 
Reserve could not just as easily find themselves at cross 
purposes with the RTC * given the right developments. These 
problems were deemed important enough to merit front-page 
coverage by the New York T i m e s . <March 13 '90> The Office 
of Thrift Supervision <OTS) is the normal regulator of 
thrifts. Like its banking counterpart* the Comptroller of 
the Currency, it is answerable to the Treasury. So far this 
arrangement seems to have gone smoothly enough. The RTC is 
operated by FDIC which also administers the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund < S A IF)* and there are no reports 
of administrative tangles among OTS, SAIF* FDIC or RTC. RTC 
has the privilege of regulatory override over GTS if it 
perceives a safety—and—soundness concern likely to result in 
losses to SAIF. Because it has this override* one would 
have thought RTC—OTS turf wars to be the likeliest source of 
trouble* but so far the two agencies have been models of 
cooperation. Despite the frustrating ambiguities inherent 
in such a labyrinthine a r r a n gement, most of the inter—agency 
relationships seem to be quite good.
Occasionally one encounters the opinion that FDIC is 
being spread too thin. The $2.3 trillion banking industry 
has problems of its o w n — in fact FDIC is itself bankrupt or
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nearly bankrupt— and taking care of thrift liquidations and 
asset dispositions is considered by some to be a dangerous 
distraction from the a g e n c y 's primary responsibility of 
monitoring ,the banking industry. This concern» though 
valid* has not been very widely e x pressed, and it appears 
that so f a r , at least* FDIC has been able to take on its new 
thrift duties without compromising its effectiveness in 
carrying out bank responsibilities.
Although not as grave a worry as inadequate funding or 
poor interagency structures, there has been a problem of 
excess red tape with regard to real—estate dispositions.
The rigid rules regarding real—estate pricing and bidding 
procedures are probably the direct result of HUD scandals. 
There has also been some understandab1e worry about 
depressing certain markets by suddenly dumping large amounts 
of real estate. These concerns resulted in a rule that no 
real estate could be sold for less than 95% of the appraised 
value. It is evident from the slow pace of sales, however, 
that most of the appraisals are unrealistical1 y high. 
Furthermore, it is estimated that holding a property for one 
year costs the government about 15% of the market value of 
the property. The high holding costs and the low pace of 
sales have resulted in an about-face on the 95% rule, and 
sales will now be made in many cases at much lower prices.
< WSJ. April 26 '90, B I D
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In an article entitled "RTC Should Turn Its Fire Sale 
Over to Pros" < WSJ, Feb 27 '90, A24) Ronald Utt, vice 
president of the National Chamber Foundation, expresses 
doubt that RTC has the selling skills needed to complete 
advantageous deals. He in particular decries the piece—meal 
sale of individual assets which is extremely inefficient in 
terms of transaction costs both to seller and buyer, and 
points out that costs could be minimized by selling 
properties in homogeneous bundles, e.g. motels in Te x a s , 
apartment houses in Arizona, e t c . Martin Mayer (WSJ, Nov 17 
'89, A14> likewise emphasizes the need to bundle similar 
properties together for efficient sale.
Another suggested change in sales policy would be a 
slight softening of the ethics guidelines that prohibit 
awarding any contracts to any reaI-estate companies that 
have in the past been involved in any transactions resulting 
in a loss to the Government of 450,000 or more, (WSJ , Feb 5 
'90, A 1 6 ) The unavailability of real—estate agents and
developers with perfectly clean records is particularly 
severe in certain cities. For example, RTC holds, or soon 
will hold, over 40*/. of the property in Colorado Springs. 
Virtually every major developer in that city has been 
involved in at least one questionable S&L deal. < NYT, Jan 16 
'90, Cl) Although justice, and the need to set an example, 
demand that the most egregious offenders continue to be 
blacklisted, in a situation such as the one in Colorado
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Spr i ngs pr ac ticality Mill necessitate overlooking past 
offences which were comparatively minor. Suggestion has 
been made that only those individuals or agencies whose 
actions,were fraudulent should continue to be blacklisted. 
(W S J , Feb 5 '90, A16)
In view of the large number of problem areas connected 
with sales of assets it must be admitted that FIRREA has 
overall been unsuccessful as a plan for shutting down 
thrifts and disposing of assets. However these problems are 
being corrected. Its current lack of funding is soon to be 
r e m e d i e d . Complaints about excessive red tape are resulting 
in some streamlining of sales procedures. Unfortunately the 
problem of excessive decentra1i z at i on of authority does not 
so far show any sign of being corrected. As a preventer of 
future losses FIRREA may be deemed a greater success, 
particularly since it is anticipated that a revision in 1991 
will bring in deposit— insurance reform. FIRREA already has 
resulted in far greater industry discipline since it brings 
into force fairly demanding market—value capital standards. 
Many further reforms are possible, and desirable, but since 
these two are far and away the most important FIRREA is 
successful as a preventer of future unsound practices. 
Considering all of these points, it is probably safe to say 
that FIRREA is a success, but a very flawed success. The 
political will to have a really strong and effective bailout 
bill exists now as never before, so the prospects are quite
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good that within a year there will an amended FIRREA which 
hopefully will iron out most of the problems existing in the 
present bill.
• /
The O n —Budget—O f f —Budget Debate 
The United States has a dangerously high deficit which 
has expanded to the point that the United States is now a 
net debtor nation and Americans are therefore gradually 
becoming economically answ e r a b 1e to the wealth-holders of 
other nations. To reduce this problem Congress passed the 
Gramm—Rudman—H o 11ings (G R H ) Bill which stipulates that the 
budget deficit must attain certain targets year by year and 
by 1993 the budget must be completely balanced. When the 
targets are not met the Bill requires that there be pro rata 
across-the-board spending cuts. Because the thrift crisis 
is hopefully a one-time event, argument is made that bailout 
spending should be kept off the budget altogether, or else, 
if that is not possible, such spending should be 
specifically exempted from GRH calculations.
In an eleventh—hour compromise, $30 billion of the $50 
billion approved in August 1989 was kept off budget by 
stipulating that the money would be raised by special 
bailout bonds issued by a newly set up corporation, the 
Resolution Finance Corporation (Refcorp). The annual 
interest on these bonds will be paid by the Federal 
Government and will be included in the annual budgets as 
regular spending. The "on-budget" faction points out that
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Federal debt is cheaper than agency debt such as the bonds 
issued by Refcorp. (For example, in early July 1990 Treasury 
Bills were only yielding 8.54% while Refcorp bonds were 
yielding 8.93%.) Opponents of agency financing calculate 
that over the next thirty years between four and five 
billion dollars will needlessly by paid out in interest 
because of the use of Refcorp. The "off-budget" faction 
disputes that the cost difference will really be that great 
and insists that even if true it would be well worth the 
cost to maintain GRH discipline. The same debate applies to 
the raising of working capital for the RTC, Because any 
funds advanced for working capital would be quick1y repaid 
pending the sale of seized thrift a s s e t s , there is not 
likely to be much objection to keeping such funding either 
off—budget or else exempted from GRH,
According to some authorities the "on—budget" advocates 
err in not acknowledging that a swelling of Federal Bonds 
outstanding would drive up interest rates on these 
instruments and perhaps this slight bailout— induced push, 
when applied to the vast Federal debt to be issued and 
rolled o v e r , would result in increased interest expense that 
would go a long way toward wiping out the savings achievable 
by using Treasury debt instead of Refcorp debt. According 
to Nathaniel C. N a s h , "One Treasury official calculated that 
if the Ways and Means [i.e. o n —b u d g e t ] proposal caused 
interest rates on new Treasury issues to rise one—hundredth
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of one percent» or one basis point» the Government's 
borrowing costs would rise more than $280 million annually» 
more than canceling any taxpayer savings." (N Y T » May 10 '89» 
C 2 ) Professor Robert Haney Scott of California State 
University concurs that all new Treasury debt would likely 
have to pay one extra basis point wiping out any interest 
savings applying to the thrift bonds. < NYT, April 15 '89, 
p 14) Not all experts hold this view» however. Both Bert 
Ely and Professor Kane, for example, maintain that Refcorp 
financing really does result in greater overall interest 
e x p e n s e . Since there is no proof either way » the truth 
likely likes somewhere between the two extremes.
However debatable the claims of the "on—budget" 
advocates may be regarding interest savings, they are 
certainly correct when they point out that the on-budget 
treatment gives a more realistic portrayal of economic 
reality. The Federal Government really does owe all the 
bailout money borrowed from the public, and there is no use 
pretending it does n o t . The de facto deficit is going to be 
the same no matter how the debt is disguised.
Perhaps this is merely a case of de oust ibus non est 
d i soutandum. What has been so unfortunate about this 
emotional debate is the fact that it has been » and continues 
to be, a terrible legislative distraction and was largely 
responsible for the unconscionable six—months' delay in 
passing President Bush's February 6 » 1989 initiative.
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It does not much matter how the money is raised> An 
o n —budget approach has the advantage of being more candid.
If the bailout were for certain an event of a one-time 
• m a t u r e t h e n  there could be some justification for exempting 
S&L spending from GRH calculations, but this is not really 
the case for although the thrift crisis is probably a one­
time crisis, there have always been and always will be 
numerous one-time crises which must be dealt with by the 
Federal G o v e r n m e n t . Now it is the thrift crisis that 
demands funding. In a year or two it could be nuc1ear —waste 
cleanup or some other equally expensive problem. However 
one may try to disguise the facts, debt is still debt, so 
strictly speaking it is hard even to justify the proposed 
GRH exemptions.
It could well be that a bailout income-tax surcharge 
spread over a number of years would be the best solution, if 
the surtax could be imposed without causing a recession.
Whatever financing decision is made, the essential 
thing is that funding not be held up. This is the perfect 
example of the old management adage that sometimes the wrong 
decision made promptly and decisively is better that the 
right decision made slowly and uncertainly.
Is It Appropriate For the Thrift Bailout 
To Concern Itself With Housing for the Poor?
There can be little doubt that there should be at least 
some consideration shown for providing housing for the poor
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in the bailout effort- For the sake of efficiency it is 
always a good idea to "kill two birds with one stone" 
whenever possible. It makes little sense for the government 
to s e l 1  ̂RTC-managed apartment houses for pennies on the 
dollar and then turn around and build low— income housing at 
exorbitant cost. Nor does it make economic sense for the 
government to hold on to vast surpluses of housing 
properties* at an annual carrying cost of about 15%, if the 
surplus could be relieved by selling the properties at fair 
but attractive prices to the working poor. It has always 
been government policy to relieve the problem of 
agricultural surpluses by giving surplus food to the less 
affluent, or at the very 1east selling it to them very 
cheaply. In private business as well one occasionally hears 
of donations of surplus goods to charity. So long as the 
cheap sale of surplus housing to the poor does not inflict 
materially greater cost on the bailout such activity is 
consistent with general business and government practice* 
and the OTS has already authorized the donation of certain 
hard-to—s e l 1 properties to charities and local governments 
for social purposes such as d a y —care centers and shelters 
for the homeless.
However * if concern for the poor were to divert too 
much RTC attention away from S&Ls* or result in cheap sales 
of properties that could bring good prices, then such 
activity would be inconsistent with general business and
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government practice and ought to be avoided since FIRREA is 
a thrift-bailout bill and not a welfare bill. FIRREA will 
stand a far better chance of success if it concentrates on 
thrift problems instead of trying to address a host of other 
social and consumer issues. Furthermore# it is not fair to 
these other issues to only address them "on the coattails” 
of other programs and legislation. If social and consumer 
issues have any real importance then they deserve their own 
legislation and administrative programs.
Virtually all of the experts largely agree with this 
point of view. A typical comment may be found in an 
editorial in the New York T i m e s » a publication normally 
sympathetic to social causes : "Low—cost housing is a worthy
purpose» but adding it to this bill distracts from the 
problem at hand." (N Y T » May 1 '89 $ A 14)
One social abuse likely to be closely monitored 
henceforth is red— lining* i.e. the practice of drawing a red 
line, on a m a p , around slum and near-slum neighborhoods, as 
an indication that no loans are to be approved for 
properties within the ostracized neighborhoods. On Feb. 16, 
1989, Jack Kemp, the Secretary of HUD, decried the practice 
and insisted that any bailout legislation should stipulate 
that this practice be ended. ( N YT, Feb 17 '89, p S 9 >
Mr. Kemp's permanent seat on the Oversight Board gives him 
sufficient influence to enforce this view. Politician Jesse 
Jackson has also spoken out against red-lining. (NYT, Feb 8
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’89, p30) Loan m a n a g e r s , of course, know all the 
neighborhoods in their communities, even without consulting 
any m a p s , and, unfortunately, there will likely continue to 
be some/discrimi n a tion based on irrelevant social and racial 
differences rather than legitimate credit factors, although 
hopefully the publicity given to the abuse of red— lining 
will reduce the incidence of this unfortunate practice.
In summary, then, it may be stated that the enormity of 
the thrift clean-up task precludes diverting too much 
attention to related social issues. R ed— lining, because of 
negative publicity, will now be less flagrant. In 
communities where there are numerous RTC holdings, non- 
thrift -re 1 a ted agencies will likely be set up to purchase 
bundles of housing properties for the purpose of reselling 
these to qualifying low— income citizens. Occasionally there 
will be gifts of problem properties for such purposes as 
day-care centers and homeless. It will be to the advantage 
of the bailout effort to make such nonprofit sales and gifts 
since such actions will result in lower carrying costs and 
are consistent with common business and government practices 
regarding social and charitable disposition of surplus 
inventory- It has been suggested that low— income borrowers 
be granted lower mortgage rates. There is virtually no 
expert support for such subs idization programs which do not 
in any way benefit the bailout process and therefore are 
extraneous to any thrift cleanup efforts. Many
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Many c o m m e n t a t o r s , including Brumbaugh, Bryan, Kane and Ely, 
do not mention social issues at all.
Who Have Been the Main Plavers 
In the Thrift Crisis?
The main player, and chief casualty of the crisis was 
M. Danny Wall, the last director of FSLIC and the first 
director of OTS. Demands for his resignation were centered 
on three main criticisms. First of all, he approved a 
number of deals in December 1908 which were widely and 
somewhat unfairly criticized as being overly generous. 
Second, he caved in to pressure from Charles Keating and 
removed the San Francisco examiners from the Lincoln 
examination, putting that S&L under direct Washington, D.C. 
supervision- This criticism also may be somewhat unfair in 
that FHLBB counsel Rosemary Stewart had advised Wall that 
Keating was in a strong legal position to fight orders given 
by the San Francisco office. In a D e c . 5, 1989 letter to
the Wall Street Journal (page AS3> Mr. Wall pointed out that 
"there were insufficient legal grounds back in May 1987 to 
put Lincoln in c o n s e r v a t o r s h i p , despite the recommendation 
for such action from the San Francisco examiners. My 
predecessor did not act, and by the time I  became chairman, 
the information based on the 1986 exam was stale." The 
third criticism of Mr. Wall was that he consistently 
underestimated the cost of the crisis— possibly to help 
Republicans in an election y e a r . For this deception or.
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equal ly bad» ignorance— there can be no excuse» and Robert 
Li tan of the Brookings Institute probably speaks for the 
majority of informed observers when he condemns this as 
Mr. Wald's worst failing : "I think the Lincoln affair is a 
relatively minor matter. The much greater sin, the much 
greater cost, was underestimating the size of the problem-*' 
(NYT, Dec 5 '89» A1 >
In March 1988 Mr- Wall estimated that the crisis could 
be resolved for $17 billion. In April he raised his 
estimate to $23 billion and in July he raised it to $31 
billion. Until the election in November » Mr. Wall 
maintained that the thrift industry could pay for the 
bailout without outside help » mainly by means of higher 
insurance premiums- ( WSJ, March 22 '89» A 2 ) On Dec - 16,
1988, after t^e election, he began an about-face on the 
issue of a public bailout by making a far more limited 
claim, only that no taxpayer help would be needed in fiscal 
1990. ( NYT, Dec 17 '88, pl7) Compared to contemporary
estimates made by all outside experts, all of these 
estimates were ridiculously low. Kathleen Day writes 
scathingly of Wall in an article entitled "When Hell Sleazes 
Over < Judgment Day for S&L S 1i meb alls)"- Despite its 
vivacious writing style this article is mainly only a review 
of what others have said all along- She 1ambasts Wall, 
strongly implying deliberate deception : "Why would Danny
Wall downplay the crisis to the extent of undermining his
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own credibility? H e r e 's a hint : he quit doing it shortly 
after the presidential election* suddenly* with George 
B u s h ’s victory secure* H a l l ’s S&L cleanup estimates 
miraculously matched the T r e a s u r y ’s much more alarming 
■figures." ( New R e p u b l i c * March 20 ’89, p26 >
Mr. W a 11 offers an extremely weak defense of this 
behavior : "We did not cry fire in a crowded theater* of
that w e ’re guilty. They gave us a Band-Aid and said take 
care of it until 1989. T h a t ’s what we did." < WSJ* May 1 
’09, A16)
The question may be put "what other choice did Mr. Wall 
have if his political superiors were pressuring him to 
downplay the crisis?" The answer * of course, is he could 
have resigned. He ended up having to resign anyway, and had 
he done so on a matter of principle, there would have been 
far less damage to his reputation and probably his career.
M . Danny Wall took charge of the FHLBB at an impossible 
time. No one could have succeeded. But to make the best of 
a bad situation he should have made a protest resignation 
rather than cooperating with a "don’t—make—waves" policy 
that he should have known was sure to backfire.
If the S&L crisis was the undoing of M r . Wall, it 
brought considerable praise and honor to M r . W a l l ’s nemesis, 
Texas Representive Henry Gonzalez, a Democrat.
Mr, G o n z a l e z ’ impressive performance as head of the House 
Banking Committee proved to be something of a surprise
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since, according to the New York Times < Nov 11 '80, p29) he
had formerly been a " less— than—engaged member of the 
[bank i n g ] co m m i t t e e . ..not versed on the intricacies of 
bank ing law." The Wall Street J o u r n a l 's description of 
Mr. Gonzalez as a "touchy eccentric” < July 19 '89, A 16 ) 
makes his success even more to be wondered at. Although he 
was disappointed on one issue long dear to his heart, major 
subsid i zat ion of housing for the p o o r , he was successful in 
fending off thrift lobbyists who wanted to weaken many of 
the requirements of FIRREA. A fitting testimonial was given 
by Representative Jim Leach <R— lA) ; "You have enormous 
antagonism towards Gonzalez, but my own view is that for all 
his faults, public policy is well served by his 
persistence." ( NYT, Nov 18 '09, Sec 3 p 4 )
Another individual who received much favorable 
publicity because of the crisis is William Seidman, head of 
FDIC and chairman of SAIF. Mr- Seidman has also received 
considerable criticism by some who regard him as a 
pub 1icity—seeker and not a good team player. Although 
President Bush does not have the authority to ask for 
Mr. Seidman's resignation, he has clearly shown that he would 
like to receive it by publicly announcing who M r . Seidman's 
successor will be. Because the septuagenarian Mr. Seidman 
has a long, excellent record as a bank regulator, he enjoys 
great favor and influence with C o n g r e s s , which by no means 
shares Mr. B u s h ’s cool sentiments towards M r . Seidman. In
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f ac t twenty-three members of the House Banking Committee 
effectively chastised Mr. Bush in the Seidman affair by 
sending Mr. Bush a letter warning him not to pressure 
Mr. Seidman into r e s i g n i n g . The general opinion of Congress 
was well expressed in the remarks of Henry Gonzalez who 
said* "The Administration will be foolish to let the 
services of Bill Seidman slip away just because his straight 
talk ruffles some political feathers. Seidman has great 
credibility with members of Congress and the American 
public. The Administration will be in dire need of all the 
credibility it can muster in coming months as the costs 
mount for taxpayers." (N Y T . May 2 '90* Al> Influential
House member * Charles Schumer (D - N Y ) , recently wrote in the 
New York T i m e s * "I recommend to Mr. Bush that he make a very 
humble phone call t o ..L . William Seidman..and beg him to 
remain in his j ob....M r . Bush ought to realize— fast —  that 
he cannot afford to lose h i m . " (N Y T * July 24 '90* AIS)
Mr. S e i d m a n ’s great influence with Congress was used during 
the shaping of FIRREA to ensure that the bill would expedite 
sound banking, and according to some* a 1 so to ensure that 
Mr. Seidman would have as much authority as possible. 
According to Bert Ely, "What Seidman has been doing is 
trying to grab as much power as he can. It’s a story of 
bureaucratic aggrandizement." ( See M a h a r , B a r r o n 's * Sept 11 
'09, p22.> According to American Banker * "People are just 
fed up with what they regard not as legitimate policy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-162-
differences but as an ego trip." (July 10 '89* pi) Although
comments such as these are negative» they in no way suggest 
incompetence or ethical impropriety. Furthermore» it must 
be acknowledged that many of the most talented people» if 
not exactly eccentric, at least may be considered 
"characters". Perhaps Mr. Seidman is one of these. In any 
c a s e , it is hard to sympathize with the administration's 
coolness to Mr. Seidman when one reads that "Through months 
of frustration and provocation» Seidman has never lost his 
political cool— even when he c o u l d n ’t get an audience with 
the President. Several months ago he apparently asked to 
meet with President Bush to warn him that the problem was 
ballooning. His request was turned d o w n , according to the 
National Journal, a Washington—based publication." (See 
Mahar » B a r r o n ’s » April 30 '90, pll) No matter how busy the
President may be, it is deeply disappointing that he would 
not meet with the person most central to the cleanup of the 
greatest financial crisis of the last ha If-century » the very 
crisis upon which he is blaming his v o 1te-face on the no- 
new—taxes pledge. In summary » then » it may be said that it 
appears that William Seidman has some personality 
characteristics which make him appear egotistical to some , 
but according to many observers he is, with his long 
successful record » by far the best qualified person in the 
nation to manage the bailout. Hopefully he will receive
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■full Support until he himself decides to retire---- which may
not be for another year and a half.
Not yet fully deserving inclusion on this list is Neil
B u s h , youngest son of President Bush. Apparently Neil
Bush's c o n f 1ict—o f — intere s t improprieties at Silverado were 
fairly minor, and owing more to naivete than dishonesty. 
Nevertheless, because he is the President's son he is 
susceptible to being negatively exploited in thirty-second 
"sound-bite" political a d s . The Democrats are still 
smarting from what they regard as the unethical use of such 
negative ads in the campaign against Dukakis, in particular 
the "Willie Horton" ad which suggested that Dukakis was soft 
on crime. Depending on what the Democrats are able to come 
up with regarding Neil Bush, they may be able to launch a 
negative "thirty—second—s p o t " ad campaign of their own.
Mr. Seidman has still not decided whether SAIF will bring a 
civil lawsuit against Neil Bush. Even if this were to 
occur, by no stretch of the imagination can Neil Bush be 
considered one of the major players in the crisis, but in 
spite of this, he may become one of the best known.
If the S&L crisis has a villain it is Charles H. 
Keating, Jr. Lincoln is only one of hundreds of insolvent 
S&Ls, and it is very unfair to try to make Keating a 
scapegoat for the whole crisis- Although the Lincoln 
failure is expected to be the costliest at $2 billion, there 
are several others that rival it, most notably Sunbelt of
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Dal las, and Centrust of M i a m i , at about $2 billion and $1.7 
billion respectively. Like Lincoln» bo th of these thrifts 
have been brought to ruin by unethical mana g e r s . The 
President of Sunbelt» Edwin T . McBirney III, has been 
indicted on seventeen counts of bank fraud. The president 
of C e n t r u s t , a certain David Paul» is no less a person of 
notorious reputation» having lived a sybaritic existence 
complete with a painting by Rubens provided for his personal 
delectation by Centrust. However » neither Mr. McBirney* nor 
the pampered Mr. Paul can begin to arouse public ire as 
Charles Keating can. Keating has been so flagrant» so 
brazen » so materialistic» and so hypocritical that he has 
come to symbolize all the S&L evils. K e a ting’s excessive 
materialism unmistakably reveals itself in the Phoenician 
Inn » a hotel erected by Keating in suburban Phoenix which is 
lavish almost to the point of vulgarity. He used insured 
deposits to pay his 26—year—oId son a salary of nearly a 
million dollars a y e a r . <See Zuckerman » U.S. News and World
Report» June 18 ’90, p92.) He is an avid and outspoken
religious fundamentalist and yet he has a long history of 
deception and shady dealings. (See Stein, "What Investors 
Never Knew— Ugly Facts About Charles Keating Were Not 
Disclosed", B a r r o n ’s , April 16 ’90, p6-> Constantly suing
regulators and threatening to sue t h e m , he cowed all but the 
most stalwart. Not only was he a master of intimidation 
tactics, he also knew how to use the power of the purse.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 6 5 -
donating millions to politicians at all levels of government 
< See B o r g e r » "The Man Who Tried to Buy Washington"» U . S .
News and World Report, Nov 27 '89.) Mike Patriarca» the San 
Francisto regulator who was removed by Mr, Wall from the 
Lincoln audit has s a i d , concerning the efforts of the 
Keating Five» "I can tell you for a fact there aren’t any of 
the largest banks in the country who can get two senators in 
a room together to argue with its regulator about the 
examination. I think that this meeting is an example of 
some extraodinary political influence» the likes of which 
I ’ve never seen in my career." < NYT, Nov 4 ’89» pi) When
asked once whether he thought his money affected the actions 
of politicians Keating replied, "I certainly hope so." When 
former FHLBB chairman Edwin Gray started to be an 
inconvenience, Keating unsuccessfully tried to get rid of 
him as a regulator by hiring him for $300,000 a year. <NYT » 
Nov 9 ’89» A 1) Keating continues to give interviews, even
with national publications such as Time (with Margaret 
Car 1s o n , April 9 ’90) and the Wall Street Journal and in an
affable and disarming style, which no doubt dupes many of 
the uninformed, he portrays himself as the innocent victim 
of vindictive regulators.
There is no disputing the fact that operators such as 
Keating are u n 1 i k a b le, ruthless and difficult individuals, 
but it misses the point to blame the crisis on these fast 
operators. That type of person is always going to exist in
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society» and perhaps these people really cannot help being 
the way they are. If this is true » there is no use blaming 
them— the fault is society's for negligently allowing 
cond i t ions to arise in which these people can so freely 
pursue their predatory impulses. Fraud and embezzlement 
"^ust be punished if social order is to be maintained» but 
the search for industry improvement must be based on 
improved structure and regulation rather than hoped-for 
changes in human nature.
If Char les Keating is the main thrift villain» the main
thrift hero— and martyi has been former FHLBB chairman
Edwin G r a y . In sharp contrast to Danny W a 11» who cooperated 
with Keating» Gray fought him fiercely. Mr. Gray's few 
detractors point out that he made his share of mistakes in 
his years as chairman, but his host of admirers paint a 
portrait of an extremely concerned and sincere individual 
whose inconvenient penchant for telling the truth earned him 
nothing but scorn and animosity. Mr. Gray a number of years 
ago gave realistic estimates of the size of the crisis. 
According to his friends» the burgeoning crisis became a 
personal obsession and he would talk about it on the ' phone 
late at night for hours on end- He became more and more 
frustrated as the political cooperation necessary for a 
c 1ampdown was persistently withheld. According to Nathaniel 
C. Nash » " M r . Gray » an advocate of strong regulation, was 
pressed by the White House chief of staff, Donald T. Regan,
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dur ing the Reagan Administration to resign, but he did not. 
When his term expired in June 1987, he was not renominated. " 
( NY%, Nov 3 '89, A1 ) Whatever mistakes Mr. Gray may have
made in^ his c a r e e r , of one thing there can be no doubt : he
is a man of exceptional character. The normal reaction to
such a lack of appreciation would be to say, "To heck with
them! 1 tried to tell them but they w o u l d n ’t listen! Let 
them find out the hard way!" And when one considers that at 
the very time there was this frustrating lack of 
appreciation, Charles Keating was waiting with open arms and 
an offer of $300,O O O , it becomes plain that Mr. Gray —
regardless of his technical skills as a banking regulatoi---
is clearly a man of the highest principles- Studying the 
S&.L crisis can leave one with a deeply pessimistic 
impress ion of human nature. It is certainly refreshing to 
1earn about someone like Ed G r a y . Some feel Mr. G r a y ’s 
virtues have been somewhat exaggerated, but none will deny 
that this public servant, unapprec i ated and unpopular as he 
w a s , has long since been vindicated.
The same favorable comments cannot be made about the 
United States League of Savings Institutions, which has come 
out of the crisis as one of the most detested organ i z at i ons 
in American business. The hatred now felt for the League is 
so intense it sometimes verges on paranoia. An editorial in 
New Reoublic entitled "S&L Hell Revisited" declares that 
lobbyists from the League "should be treated literally as
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untouchab 1 es $ ar\y member of Congress who so much as has 
lunch with one of them should be publicly flogged-." (June 
26 '09, pV) Eric H e m e 1, of First Boston Corporation, s a y s , 
"After it stops breathing I'd wait lO minutes before I 
declared the league dead." (W S J , March 7 '89, A 1 ) All S&Ls 
under the control of RTC are forbidden to belong to the 
L e a g u e . (NYT, July 4 '89, pS9) Because until the recent
past nearly all thrifts have been members of the L e a g u e , and 
because S&Ls have been prominent and influential businesses 
in nearly every community, the League has in the past 
enjoyed great influence with politicians, and this influence 
has been strengthened by the efforts of well financed thrift 
lobbyists, the most notorious of whom was a certain Mr. J. 
Freeman, better known as "Snake" Freeman. The League until 
very recently was so influential that for all intents and 
purposes it wrote its own regulatory legislation and named 
its own regulators, which resulted in an unhealthily close 
"revo1Ving—d o o r ” situation reminiscent of similar problems 
which occurred a few years ago in the procurement department 
at the Department of Defense. Because the same people 
shuffled back and forth from executive positions in the 
League to executive positions in the FHLBB and state 
agencies, strict, disinterested enforcement was compromised. 
Former Comptroller of the Currency John G . Heimann has said 
that "the regulators [of the thrift industry] were closer to
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"the r egu 1 a ted than in any other industry in America." < NYT» 
June 6 '90, A 1 >
Because the League campaigned for, and received, many 
1 it'*^ regu 1 ations it has now been held to account as one 
o-f the major contributors to the thrift crisis. When the 
chairman of the League attempted to make a suggestion at 
bailout hearings he was bluntly told by one senator, "You 
have no credibility here today." (N Y T . March 8 '89, p29> 
Occasionally a commentator describes the League as "still- 
m i g h t y " , "still—p o w erfu1" or "not to be underestimated"; the 
fact of the matter is that it is now thoroughly discredited 
and its influence is greatly on the wane. To the amazement 
of many long-time observors the League was not able to exert 
much influence on FIRREA. Robert M . Garsson describes the 
rescue as "historic not only in the size of the problem it 
addressed but in the way it brushed aside the lobbying 
efforts of the once—powerful thrift industry.” (American 
Banker. July 31 '89, pl2> Hopefully the League will be able
to rehabilitate itself and earn the respect of the financial 
and general community, so that it can in the future play a 
more positive liaison role between the industry and both the 
government and the general public.
The thrift crisis is so dispersed and so vast that it 
cannot be fairly represented by these few individuals along 
with this one organization. However the individuals and 
organization just described have to a great degree captured
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- 1 7 0 -
the imagin â t iort of the public and symbolically at least may 
be considered the principal players in the crisis.
Should the Government Renounce the 
"Give-away" Deals Made in 1988?
Although some of the sales of government—held thrifts 
in December 19B8 were unduly favorable to the buyers» and 
aroused a furor in Congress » few commentators recommend 
abrogating these sales. Most observors feel that to do so 
would be counter—product i ve since future thrift buyers would 
not trust the government and would therefore not be willing 
to deal with it. With fewer interested buyers sales would 
have to be made at extremely low prices and this would cost 
the government more than it could gain by renegotiati ng the 
December 1988 deals. With this in mind Comptroller General 
Bowsher suggested that when possible unfavorable terms 
should be renegotiated and yet "stopped short of advising 
Congress to cancel the contracts» saying that would set a 
dangerous precedent." < NYT » March 13 ^89» p 2 5 ) Nathaniel C. 
Nash writes» "Few in and outside Government actually believe 
Congress or the President will abrogate the contracts signed 
in 1988 with investors. They warn that such an action would 
set a very bad p r e c e d e n t , severely disrupting confidence in 
the validity of Government contracts." (NYT» Feb 11 89»
pl8)
Even if abrogation were a viable alternative, however » 
it is doubtful whether a cancellation of these sales would
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pcii; tHe go v e m m e n t  in much bet ter a position with regard to 
S&.L dispositions- Those who condemn Mr. Wall and his staff 
for the supposedly bad deals which they struck forget the 
terrible conditions under which the Bank Board labored. The 
FHLBB had virtually no money and the thrifts that needed to 
be sold had a negative net worth, i.e. money had to be spent 
on them before before any rational buyer would consider 
purchasing them even for a price of one dollar. Since the 
FHLB did not have the cash to bring the seized S&Ls up to a 
saleable condition, the only way they could dispose of these 
thrifts was to make whatever concessions they could to 
compensate the purchasers for whatever expenditures would be 
necessary to bring up to zero the net market value of the 
purchased institution. Far and away the strongest selling 
point available to the FHLBB was the 100% transferability to 
the purchaser of the past taxable income losses of the 
purchased thrift. The tax code only allowed this lucrative 
tax break until December 31, 1908, so it is not surprising
that there was a flurry of sales late in 1980.
Although these sales were condemned as give-aways, once 
this tax break expired very few additional purchasers came 
forward. Therefore actual market experience has shown that 
generally speaking the terms of those sales were no more 
favorable than what was necessary to make the sales. There 
w a s , however , one deal that was exceptional ly unfavorable
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the sale of First Texas Gibraltar S&L to Ronald Perelman. 
According to Willi am E . S h e e 1i ne :
"Perelman invested $315 million, $155 million 
of it b o r r o w e d . Less than a week after closing 
the deal, he sold $2 billion of the thrift's 
assets for a loss, mainly mortgage—backed 
securities. One investment banker familiar with 
the transaction estimates that this generated 
about $200 million of losses for tax purposes.
The red ink saved Perelman $135 million of tax he 
otherwise would have had to pay. T h a t ’s an 84% 
return on his equity capital in the first ninety 
days of the deal. Does he face any risks on the 
transaction? Says an expert : * The only one is
that he can't run an S&L on a 2 50—basis—point 
spread, which is unlikely since even the mediocre 
guys can make a buck on a lOO-point spread.'"
("The Screwiest S&L Bailout Ever", For tune, June 
19 '89, pl22)
There can be no excuse for careless deal—making such as 
this. Fortunately it appears to be the only really 
scandalously bad large—scale deal, so there probably would 
be little economic justification for a blanket renunciation 
of the December 1988 agreements.
One exception, however , may be the sale of Bluebonnet 
S&L of Dallas to James M . Fail of Phoenix for $97 million 
less than the highest bid. Senator Metzenbaum <D-OH> has 
made this particular sale a cause c e l e b r e . The FHLBB 
apparently was so busy in December 1988 that it did not 
adequately check Mr. F a i l ’s background, which includes a 
1976 admission of fraud on the part of a company owned by 
M r . Fail, admitted by Mr. Fail, and in the same year a 
personal indictment of fraud, later dropped, but not 
mentioned by Mr. Fail in his application- Since Mr. Fail
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Mâs a staunch "financial supportair of the Republican party 
there is at least some appearance of impropriety in his 
having obtained the thrift despite the existence of a much 
better t i d . Bluebonnet has been highly profitable and has 
already received a $250 million installment of bargained—for 
federal aid. Although the loss to the taxpayer will be far 
less than in the Perelman d e a l , the ethics problem* 
particularly the concealment of past fraud* makes the 
Bluebonnet deal a likely candidate for reversal * and such 
action would probably be well accepted as fair by the 
business community, and therefore would not undermine the 
Federal Government's reputation as a bona fide bargainer.
Considerable controversy has also been expressed 
concerning many of the guarantees and concessions granted in 
the 1a te— 1988 deals. These include indemnification of any 
clean—up expenses in the event that any of the S&L 
properties are found to be contaminated with toxic waste 
( WSJ* Jan 13 '89, A 1 > ; a lO-year guarantee of a minimum
stream of profits on designated thrift properties <NYT *
March 11 '89, p7); permission to open a new thrift to which
nonperforming assets could be transferred— the idea being 
that the new thrift would soon fold and become the 
responsibility of the government, leaving the original 
thrift with its selected assets unaffected by the losses at 
the newly created thrift < WSJ, Jan 23 '90, A18)j guarantees 
against losses in performing assets caused by adverse
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movements in interest rates (See Stein, B a r r o n ' s , Feb 20 
8*?» p7>; the issuance of high-yielding promissory notes, 
usually of a ten—year duration, to purchasers to cover the 
negative net worth of the thrift being sold.
Although the slow pace of sales in the past year and a 
half suggests that these controversi a 1 bonuses may have been 
DBcessary to attract b u y e r s , there is no ethical reason why 
the thrift a g e n c y , now much better funded, should not 
improve its position as much as it c a n . Congressman Schumer 
has pointed out that if the Federal Government were to 
explicitly back only certain notes (presumably those paying 
less interest) then all the other notes would plunge in 
market value enabling the Government to retire them through 
open—market purchase. (W S J , Feb 15 ' 89, A3) Such unusual
guarantees as indemnification against toxic—waste cleanup 
are unlikely to result in inordinately great expense for the 
Government and perhaps are acceptable public policy if they 
expedite sales- Nor are the pocket charters which were 
granted likely to create much difficulty. The stiffer 
tang ible—cap i t a 1 requirements imposed by FIRREA make it most 
unlikely that such charters will ever be exercised for the 
purpose of establishing dumping—grounds for bad assets. As 
Stuart Root, the former director of FSLIC, has pointed out, 
the negotiators of the 1988 deals had the foresight to make 
provision for optional advance payouts of the ten—year notes
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as well as optional repurchase of guaranteed assets. <WSJ . 
March 13 '89, A 1 6 )
The Oversight Board has addressed the issue of 
guaranteed profits on assets by stipulating that purchasers 
given only six months to decide whether to return a 
given a s s e t . The 1988 deals generally guaranteed a stream 
of profits for ten years. Because many properties cannot be 
accurately appraised buyers do of necessity assume 
considerable risk and justly demand compensation for this 
r isk—assumpt ion in terms of an adjusted purchase price. The 
Government finds it advantageous to relieve the buyer of 
this r i s k —assumpt i o n , and this is achieved by the stream—o f — 
payments guarantees and/or return-of-assets privilege.
Whi le ten years seems an unnecessar i 1 y long period for such 
g u a r a n t e e s , six months is certainly too short, since many 
real—estate projects < some in need of completion) are based 
on zoning and/or development plans which may depend upon 
government or business decisions requiring two or three
years for finalization common delays being litigation,
public hearings and the need to obtain confirmation from 
other levels of g o v e r n m e n t . Because of these complications 
it would be fairer to allow a purchaser two or three years 
to exercise the return option. William Seidman has 
suggested that the six—months policy be changed. (W5J , Feb 1 
'90, A14 ) The tax breaks still existing in 1908— now
expired while questionable public policy were the result of
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provisions in the tax code and not subject to alteration by 
banking authorities.
In summary * it may be stated that with the exception of 
the Perelman sale» the controversia1 deals struck late in 
1988 were probably not o u 1 1and i shly generous » for once the 
sales conditions were made less favorable further sales 
ceased. Outright abrogation» even of the Perelman deal » is 
not to be recommended in that it would undermine the 
Government's future bargaining credibility. If Senator 
Metzenbaum's ethics case against the deal with James M. Fail 
is as strong as it now appears to be, then the public good 
would probably be best served by making an exception in this 
one case and reversing the sale. Since the agency is now 
better f u n d e d , and since provision was made right at the 
outset for advance payout and repurchase options, these 
should be exercised whenever this would be financially 
advantageous to the Go v e r n m e n t .
Is There Any Advantage to Maintaining 
A Separate Thrift Industry?
On this point there is virtually unanimous agreement 
among experts that the time has come to merge S&Ls into the 
banking industry. The advocates of this position point out 
that h o m e —mortgage loans are now quite freely offered at a 
variety of financial institutions, so there is no longer any 
justification for maintaining a separate banking system 
devoted to making mortgage loans. Merging thrifts and banks
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wou 1 d cut dow n  on administrative e x p e n s e , since only one 
insurer and one regulatory agency would need to be 
m a i n t a i n e d  where now there are t w o . The only dissenter 
among the experts is Paul Volcker who has said, "I think 
there is a future for the indu s t r y ...the institutions that 
have conce n t r a t e d  on home lending have done quite 
well... they should have a f u t u r e . " (N Y T , Feb 8 ’89, p30)
Far more typical is the view of Robert Li tan, who said, 
"Danny's Ci.e. Danny W a 11's ] successor should realize that 
it is his place to phase out this industry and this a g e n c y ." 
< NYT, Dec 10 '09, Sec 4, pi) On February 17, 1990 the New
Vork Times, normally sympathetic to consumer causes, stated 
editorially that the thrift industry “has outlived its 
original function," (p 16) The W a 11 Street Journal 
editorially agreed on April 2, 1990, stating that "in the
current financial environment there is no public-policy 
justification whatever for a separate and distinct Savings 
and Loan industry. The good thrifts should become banks, or 
perhaps in some cases financial firms without deposit 
insurance. The rest should be put out of their misery with 
the least damage to anyone else." (page A 14) Lowell Bryan, 
writing in the Washington Post , noted:
"Many outside observors have come to believe 
that there remains no useful distinction between 
the sav i n g s —and — loan and c o m m e r c i a 1 —bank 
industries. Commercial banks have become very 
c o mmitted to the housing and real—estate 
industries? indeed r e a l —estate loans now exceed 
commercial and industrial loans as the largest 
category of loans on c o m m e r c i a 1—bank balance
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sheets. M e a n w h i le, savings and loans have used 
■their expanded powers to look more and more like 
b a n k s . And the securitization of mortgages has 
dramatically expanded the role of n o n —d e p o s i tory 
i i^st i tutions (e.g. pension funds» insurance 
companies, individuals, etc.) in the finance of 
residential m o r t g a g e s .
"Moreover » many feel that the nation suffers 
by having two overlapping sets of deposit— 
insurance regulation. Essentially we have two 
sets of players both of whom are funded by 
federally insured deposits, which play by 
different sets of rules...This makes no sense."
( "Rx for S&Ls : M e r c y - K i 11 the S i c k e s t " ,
November 20, 1 9 8 G , page D 1 >
In a similar vein, David Q. Beim states, "Thrifts 
helped house America, but times have c h a n g e d . Rather than 
cling to the failed patterns of the past, we must move 
a h e a d . The destiny of healthy thrifts is to become banks; 
the destiny of insolvent thrifts is to be liquidated." 
("Beyond the Savings — a nd—Loan Crisis", The Public Interest . 
Spring 1989, p Q 8 )
When virtually all the top experts seem to speak 
withone voice, it is not likely that they can be far 
w r o n g .
Would It Be Possible to Disband 
The Thrift Industry at This Time?
In terms of political influence, thrifts, for the first 
time in history, are bankrupt. The reaction of Congress and 
the public to the crisis has been so negative that the 
disbanding of the industry would be favorably viewed by many 
as the one sure g u arantee that there will never again be a 
multi-billion-dollar thrift crisis. As late as 1988 this
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s t a temert t could no t have been made # but over the l as t two 
years, as the losses have been tallied, public sentiments 
toward this industry have soured.
' i
Why It Mi oh t Be Advantageous to Temporarily 
Postpone Shutting Down the Thrift Industry 
Because there is currently such a strong emotional 
backlash against thrifts it might be wise, simply on general 
principle, to postpone taking any irreversible actions until 
the danger has passed that irrational emotions may have 
compromised the decision-making process. In other w o r d s , 
although it seems very likely, in the light of expert 
opinion, that the S&L industry and the banking industry 
ought to be m e r g e d , it might be prudent to allow a cooling- 
off period before making the final decision, just in case 
thrifts, despite their current low reputation, still have 
something distinct to offer society.
Home ownership is still the American dream- There 
seems to be little dispute that generally speaking home 
ownership is conducive to psychological contentment, lower 
crime rates, and a better sense of belonging to the 
community. The Government of the United States must 
consider hom e  ownership to be a worthwhile social g o o d , or 
else it would not encourage home ownership by allowing 
m ortgage interest to be fully deducted from income for tax 
purposes. If the Government is willing to forego vast tax 
revenues to p r o mote home ownership then it cannot be
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cons i der ed inconsistent or u n r e a s o n a b 1e to maintain a 
sepa r a t e  housing-related banking industry if this also 
promo t e s  home o w n e r s h i p .
O në factor that suggests that thrifts may become less 
necessary in the future is the upward shift in the average 
age of the American population. Most of the "baby boomers" 
have reached or passed the age when they are likeliest to be 
in the market for a h o m e . The "baby b u s t e r s " are going to 
find that in most parts of the country residential real 
estate will be a buyer's market- After discounting for 
inflation, the real price of residential property is 
expected to steadily decline for the foreseeable future.
For this reason it will be less and less urgent that a 
separate industry be maintained to provide financing for 
hous i n g .
Furthermore, risk-related capital standards are 
expected to help assure that adequate housing financing will 
continue to be available, since the more loans for owner- 
occupied homes there are at a given b a n k , the less owner 
capital will be required.
When one considers these two factors, the one 
demographic and the other financial, it would certainly 
appear that in the future there will be less need for 
thrifts than there has bee n  in the p a s t .
The problem with projections such as these is that they 
are at this time only expectations. The amount of caution
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the government shows in demanding an adequate cooling—off 
i od b efore taking final action should be commensurate 
with the importance society attaches to personal home 
ownersh;^p. Because FIRREA does require that 70% of thrift 
loans be housing related, a surviving thrift industry will 
give stronger assurance of continued mor tgage funding than 
can be provided by the housing incentives built into the 
newly adopted risk-related capital standards which only 
enc o u r a g e  home lending, but do not stipulate that any 
required percentage of loans be for housing. And 
furthermore, if there is any kind of debt that in terms of 
volume can justify its being the object of a specialized 
industry, it is mortgage debt. According to Jonathan E.
Gray of Sanford E- Bernstein & Company :
"By comparison, no other sector of the market 
comes close. Mortgage debt is five times the size 
of bank loans ($600 billion), four times the size 
of consumer credit ($700 billion), and four times 
the size of the corporate bond market ($760 
billion). Whether mortgage investment is done 
through a separate industry called the thrift 
industry or through the banking s y s t e m , the thrift 
funct i o n  will persist as the largest and most 
impor tant sec tor of the fi nanc iai system." ( NYT,
Jan 1 '89, pi)
John R. Cranford, writing in Congress ional Quarterly > 
raises d oubts that the huge thrift industry could be shut 
down without reducing the supply of mortgage funding.
Mr. Cranford notes that "thrifts still generate 49% of all 
mortgages, a task that could not be transferred overnight to 
banks, mort g a g e  companies, and other financial institutions
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without shrinking the supply of mortgages and driving up 
their costs to b o r r o w e r s ." (Aug 12 '89, p 2 1 14) If 
Mr. Cranford is correct on this point then society has all 
the more reason to demand a fairly long period of study 
b efore disbanding the industry.
Because there is considerable doubt that thrifts should 
even be allowed to continue playing their traditional 
mortgage role» it may seem out of the question to propose 
expanding their lending role» but if it is deemed good 
public policy to maintain a double banking system » the one 
purely for profit, the other mainly to cater to loans for 
socially desirable expenditures, then argument can be raised 
that not only housing should be catered to by this second
set of b a n k s  which would be S&Ls by that or some other
n a m e — but other socially desirable loans could also be made
at these b a n k s  perhaps even loans for education and
durables of a non-frill nature. While it might seem logical 
to include these other socially desirable loans with housing 
loans it is not likely in the aftermath of the thrift crisis 
that S&Ls will soon receive any extra privileges. They will 
be lucky if they are allowed to stay in business at all, and 
it would be unrealistic to hope for any expanded powers 
within the next ten years or so, although in the distant 
future it is possible that the suggestion made above might 
a d v a n t a g e o u s 1 y be adopted, assuming a separate S&L industry 
still ex i s t s .
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A very good reason for maintaining a second set of 
 ̂s that there is really no way of knowing for sure 
that at some time in the future there may not be an extreme 
shor t a g e  of capital. If this occurs rational lenders will 
p u rsue the highest interest earnings and will not concern 
themselves with promoting social g o o d s . The result could be 
that the only people able to afford to borrow money would be 
those who intend to use the funds to earn money (i.e. 
commercial loans) or those borrowing small amounts for 
consumer p u r c h a s e s — the small size of the loan guaranteeing 
that the interest charges, even at near-usur ious r a t e s , 
could still be easily paid out of the b o r r o w e r ’s monthly 
paycheck. If there is an extreme shortage of lendable 
capital home buyers may not find affordable mortgages 
available since a lender would be far better off making 
h i g h —earning loans such as c redit—card loans to compulsive 
spenders unaware of and unconcerned about the usurious rates 
they are paying- If the government feels that the purchases 
made with these high — interest loans, such as business 
projects of a venture nature, or consumer goods purchased on 
revolving charge accounts, are of less social benefit to the 
nation than good housing it may consider it good public 
policy to intervene in some way in favor of housing. Such 
intervention, whatever its form, will be easier to implement 
and probably more effective if it can be directed across the 
board to a separate and intact h o u s i ng—related banking
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industry instead of being parcelled out only to some 
d epart m e n t s  within a commercial bank and not to others.
Such intervention, of course, need not be outright 
subsidization, but can as easily consist of the granting of 
various competitive advantages. For example, recent 
advantages enjoyed by thrifts have included permission to 
make direct investments in real estate (as opposed to being 
limited to acquiring real estate only through seizure of 
collateral), permission to o w n , or be owned by, real-estate 
or securities firms, and permission to directly market on 
their premises products of related corporations. If 
interest rates were to sky-rocket as a result of a shortage 
of lendable capital then more radical actions could be 
taken, such as allowing interest income earned on deposits 
at thrifts to be tax free ; this would permit thrifts to pay 
b e l o w —market rates to savers, and charge below—market rates 
on house mortgages. If there were no separate thrift 
industry then the government would no longer have available 
the segregated banking structure which would so greatly 
facilitate the implementation of any such promotional 
ac t i V i t i e s .
In spite of these precautionary remarks, it would be 
irresponsible to propose propping up the thrift industry 
forever, no matter how unnecessary thrifts prove to be. The 
key to the proper r e s o lution of this question is to maintain 
an open mind- If, as the critics s u g g e s t , there will be
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amp 1e mor tgage funds available from other sources» and the 
government » because of this ample availability of housing 
it* does not need to grant the industry any particular 
favors » ,then assuming the critics are right that thrifts are 
redundant » thrifts will one by one shut down due to lack of 
business» since» if they are redundant, then by definition 
they will not be the low-cost providers of housing finance.
The advocates of forced thrift — industry shutdown claim 
to favor reliance on free market forces for the provision of 
housing financing. T h e r e f o r e , by this very reasoning, if 
thrifts really are redundant then there should be no need 
for the government to formally shut down this industry since 
the m a r k e tplace itself will do so. The experts contend that 
it is costly to maintain an extra regulatory structure, but 
this cost is not prohibitively high if there is any 
lingering question that such an expenditure might now or in 
the future expedite a worthy social goal. If there is any 
danger that in the future there might be a shortage of 
lendable capital, then it might be prudent to leave in 
place, e s p e cially now that the losses have been largely 
s t e m m e d , a structure that specializes in and promotes home 
lending. Of course the experts are very likely correct. 
There probably is really no need for a separate thrift 
industry and time will likely bear this out. But just in 
case » due to un f o r e s e e n  developments, there is, it might be 
wise to err on the side of caution and not allow any
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disbanding of the industry to be the result merely of 
government f i a t , but instead only allow the decision to be 
made by the American public itself, as it expresses itself 
in a fr^ e  marketplace.
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